【作者】 黄瑛；

【导师】 陈文开；

【作者基本信息】 广西师范大学 ， 国民经济， 2002， 硕士

【摘要】 在人们已对国有企业的产权主体多元化改革为中心的产权制度改革达成共识后，国有企业现代企业制度建立的重点转向了公司治理模式的创新。公司治理是一个世界性的前沿问题。它的重要性在于随着现代公司所有权与经营权的日益分离，在环境的不确定性、信息的不对称不完善和人的有限理性条件下，经营者的机会主义倾向使代理问题成为现代公司必须面对的问题。一般而言，有效率的公司治理结构应使剩余索取权和剩余控制权对应配置，其依据是构成企业这个利益集合体的契约各方的谈判力对比，而企业所有权安排是企业参与者之间博弈的均衡结果。但在主流经济学那里，“资本雇佣劳动”被证明是最有效率企业所有权安排。从引入风险偏好来解释这一逻辑的必然性的风险偏好差异说开始，在随后的几十年时间里，又有团队理论提出以可监督性差异这一技术指标，来对资本雇佣劳动的合理性进行解说：不完全契约理论通过对非人力资本的可抵押性从而承担了所有的剩余风险，将企业视为非人力资本的“粘结物”；到以要素所有者谈判力差异来解释企业所有权的安排。这一系列的治理理论均未脱离新古典经济学的范畴，因而带有个体主义分析方法天然的局限性。从世界各国公司治理的实践来看，股东主权式单边治理的典型美国公司，由于20世纪80年代起其公司的竞争力开始下降，人们相信这与其单边治理的效率下降有关，而进入90年代以来到现在，大规模的收购兼并一方面给美国社会造成很多社会问题，另一方面，管理层的反收购措施也表明其与股东利益的明显背离。基于此，推动机构投资者参与公司治理、加强独立董事制度和安排人力资本所有者与非人力资本所有者共同分享企业所有权成为一种趋势。在欧洲，《OECD公司治理原则》也对利益相关者参与公司治理作出明确的回应。而从英美模式和德日模式两种模式的治理结构特征比较中，我们看到，由于宏观的经济制度环境和微观的公司融资结构的差异，两种模式的治理机制发挥作用的途径大不一样，但两种模式在世界经济一体化的过程中却出现趋同的共性。特别表现在其公司治理中的利益相关者因素上。保护利益相关者的权益并通过各利益集团权力的制衡机制实现公司决策的科学性目标，最终保持公司的赢利和可持续发展，已成为各国公司治理实践中的共识。一国的公司治理模式必与其历史文化经济制度有密不可分的关系。因此本文通过对发达资本主义国家的制度遗产的分析，结合我国的具体国情，得出我国应在自身特殊的制度环境下构造符合中国国情以及各公司不同融资结构下的公司治理模式。所有者缺位导致的廉价投票权问题和行政干预下的经营者控制，是在国有资产共有产权特性之下致使国有控股公司运营低效的两大原因。由此国有控股公司内部治理存在着各种各样的问题。本文认为，不论从适应现代市场经济环境的角度，还是从降低代理成本、弱化所有者缺位问题和考虑到我国的特殊国情的角度出发，利益相关者共同治理都不失为一种更可行的公司治理结构重构方案。根据本文第二部分的理论框架和第三部分的模式借鉴的结论，提出国有控股公司应采取共同治理和相机治理相结合的利益相关者共同治理模式。共同治理机制的建立一方面体现在相机决择的外部治理结构上，另一方面体现在内部治理结构中的最高权力机构的共同治理机制和董事会当中的共同治理机制上。这也正是本文创新之处。尤其是在论述最高权力机构的重建中，提出以各利益集团的资产占公司总资产的比例来衡量各自谈判力的大小，并由此决定各自投票权分配，紧密地与前而企业所有权分配原则相扣。本文认为，建立一个类似于利益相关者大会的最高权力机构的设想下仅在理论上可行，而且有实践的基础。同时它还为通常经济学者们所提到的职－厂重事制度、银行董事制度的建立提供了合法的程序。另外一个创新之处在了，我们还认为，我国国有控股公司日前最大的问题在于大股东对中小股东利益的侵犯和员工、债权人的权益得不到有效保护上。从利益相关者共同治理的角度出发，鉴于最高权力机构和董事会当中共同治理机制的建立，非股东利益相关者的权益己得到了保护，再设一个与董事会平行的监事会将是一种资源的浪费。而且其监督的效果不会超过董事会内各集团之间的相互监督。当然，本文也考虑到目前我国公司法中行对监事会建立的明文规定，因此，本文认为，近期来看，仍有必要在监事会当中也建立以员工和股东代表为主的共同治理机制。但本文主张对于那些董事会中己具备对管理层决策正当性监督功能的公司，可以取消监事会，以实现公司治理效率。更多还原

【Abstract】 After the agreement on property right system reform that focused on the multi-element property right reform , the keystone construction of enterprise institutions for state-owned enterprises has switched to innovation of the corporation governance. This is a national and international problem because it encompases the solution for the agency problem after ownership and the decision rights have been seperated. Generally, efficient corporate governance depends on the symmetry arrangement of the residual claim rights. These residual claim rights conform to the negotiation balance among correlating stakeholder groups in an enterprise that is in essence a contract aggregation. However, the "Capital Hires Labour" model has been considered as the most efficient method of corporate governance according to main economics. The Theory of Venture Prefrence Difference, the Theory of Supervision Technology Difference, the Theory of Imperfect Contraction as well as the explanation of Negotiation Ability Diversity all concentrate on explainig why the model of "Capital Hires Labour" is the most efficient one. As the main theories are derived from the new classic economics , they commonly have limits on the analysis method. So far as the experience of many countries are concerned, where corporate goverrnance matches to the model that main economics insists on , their competition capacity declined for the enterprises’ unilateral governance. This made economists thinking about reform change to considering enterprises’ stakeholders rights , especially for companies in the U.S.A. Moreover, large-scale purchasing and annexing causes a lot of social problems. And in the "OECD Corporate Governance", stakeholder’s rights have been emphasised.Through the contrast of the English-American and the German-Japanese models, despite their difference from the macroscopical system environment and microcosmic financing structure , both of the governance models tend to be more and more similar.To protect the stakeholders rights in many companies so that their long-term value or persistent development can be realized, the re-construction of the corporate governance becomes more and more popular. In this way the reform of Chinese SOEs’ Corporation Governance then also depends on our system environment and the financing structure.Owner absence and insider controling are the radical factors that make SOEs run inefficiently. They are the consequences of the arrangement of communion property rights. The stakeholder co-governance mechanism is a practical and feasible model to rebuild the structure of an SOEs corporation gorvernance from each aspect .The structural innovation of SOEs must , therefore , organically combine co-governance and contingent governance. The former means of cooperation among stakeholders and the latter means different outsider governance structure. This paper provides a design for cooperation of the inside governance and the contingent outside governance mechanisms after giving some fundamental principles . The innovation of this paper majorly lies in the re-construction of both the tiptop power framework and the directorate according to the different negotiation capacity of the stakeholder groups.To build a stakeholders convention not only guarantees the long-term co-operation among different stakeholders , but also supplies a legal procedure to set up the bank director institution and the employee director institution. Besides, it isn’t necessary to construct a parallel supervise convention to protect the un-dominated stakeholders’ rights. Through the re-construction of the tiptop power convention and the directorate, these groups’ rights have properly at an equilibrium. So for those enterprises whose directorate has been perfected, the cancelling of the supervision convention is the right way to reduce the cost of transaction and promote governance efficiency.更多还原