【摘要】 为了比较按回收量补贴和按回收电池容量补贴对提高新能源动力电池闭环供应链回收率的有效性，运用博弈论建立3个回收决策模型。研究表明：(1)在按回收电池容量补贴政策下，随着补贴系数的增大，回收率可能减小；(2)与无补贴相比，按回收量补贴政策下的回收率较大，而按回收电池容量补贴政策下的回收率可能较小；(3)当补贴总金额相等时，按回收量补贴政策下的回收率大于按回收电池容量补贴政策下的回收率。此时，按回收量补贴政策下的制造商利润更高，按回收电池容量补贴政策下的零售商利润和消费者福利更高，而两种补贴政策下社会福利的高低与补贴系数的大小有关。更多还原

【Abstract】 In this study, three recycling decision models are developed with Game Theory, to verify the effectiveness of two subsidy policies based on recycling quantity and battery capacity respectively on improving the recycling rate of new-energy-power battery in closed-loop supply chain. The results are as follows:(1) The recycling rate and subsidy coefficient may be negatively correlated under the subsidy policy based on battery capacity;(2) The recycling rate is higher under the subsidy policy based on recycling quantity compared with that under no subsidy. On the contrary, the recycling rate may be lower under the subsidy policy based on battery capacity compared with that under no subsidy;(3) The recycling rate under the subsidy policy based on recycling quantity is greater than that based on battery capacity when the total subsidy amount of each subsidy policy is equal. Furthermore, profits of manufacturers are higher under the subsidy policy based on recycling quantity compared with that under the other policy, and retailers and consumers benefit more from the subsidy policy based on battery capacity compared with the other policy, while the level of social welfare under the two subsidy policies is related to the subsidy coefficient.更多还原