中国基础设施产业的私人参与和亲贫规制

【作者】 吴绪亮；

【导师】 刘凤芹；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 西方经济学， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 本文共分三部分：第一部分考察了基础设施产业的私人参与潮流；第二部分从多个方面分析了私人资本参与基础设施服务与弱势群体福利变动的联系；第三部分提出了中国基础设施产业亲贫规制体系设计的总纲，并从微观和宏观两个层面展开论述。 第一部分的分析始于基础设施服务提供的传统模式及其弊端，紧接着便转向考察私人资本参与基础设施产业的世界潮流和中国情况，研究了公私合作伙伴关系(PPP模式)的技术形式，并重点讨论了中国私人资本进军基础设施产业的现状、意义与远景。本文认为，过去二十年来，在整个世界经济范围内，基础设施产业以私人参与为主要内容的变革，正在深刻地改变着基础设施产业传统的提供方式。在中国，私人资本的进入不仅能够解决中国基础设施产业的资金短缺、投资不足问题，而且还是基础设施产业建立竞争机制、投资约束机制和风险控制机制的基本条件。可以预见，中国即将掀起私人资本进入基础设施产业的浪潮。 第二部分从多个方面分析了私人资本参与基础设施服务和弱势群体福利变动的联系，包括普遍服务的理念受到威胁，公共垄断可能让位于私人垄断，费率水平和费率结构会产生不利于弱势群体的变化等。本文指出了一个寓意深远的现象，即贫困农村、偏远山区和城市边缘地区人群本来就具有较低的支付能力，而更不幸的是，为这部分人群提供基础设施服务的成本也特别高。低支付能力与高提供成本的悲剧性结合往往使得以盈利为目标的私人企业不愿为这部分人群提供服务。这就论证了私人资本参与基础设施服务必须以完善的亲贫规制体系为前提条件。 第三部分探讨了如何设计完善的亲贫规制体系以防止私人资本参与基础设施服务后对弱势群体的歧视。所谓的亲贫规制，简单地说，就是采取有利于弱势群体的规制措施。本文指出，中国基础设施产业的亲贫规制体系设计受Ⅰ、Ⅱ两大类约束条件的限制：Ⅰ类约束包括基础设施产业所具有的五大经济特性，Ⅱ类约束是亲贫目标。在Ⅰ、Ⅱ两大类约束条件下，就中国这样的发展中大国而言，一个优良的亲贫规制体系设计的最优解，必须是既能刺激私人资本进入内容提要基础设施产业，增加总供给，同时，又能确保弱势群体可以分享到这种增长的好处。这应该是当前中国基础设施产业亲贫规制体系设计的总纲。最后，本文从微观和宏观两个层面探讨了中国基础设施产业的亲贫规制体系设计。在微观层面，亲贫规制设计包括价格规制方案选择、多样化的服务质量规制、竟争规制和补贴等内容。在宏观层面，本文则重点讨论了改革的顺序、构建现代化的亲贫规制框架和制度基础等三方面问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 The paper is divided into three parts. The first part observes the trend of private participation in infrastructure industries. The second part analyses the links between the private participation in infrastructure industries and the change of welfare of vulnerable groups. The third part put forward a general principle for the design of pro-poor regulation system in China’s infrastructure industries, and discusses from micro-and macro- levels.The first part’s analysis begins with shortcomings of traditional supply mode of infrastructure services, then turns to observe the world wide trend of private participation in infrastructure industries and China’s case. The technological forms of private-public partnerships ( PPP mode) are studied, and China’s case is explored specially. The paper hold that, over the last 20 years, within the body of world economy, the traditional supply mode in infrastructure industries has been transformed profoundly, featured mainly by private participation. In China, private participation can not only deal with the problems of shortage of funds and investments , but also help to establish competition mechanism , investment-restraining mechanism and risk-controlling mechanism. It can be predicted reasonably that there will be a fast-grow period of private participation in China’s infrastructure industries in the near future.The second part analyses the links between private participation in infrastructure industries and the change of welfare of vulnerable groups from varied aspects, including USOs were threatened, public monopoly may turn into private monopoly, fee rate and structure may change and hurt vulnerable groups etc. .The paper unveils a meaningful phenomenon, namely, the residents in poor rural districts, remote mountain areas and city suburbs have lower affordability, and more unfortunately, the costs of supply of infrastructure services to these groups are even higher incredibly. Lower affordability combines higher supply costs unfortunately makes it impossible to offer services to these groups by private firms,which aims at profit-maximization solely. Thus it turns out that private participation in infrastructure industries must leave the perfect pro-poor regulation system be precondition.The third part discusses how to prevent discriminations against vulnerable groups after private participation in infrastructure industries by perfect pro-poor regulation system design. The paper points out that the design of pro-poor regulation systems of infrastructure industries in China is restrained by Ⅰ and Ⅱ categories. Category Ⅰ includes five economic characteristics of infrastructure industries, and category Ⅱ is pro-poor goal. Under Ⅰ and Ⅱ restraints, as far as a large developing country just like China is concerned, the optimal solution to a good design of pro-poor regulation must be one that can not only stimulate private participation in infrastructure industries, and increase the aggregate supply , but also guarantee that the advantages of growth shared by vulnerable groups. This should be the general principle in design of pro-poor regulation system in infrastructure industries in current China. In the end, the paper probes into the design of pro-poor regulation systems in China’s infrastructure industries from micro- and macro- levels. At the micro-level, the design of pro-poor regulation includes choice of price-regulation scheme, diversified service-quality-regulation, competition-regulation and subsidies. At the macro-level, the sequences of reform, the construction of modern pro-poor regulation frame and its institutional foundations are explored in detail.更多还原