【作者】 黄波；

【导师】 孟卫东；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 企业管理， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 供应链战略伙伴关系是一种基于核心竞争力的虚拟一体化战略联盟形式，与企业间其他的关系（市场交易关系、企业集团模式和企业一体化模式）有着很大的区别：作为介于市场交易和纵向一体化之间的一种中间组织形态，其存在能够节约交易费用。作为一种稀缺的组织形式，合作伙伴形成的战略联盟能产生关系性租金；在现实中能为交易双方带来各种经济和非经济绩效。供应链战略伙伴的选择非常重要、复杂。作为一种多目标/属性决策问题，它有着一般的选择程序和多种选择方法。为了兼顾主、客观权重选择的影响，本文提出用多属性决策组合赋权法来优化属性权重选择。另外，有别于常用的多目标/属性决策线性目标规划方法，本文提出用TOPSIS法来最终进行战略伙伴的择优判别。从而，本文提出了一个基于多属性决策组合赋权法、TOPSIS法的供应商择优模型；并通过一个算例作了详尽的说明。选择合适的供应商，只是创建供应链战略伙伴关系的一个重要前提。为了建立供应链战略伙伴关系，交易双方必须投入一定的特定关系投资并通过垂直协同来加以有效利用。另外，伙伴关系得以长期维系必须倚靠防卫事后机会主义的三种治理模式：双边特定关系投资、信任与共同规范、目标一致性。有关战略伙伴关系解体的研究不多，本文通过一个博弈论的模型阐明：（1）、核心企业（多为制造商）在面对更好的伙伴选择时，会首先提出终止关系的要求；若从属企业（多为供应商）无明显的绩效改进措施，则关系可能破裂。（2）、战略伙伴关系破裂与否，取决于终止合同诉讼时从属企业所得赔偿金（γf）。（3）、一旦战略伙伴关系破裂，则合作双方总福利有明显改善，即出现了额外总收益。且：总收益分配随着赔偿金（γf）的递增在核心企业与从属企业之间向后者倾斜；即完备合同（γ→1）、高额违约金（f）不但有助于维系战略合作关系的继存，而且也有助于维护从属企业的利益。进一步，完备性合同主要受环境不确定性大小的影响，与之负相关；而违约金的大小则受制于买卖双方的市场力量对比。更多还原

【Abstract】 Strategic partnerships in supply chain can been seen as a kind of virtual integrated strategic alliance based on core competence. As a form of organizations between arm-length market transaction and vertical integration, its existence can reduce transaction costs by contrast with the other forms (relationships of market transaction, group of firms, and vertical integration). And as a scarce form of organization, it can also create relational rents, which can practically bring about a great deal of economic or non-economic performance.The selection of partner is very important and complicated. As a multi-objective /attribute decision-making task, it has a general process and a variety of methods.Both subjective weights and objective weights considered, a method of combination weighting in multi-attribute decision-making is proposed here. What’s more, the method of TOPSIS is suggested to select first-class supplier in the end, which is quite different from the linear-objective programming method in common use. Therefore, a model for supplier selection based on the methods of combination weighting in multi-attribute decision-making and TOPSIS is brought forward. Then, a simple example is given to explain the use of this model.It’s only an important premise to create and build strategic partnerships in supply chain after suitable supplier is selected. To create specific partnerships, the both sides of transaction must contribute some relationship investments and make good use of them by vertical coordination. Besides, to maintain the relationships, three different governance mechanisms against the poisonous effects of opportunism ex post are suggested: bilateral idiosyncratic investments, goal congruence, and interpersonal trust.Few people have discussed the end of partnerships, and some conclusions are reached here by the analysis of a game theory model: (1). The core firm (mostly to be manufacturer) will call for ending the relationships when it has better supplier to select. If the subordinate firm has no steps to improve its performance, the relationships will probably break. (2). It’s the compensation (γf) supplier gets when the contracts break that decides whether the relationships maintain or not. (3). Once the strategic partnerships end, the total welfare of the alliance will improve. And with the increase of compensation (γf), the subordinate firm will get more from the total welfare. That is, the completeness of contracts (γ→1) and great fine of breaking contracts (f) will not only maintain the relationships, but also protect the benefit of subordinate firm. Further more, the completeness of contracts is negatively correlated with the uncertainty of environment, and the amount of fine of breaking contracts is decided by the comparison of each other’s market power of manufacturer and supplier.更多还原