【摘要】 一般认为，笛卡尔在《论世界》《谈谈方法》《第一哲学沉思》中根据光学的科学原理及视知觉的机械生理学规则，彻底否定了占据中世纪意向性理论核心的认知种相说。他还在《第一哲学沉思》中明确提出，那些被直接赋予人类心灵的最“清楚明白”的观念，引致了以纯粹理智直观能力为基础的认识论范式。文章指出，首先，笛卡尔虽然彻底否定种相的认知功能，但是从未放弃理智认识流程本身；其次，在涉及视觉发生学等的实践性的物理学和生理学范围内，他始终暗示，纯粹理性直观只是哲学的理论理想。在人类形成视觉内容的过程中，理智判断能力需要时刻参考周边的具身环境及其中的各类变量。以新科学为基础，笛卡尔以某种方式回归了有关人类感知觉机制的本源问题域。身心关系议题始终占据经院哲学意向性及认知理论的核心。更多还原

【Abstract】 It is commonly believed that in The World, Discourse on the Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes – drawing upon scientific principles of optics and mechanical physiological rules of visual perception – completely denied the theory of cognitive species that had occupied the core of medieval intentionality theory. Furthermore, in Meditations on First Philosophy, he proposed that the “clear and distinct” ideas directly imparted to the human mind serve as the foundation for an epistemological paradigm based on purely rational intuitive ability. This paper argues: first, while Descartes did completely denied the cognitive function of species, he never abandoned the process of rational cognition itself;second, within the practical domains of physics and physiology, including the study of visual perception, he consistently implied that pure rational intuition is merely a theoretical ideal in philosophy. In the process of human beings forming visual content, intellectual judgment must continually refer to the surrounding physical environment and its many variables. Grounded in the new science, Descartes somehow returned to the original problem domain concerning the human perception and consciousness mechanism. The mind-body problem has always been at the core of intentionality and cognitive theory in scholastic philosophy.更多还原