我国股票市场虚假信息披露问题研究

【作者】 严华兵；

【导师】 曹廷贵；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 金融学， 2002， 硕士

【摘要】 “公开、公平、公正”是股票市场的三个基本原则，也是证券立法的最高指导原则。其中的公开原则就是股票发行与交易的基础，所以作为公开原则在证券市场中的具体体现，信息披露制度一直是证券市场不可分割的重要组成部分，信息披露也是各国政府进行证券监管的重点。可以说，信息披露制度的成熟是一国证券市场步入有效的基础。只有保证真实、完整、及时的信息披露，才能形成一个有效的证券市场。自我国股票市场建立以来，政府就不断完善信息披露制度，且已经取得了很大的成效。但从中国股票市场接连不断发生的信息披露案例看来，我国股票市场透明度依然不高，信息披露仍然有诸多不完善之处，而正是这些问题阻碍了我国股票市场的进一步发育和成熟。所以为了更好地发挥证券市场的作用，需要对信息披露存在的问题进行认真研究并提出应对之策，以完善我国股票市场的信息披露，从而推动股票市场真正实现“公平、公开、公正”。这正是本文要研究的问题。本篇论文的基本逻辑结构为：首先，指出我国股票市场信息披露的问题所在，提出本文的中心问题：为何我国股票市场虚假信息披露屡禁不止，如何治理？接着，通过经济理论对我国股票市场进行分析，总结出问题的理论原因。然后，把信息披露放到整体的制度环境中，对我国信息披露制度的各个方面进行系统的分析，指出问题的实际所在。在此基础上，提出虚假信息披露的治理对策。全文共分为五章。第一章提出了本文的选题背景、基本思路和方法、内容结构。第二章介绍了信息披露制度，并指出了我国股票市场信息披露存在的问题。在股票市场上，只有完整、及时、真实地披露信息，市场才能合理地配置资源。所以，各国均对在其证券法中对信息披露作出了强制性的规定，这不仅能降低信息交易成本、防止证券欺诈、减少内幕交易等舞弊行为，也能保护投资者利益，从而提高股<WP=3>票市场的效率。我国对于股票市场亦作出了强制信息披露的规定，但披露信息不充分、重大事件临时披露不及时、信息虚假披露等事件时有发生。那么，是什么原因导致了这种情况的发生呢？对此，又该如何进行治理呢？这就是本文的中心论题。在问题提出后，第三章从经济学理论角度出发，对我国股票市场虚假信息披露进行了分析。首先，我国股票市场，不仅投资者和公司管理人员之间的信息不对称，而且不同的投资者之间，如庄家、控股股东和中小股东，也存在信息不对称。而公司管理人员或者控股股东，可以利用其在信息编报方面的权力，向外界发布虚假的信息，从而谋求其自身的利益最大化。这种由不对称信息导致的道德风险，是我国股票市场虚假信息披露存在的原因之一。其次，在信息披露问题上，公司管理人员和投资者难以达成具有约束力的协议，所以他们之间是非合作博弈。从该博弈的分析可知：从个人理性出发，公司管理人员总倾向于披露虚假信息。从社会效益看，这并非最优选择，但如果没有相关的制度安排，这个博弈结果是不会改变的。而由于我国相关制度没有对这个问题作出合理的安排，使得我国公司管理人员从其个人理性出发，在披露信息时的最佳选择仍然是披露虚假信息。再次，信息披露是需要相关成本，并且存在外部效应，而且这种外部效应可能会导致公司的竞争劣势，所以上市公司缺乏充分信息真实披露的动力，这也是一个原因。那么，对于制约上述原因所引起的虚假信息披露，我国政府是否从相关制度方面作出了安排呢？第四章就这个问题，通过对我国股票市场的信息披露制度及相关的制度执行环境进行了实证分析，指出正是由于制度的缺陷以及执行效率低下等原因，才导致了虚假信息披露屡禁不止。从法律制度来看，我国证券法虽然对虚假信息披露规定了行政、刑事及民事责任，但实际执行中，对于相关违规人员行政或刑事处罚都很少，更不用说进行经济处罚或承担民事赔偿责任。而经济处罚的缺位，尤其是民事赔偿制度的欠缺，使得披露虚假信息的各利益主体不需要为其违规行为承担成本，或者只承担很小的成本，所以法律制度没有对虚假信息披露进行有效制约。从审计制度看，我国市<WP=4>场对于审计服务的需求，不是源自于市场自发的需要，而是政府选择的结果。这种情况下，公司并不需要高质量的审计意见。与此同时，会计师事务所本身也存在比如数量过多、服务过窄等问题，而地方政府出于本地经济考虑也会干涉注册会计师的独立审计，此外，公司治理结构的扭曲也使得公司的会计师事务所聘任制度存在缺陷，所有这些，都使得我国注册会计师的独立审计功能受到限制，从而难以对虚假的信息披露进行有效的遏制。从而，审计制度也未能就抑制我国股票市场虚假信息披露作出合理的安排。从会计制度看，不少虚假信息披露案例就是利用了会计制度的漏洞。现阶段，主要表现在：上市前利用剥离来对公司业绩等进行“包装”，以达到上市目的；而上市后，则主要通过资产重组及关联交易来操纵公司利润，进行报表粉饰。这些都动摇了公司财务信息等的真实性，使信息使用者无法了解企业真实的财务状况、经营业绩和现金流量等，其实质与造假没有很大的区别。但是会计制度并没有对此进行及时、有效的制止，所以会计制度也更多还原

【Abstract】 In stock market, openness, fairness and justness are three fundamental principles, which are also the golden rule for security legislation. Among the three principles, openness is the foundation for stock issuing and dealing, so information disclosure system, a represent action of openness, is inseparable from security market, and is the focus of government’s security supervision. Only true, complete, timely information disclosures can guarantee an efficient security market.Since the establishment of the stock market in China, information disclosure system has been improved a lot. But, seeing from the successive cases on information disclosure, the transparency of our security market is still very low, and the information disclosure system is still imperfect, which impedes further development of our stock market. So we should analyze information disclosure problems, the task this paper is to fulfill.The logical structure of this paper is: First, information disclosure problems on our stock market are pointed out. Then, mendacious disclosure is thoroughly analyzed through economic theories and practical institution environment. Based on the analysis above, some suggestions are made to improve our information disclosure system. This paper consists of five chapters. Chapter One introduces the background, research methods, and basic structure of the dissertation. In Chapter Two, problems in our stock markets are advanced. Though compulsive disclosure is stipulated in our stock market, incomplete, untimely, and mendacious disclosure still surfaces frequently. Why mendacious disclosures continually happen? How to solve that problem in stock market? That is the topic of this<WP=8>paper.After that, Chapter Three analyzes mendacious disclosures in our stock market from economic theory perspectives. First, asymmetric information exists not only between investors and corporate managers but also among different investors such as institutional investors, dominated shareholders, and minority shareholders. So managers or dominated shareholders can use their priority on information report, disclose mendacious information to strive for their own profits. That moral hazard is one of the reasons causing mendacious disclosures in our stock markets. Second, on information disclosure, there is a non-cooperative game between corporate managers and investors. The result of the game is that managers always intend to disclose mendacious information for the good of their own. It’s not the best choice of the society, but the game result will not change until reasonable institution is arranged to regulate that condition. In our stock market, the lack of such an arrangement makes corporate managers still prefer to mendacious disclosure. Finally, information disclosures have costs and externalities, which may lead to an inferior competition position. So the managers lack motive power for timely disclosure.After anatomizing the information disclosure system and implementation environment for that system, Chapter Four finds that the actual reasons for mendacious disclosure are defects in related systems and inefficiency of their execution. In legal system, lacking of economic punishment, especially the absence of civil compensation system has sheltered entities related to mendacious disclosure from paying cost for their acts. So the legal system cannot efficiently prevent mendacious disclosures. In the audit system, demands for audit service are the result of government’s selection, but not the market’s own needs. Under such a condition, listed companies don’t want high quality audit opinion. In the<WP=9>meantime, because of accounting firms’ own problems and local governments’ intervention and distortion of corporate governance in listed companies, CPA’s independent audit function is limited. Then, the audit system cannot restrain mendacious disclosure effectively. In the accounting system, many mendacious disclosure cases utilize nothing but the flaws of the accounting system. Currently, stripping and affiliated transacti更多还原