【摘要】 按照康德的理解，一个概念的意义(Sinn)指在显象(或经验对象)之上展示该概念的意指(Bedeutung)的方式，或者说在直观中展示该概念指涉的对象的方式。在《纯粹理性批判》以及其他著作中，康德常常将意义和意指结合在一起使用，认为一个概念如果拥有意指，那么便拥有意义。因此，如果一个概念没有意义，那么也就意味着它没有意指。而且，一个概念可以有意义，但是并没有现实的意指，而是仅仅有想象的或假定的(或者说可能的)意指。通过对康德和弗雷格的相关文本的细致分析不难发现，弗雷格的Sinn和Bedeutung之分应直接源自康德的相关讨论，正如弗雷格关于存在不是个体的性质(所谓“一级性质”)而是个体的性质的性质(所谓“二级性质”)的观点直接源自康德一样。本文论证前一个结论，并批评其他作者关于弗雷格和康德相关观点之关系的评论。更多还原

【Abstract】 The Sinn of a concept, according to Kant, is the way in which its Bedeutung is displayed in intuitions(empirical objects), or the way in which the object to which the concept refers is presented. In the Critique of Pure Reason and his other writings, Kant often uses Sinn and Bedutung together, maintaining that if a concept has Bedeutung, then it has Sinn; therefore, if it lacks Sinn, then it lacks Bedeutung. Moreover, a concept can have Sinn without having actual Bedeutung, but only some imagined Bedeutung. Through a careful analysis of the relevant writings of Kant and Frege, it is becomes clear that Frege’s distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung is derived from Kant. This is similar to Frege’s view that existence is not any property of individuals(the so-called “first-order properties”), but rather a property of properties of individuals(the so-called “second-order properties”). This paper argues for the first point and offers a critical analysis of the views of other authors regarding the relationship between Kant’s and Frege’s respective viewpoints.更多还原