【作者】 敬希泠；

【导师】 李嘉明；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 会计学， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 人力资本是经济增长的原动力之一，而专用性人力资本则是现代企业获得竞争优势的必要保证。本论文基于人力资本投资的基本理论，从信息不对称的角度运用博弈论与委托—代理理论对人力资本市场、企业招聘人才以及对职工的培训与激励进行了深入分析，为企业的人力资本投资提供理论指导与政策建议。 首先，论文分析了人力资本的产权特征，针对其与物资资本的区别，论述了企业人力资本投资的特征、作用、目的以及形式。然后，分析了人力资本市场上“逆向选择”的形成机理。市场上招聘者与应聘者之间的信息不对称是其主要原因。而造成人力资本市场上信息不对称的根本原因又是Spence的教育“信号传递”理论在这里失效。应聘者受教育程度不能真实的反映其能力水平，而招聘者得到的很有可能是虚假的信号。第三，针对人力资本市场上“逆向选择”行为，提出了应聘者在进入企业之前必须交纳一定的专用性培训费用的策略。这一策略能得到唯一的分离均衡，从而有效的从人力资本市场上分离出高能力应聘者，避免因信息不对称给企业带来损失。第四，论文研究了信息对称和非对称信息两种不同情况下，企业人力资本投资的最优激励合同，并对结果做了分析比较。结果表明，在信息对称情况下，职工将得到一个与其努力程度匹配的额外收益；在不对称的信息情况下，企业为了提高职工的努力水平，将给予职工变动额外收益分配率，使职工的额外收益与人力资本投资的额外收益挂钩。这些结论对于企业内的人力资本投资决策有重要的参考价值。第五，提出了建立、健全人力资本市场的政策建议，从根本上消除市场上的逆向选择行为，努力使人力资本市场成为有效市场：市场上供求信息灵通、充分共享，人力资本具有高度流动性，市场完全开放公平、竞争有序，管理规范，完全由市场决定人力资本的定价，投资收益符合高风险高回报的原则。最后，根据激励理论的分析结果，就人力资本参与收入分配的方式提出了一些具体方案：年终奖金制、股票期权、员工持股制、专项奖励。更多还原

【Abstract】 The investment of special human capital in enterprises is the base of business competition advantage contrast to human capital as power of economic growth. On the bases of human capital theory, in view of the asymmetric information in the human capital market, business employment and employers training, the paper models them through game theory and agent-principal theory and analyzes the investment of human capital in enterprise.First, the characteristic of human capital property rights is explored and the feature, function, purpose and way of enterprises human capital investment are discussed distinguished from substance capital investment. Then the reason of adverse selection in the human capital market is investigated, which indicates that asymmetric information between employer and employee is the source of adverse selection and it’s result from the education signaling model of Spence model losing efficacy. The education degree of employer doesn’t truly display his ability, so the employee acquired the false information. Thirdly, the strategy of handing in training payment to separate worker owned the higher and lower human capital level is put forward aimed at the adverse selection in the human capital market. The paper also proved that strategy is the only separating equilibrium to avoiding the loss coming from asymmetric information. Fourthly, the best incentive contrast under the symmetric and asymmetric information is studied and compared. The result indicates that under the symmetric information, the employer will acquired the extra profit match with his effort, while under the asymmetric information the worker acquired the varied allocation of extra profit to encourage them work hard, which is connected with the extra profit of investment in human capital. Such conclusion is an important basis to the human capital decision inner the enterprise. At last, the paper explored the measure to construct and amplified the human capital market. The measure also contributes to eliminate the adverse selection action in the human capital market and foster the effective talent market. The character of effective talent market is that: the information of supply-demand is open and completely shared, the human capital is highly flowed and priced according to the market, the higher return of the human capital investment is come from higher venture.So an open, fair market can become, it also can compete and management orderly. The paper gives the scheme about the way of human capital allocation the profit such as bonus, stock-option and stock-sharing.更多还原