【摘要】 基于2007-2021年中国A股上市公司数据，本文实证检验了超额薪酬对高管机会主义减持的影响。研究发现，超额薪酬驱动了高管机会主义减持，信息机制和风险机制是重要的作用机制，超额薪酬抑制了信息效率、加剧了市场风险，进而为高管机会主义减持提供了机会。横截面检验发现，超额薪酬对高管机会主义减持的正向影响在高管权力较大的公司更显著，在机构投资者退出威胁较大时受到了显著的抑制，高管能力则没有产生显著的影响，结果支持了“权力体现”假说。进一步检验发现，获得负向超额薪酬的高管减持时择机性较差，佐证了“权力体现”假说。本研究不仅有助于全面认识超额薪酬的经济后果，还有助于监管当局对高管机会主义减持行为实施精准监管，对于维护资本市场健康发展具有积极意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021, this paper empirically tests the impact of excess pay on executive opportunistic selling. The research found that the excess pay drove executive opportunistic selling, and the information mechanism and risk mechanism were important mechanisms. The excess pay improved the synchronization of stock prices, exacerbated the company’s market risk, and thus provided opportunities for executive opportunistic selling. The cross-sectional test found that the positive impact of excess pay on executive opportunistic selling was more pronounced in companies with more executives’ power, significantly inhibited when the exit threat of institutional investors was greater, and executives’ ability did not have a significant impact. The results supported the power hypothesis. Further tests found that executives who received negative excess pay had poor timing of shareholding selling, which also supported the power hypothesis. This study not only helps to fully understand the economic consequences of excess pay and the importance of pay equity, but also helps the supervisory authorities to implement more precise supervision for the executive opportunistic selling, which is of positive significance for maintaining the healthy development of the capital market.更多还原