【摘要】 在政府对绿色产品提供补贴的基础上，构建以制造商为主导的供应链博弈模型，利用均值方差法分析了在双方风险中性（RN）、双方风险厌恶（RA）、仅制造商风险厌恶（MRA）和仅零售商风险厌恶（RRA）4种模式下的双渠道绿色供应链决策及效用，并设计带有转移支付的成本分担契约以实现协调。研究发现：在RRA模式下，产品绿色度与风险厌恶程度正相关；而在MRA模式和RA模式下，产品绿色度与风险厌恶程度负相关；双方效用在4种模式下均与政府补贴正相关，且在RRA模式下制造商效用受政府补贴的影响最为显著；当研发成本系数较大时，在MRA模式和RRA模式下，一方的效用与另一方的风险厌恶程度正相关，而在RA模式下双方效用与风险厌恶程度负相关。此外，通过数值分析揭示了成本分担比例与风险厌恶程度负相关、与政府补贴正相关。以上结论可为双渠道绿色供应链的决策制定及协调管理提供参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 “Made in China 2025”puts forward the goal of fully implementing green manufacturing to build an efficient and clean green manufacturing system. However, due to the uncertainty in the development of green products and the limit in loss tolerance, enterprises need to consider the impact of risks when making decisions. The government usually provides subsidies for green products to encourage enterprises to increase investment in green research and development and improve the greenness of products. At the same time, the rapid development of e-commerce has prompted changes in the structure of current consumption channels, for example, food enterprises such as COFCO and Shuanghui have begun online sales through electronic trading platforms, including Womaiwang and JD Fresh.In such context, we constructed a manufacturer-led dual-channel green supply chain game model. Considering risk factors and using the mean-variance method, we analyzed the decision-making and utility of the dual-channel green supply chain under four modes, namely both risk neutral(RN), both risk aversive(RA), only manufacturer risk aversive(MRA) and only retailer risk aversive(RRA). Then, we designed a cost-sharing contract with transfer payments to achieve supply chain coordination.The results show that:(1) Under different models, the relationship between product greenness and risk aversion is different. Under RA and MRA, product greenness is negatively correlated with risk aversion,while under RN, product greenness is positively correlated with risk aversion. Under different models, retail price is related to risk aversion and government subsidy. When R&D cost coefficient is small, retail prices under different models are positively correlated with government subsidies. When the R&D cost coefficient is large, the retail prices under different models are negatively correlated with government subsidies. Under RRA, when R&D cost coefficient is small, the retail price is positively correlated with risk aversion. When R&D cost coefficient is large, the retail price is negatively correlated with risk aversion. Under both RA and MRA, the retail prices are negatively correlated with risk aversion.(2) Under the four models, the utility of both parties is positively correlated with government subsidies. Especially under RRA, manufacturer utility is significantly affected by government subsidies. Under RA, the utility of both parties is negatively correlated with risk aversion. In addition, through the cost-sharing contract with transfer payments, both parties can achieve green supply chain coordination. Cost-sharing ratio is negatively correlated with risk aversion and positively correlated with government subsidies. Compared with government subsidies, risk aversion has more significant impact on transfer payments, and reduces the bargaining range of the transfer payments between the two parties.The above conclusions can provide important theoretical and practical guidance for decision-making, coordination, and management of dual-channel green supply chains.更多还原