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国有商业银行监管问题研究

The Research about the State-owned Commercial Bank Supervision

【作者】 高明辉

【导师】 王彩波;

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 , 公共管理, 2004, 硕士

【摘要】 银行监管就是力争在鼓励银行提高服务质量、激发竞争活力与维持该行业清偿力与稳定性之间寻求一种最优的权衡。由于市场的不完全性以及银行金融机构所提供的产品的公共性,在市场失灵和信息不对称的情况下,政府有必要对银行金融机构进行外部监管。因此银行监管是一种基于市场行为与法律行为之间的一种政府行为。相对于证券、保险行业,银行业对社会稳定的影响明显偏高,尤其是国有商业银行占有大部分的金融资源,对中国银行业几乎成垄断之势,对社会政治经济的稳定影响尤为突出。因此我国政府银行监管部门对国有商业银行的监管一方面是由于市场的不完全性,即金融市场失灵。另一方面是由于国有商业银行目前在经营上陷入困境,蕴含巨大的经营风险,如果国有商业银行的问题无法得到圆满解决,势必会对我国的经济发展造成巨大的危害。基于这两个主要原因,促使政府监管部门必须对国有商业银行进行严格监管,以降低其风险,<WP=49>减小由于国有商业银行风险可能带来的对社会经济的破坏性,保护存款人利益。我国国有商业银行的监管职权一直由人民银行行使,2003年4月28日开始由银行业监督管理委员会独立行使银行监管职能。银行监管职能从人民银行分离,在一定程度上赋予了银行监管部门更大的独立性,有利于银行监管部门更好地履行职责,保护存款人利益,维护银行业的安全与稳定,提高社会福利。银监会成立之初即确定了国有商业银行的监管重点,针对各家国有商业银行不良贷款比例居高不下的问题,以审慎的监管原则,推行全面的风险管理,促进各家国有商业银行加强内部管理,深化改革,努力增强竞争力,督促各家国有商业银行提高经营透明度,以及时高效的现场检查和科学严谨的非现场检查纠正业已存在和可能发生的任何不当关联交易和“内部人行为”,进而帮助国有商业银行加快改革步伐,提高资产质量,增强其抗风险能力。但是我们应该看到,由于我国迄今为止仍然没有形成一套完整的适合国有商业银行的监管体制,加之国有商业<WP=50>银行自身存在的诸多问题,使得银行监管部门在银行监管工作中面临着两难的选择。首先,四家国有商业银行自身问题和不完善的法规体系、薄弱的市场约束机制、不充分的银行监管以及国有企业等外部环境问题交织在一起,牵一发而动全体。鉴于此,政府监管部门在对一些有问题的银行采取措施的时候不得不考虑诸多因素,因而难以做出严厉地清算或者关闭的决定,只能持宽容性监管态度和维持“大银行不倒闭”这一事实,宽容性监管成为目前银行监管部门最佳选择。其次,政府为维持存款者信心,对国有商业银行的公开或者隐性的担保仍然存在,政府的担保在一定程度上使得商业银行存在侥幸心理,认为政府在危机发生时不会坐视不管,因此有可能不会采取审慎的经营方式而是倾向于采取冒险的极端行为。政府的担保所产生的道德风险也是银行监管部门必须面对的难题。最后,国有商业银行积累的不良贷款有相当大的一部分是由于政府对银行的干预而产生的,由于银行监管部门难以对政府进行惩罚,导致监管部门的惩罚措施也难以对<WP=51>银行管理者进行约束。银行监管部门面对困难的两难选择要求监管部门必须在短期社会成本和道德风险,在银行安全和社会资源分配有效性之间作出权衡,从而在银行体系的近期稳定和中长期效率之间寻求最佳平衡点,作出在现实条件下成本最小、效用最大的监管措施选择。一个先进有效的银行监管体制应该能够解决市场失灵问题,银行监管的目标不是保证每家银行都可以生存,而是要保证整个金融体系的稳定和安全。因此,我国对四家国有商业银行监管应在充分考虑经营者、所有者、监管者、规则、市场约束和控制等因素的基础上进行最为有利的选择。首先,完善国有商业银行治理结构,积极推进国有商业银行改革步伐,使国有商业银行成为具有完善产权主体的金融企业,为国有商业银行监管奠定良好的基础。其次,建立有效的监管协调和沟通机制,监管机构之间、监管机构与央行之间都要建立良好的内部和外部协调沟通机制,避免出现重复监管和监管真空现象;再次,加强监管规章制度建设,提高国有商业银行监管工<WP=52>作的技术性程序规则。清晰、透明的监管规章制度有利于国有商业银行形成理性预期并采取理性行为,有利于降低银行的系统性风险。提高监管工作的技术性程序,可以有效减少监管工作中的“寻租”现象,有效遏制监管腐败。第四,培育健康的国有商业银行监管环境。强调依法监管,整治社会信用环境,完善政治环境。只有建立健康有序的国有商业银行监管环境,政府监管部门才能够更加独立有效的行使银行监管职能。最后,逐步引入市场约束机制对国有商业银行的监管作用。主要是要建立规范的银行信息披露制度,建立科学可行的银行信用评级制度。有效利用市场机制的作用可以在一定程度上降低政府监管部门的监管成本,增加社会对国有商业银行监管力量,有利于银行及早发现问题,有效的促进国有商业银行稳健经营。由于国有商业银行自身以及长期以来形成的有关国有商业银行问题的复杂性,国有商业银行监管也显得尤为复杂,会牵涉社会的方方面面的利益,因此国有商业?

【Abstract】 Bank Supervision is striving for a kind of optimised balance among such factors as encouraging the bank to improve its service, stimulating the energy for competition, maintaining the paying-off ability and steadiness of the line. Due to the un-integration of the market and the publicity of the products offered by the bank’s financial organizations, when the market is out of control and the information is not symmetric, it is necessary for the government to conduct external supervision on the financial organizations of the bank. So, the supervision on banks is a kind of governmental behaviour basing on the market behaviour and legal behaviour. Comparing with securities line and insurance line, banking affects the social steadiness in a higher level, especial the state-owned commercial banks, which occupy a great majority of the financial resources, has almost monopolized China’s banking industry, thus greatly affecting the steadiness of the society, the politics and the economy. So the bank supervision authorities in our government supervise the state-owned commercial banks because of the un-integration of the market, that is, the out-of-control of the financial market, on the other hand, because of the dilemma and the huge business risk in management faced by the state-owned commercial banks presently. If these problems of the commercial banks could not be solved successfully, it will be inevitable to greatly harm the economic development of our country. Basing on these two reasons, the governmental supervision organs should have to conduct strict supervision on the state-owned commercial banks in order to diminish the risk and decrease the possible damage on the social economy brought by the risk of the commercial banks and protect the benefit of the savings depositors. The supervision function on our country’s commercial banks has ever been practised by the People’s Bank. Since April 28, 2003, the bank supervision function started to be practised independently <WP=54>by Bank Supervision Committee. The bank supervision function has been separated from the People’s Bank, which has endowed the bank supervision authorities more independence to a certain extent, and which is positive for the bank supervision authorities to better fulfil their obligations, for protecting the benefit of the savings depositors, for protecting the safety and steadiness of banks and improving the social welfare. At the beginning of the establishment of the Bank supervision Committee, it put the emphasis on the supervision of the state-owned commercial banks. With respect to the problem that the bad loans proportion of the state-owned commercial banks kept increasing, they, basing on the principle of cautious supervision, popularised an omni-bearing management on risks, urged all the state-owned commercial banks strengthen their internal management, further their reforms and make effort to increase their competition force. They also supervised and urged the commercial banks to increase the transparency of their business, to correct the existed or the possible improper corresponding transactions and the “internal behaviour” with real-time, effective on-site examinations and scientific, strict non-on-site examinations, thus helping the state-owned commercial banks speed up their steps for reformation, increase their assets volume, strengthen their risk-resistance ability. But we should note that, as we have not formed a complete set of supervision system that suits the supervision of the state-owned commercial banks up till now in our country, further more, there are many problems in the state-owned commercial banks themselves, the bank supervision authorities fall into a dilemma in making choices in the bank supervision work. Firstly, the problems, such as the problem of the four state-owned commercial banks themselves and the external environment, such as the imperfect legal system, the weak market restriction system, the inadequate bank supervision and state-owned enterprises, are mingled, a slight move in one part may affec

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 吉林大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2004年 04期
  • 【分类号】F832.1
  • 【被引频次】2
  • 【下载频次】700
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