【摘要】 构建包含土地市场和地方政府债务的一般均衡模型,通过均衡分析发现地方政府债务与企业投资额具有正相关关系。利用中国2012—2018年289个城市数据进行实证检验,结果显示:地方政府债务具有引资效应,地方政府债务每增加1%,新增企业投资额大约增加0.3%～0.5%;相比省会城市和经济发展潜力较低的城市,这种效应在普通地级市和经济发展潜力较高的城市更大,且在经济发展步入新常态以来表现更加明显,而在去杠杆政策实施后变为负效应;这一效应随着企业投资额分位点的升高,依次呈现无效应—强效应—弱效应—无效应—负效应的变化特征。研究揭示了地方债务规模不断上扬的背后机制和债务治理的政策效果,为遏制地方政府举债冲动和降低地方债务风险提供理论依据。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper constructs a general equilibrium model including land market and local government debt, and equilibrium analysis finds that local government debt is positively correlated with enterprise investment. An empirical test is made based on the data of 289 cities in China from 2012 to 2018, and the results show that local government debt has investment attraction effect. For every 1% increase in local government debt, the investment of new enterprise will increase by 0.3% to 0.5%. Compared with provincial capitals and cities with low economic development potential, this effect is larger in ordinary prefecture-level cities and cities with high economic development potential, and it is more obvious since the economic development enters the new normal, but it becomes negative after the implementation of the deleveraging policy. With the increase of the investment quantile, this effect presents the change characteristics of no-effect, strong effect, weak effect, no-effect, and negative effect successively. This study reveals the mechanism behind the rising scale of local debt and the effect of debt governance policies, providing a theoretical basis for curbing the local government’s impulse to borrow money and reducing the risk of local debt.更多还原