【摘要】 在相对优势地位理论的争论中，理论和实务的关注点都聚焦于如何约束交易中的强势方，而不时出现在舆论中的集体抵制事件则提供了另一条思路：弱势交易方可以通过集体抵制的方式来增强议价能力。尽管面临一些限制条件，但集体抵制可以在经济性机制以及社会声誉机制两个方面发挥现实作用，实现抗衡强势交易方、达成公平交易的目的，并避免适用相对优势地位理论带来的模糊性以及执法过度问题。中国《反垄断法》对集体抵制的禁止性规定，不仅与美国、欧盟的实践不同，也与集体抵制的理论逻辑相悖。基于集体抵制的合理性，需将其纳入合理原则的分析框架下，并通过安全港制度来寻求法律规制的平衡点。即便采用谨慎的态度，由于平台经济的双边市场属性以及由此带来的不公平交易的凸显，也应当优先考虑在平台经济中考虑集体抵制的合法性。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the debate over the superior bargaining position, both theoretical and practical discussions have focused on how to constrain the stronger party in a transaction. However, boycott incidents that occasionally arise in public discourse offer an alternative perspective: weaker parties in a transaction can enhance their bargaining power through boycotts. Despite certain limitations, boycotts can play a practical role through both economic mechanisms and social reputation effects, helping to counterbalance dominant trading partners, achieve fair transactions, and avoid the ambiguity and risk of over-enforcement associated with the superior bargaining position. China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, which categorically prohibits boycotts, diverges not only from the practices of the United States and the European Union but also from the underlying theoretical logic of boycotts. Given the legitimacy of such boycotts, they should be analyzed under the rule of reason, with the introduction of a safe harbor regime to strike a regulatory balance. Even under a cautious approach, the bilateral market structure of platform economies and the growing prominence of unfair trade practices warrant prioritizing the consideration of the legality of boycotts in the platform economy.更多还原