【摘要】 以2011—2018年中国沪深两市A股国有上市公司为样本,实证考察了外部薪酬差距对高管主动离职的影响以及政治晋升预期的调节作用。研究发现,高管主动离职概率与外部薪酬差距显著负相关。具体而言,正向外部薪酬差距与高管主动离职不相关,而负向外部薪酬差距与高管主动离职显著负相关,即负向外部薪酬差距越大,高管主动离职的概率越高。而政治晋升预期作为一种隐形的薪酬激励,可以调节外部薪酬差距对高管主动离职的影响。进一步研究发现,最终控制人的不同和"限薪令"的实施会影响政治晋升预期的调节作用,研究的结果支持社会比较理论,认为过大的薪酬差距会影响高管公平感的感知,进而不利于高管团队的稳定性。研究从理论层面为2015年1月1日颁布的"限薪令"以及后续进一步深化国有企业高管薪酬改革等政策意见的制定和实施提供了充分的经验证据和支撑。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper takes A-share Chinese state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets 2011 to 2018 as samples,empirically investigates the influence of external salary gap and executives’ voluntary turnover and the moderating effect of political promotion expectations. It is found that there is a significant negative correlation between the voluntary turnover probability of executives and the external salary gap.Specifically,the positive external pay gap is not related to executives’ voluntary turnover,while the negative external pay gap is significantly negatively related to executives’ voluntary turnover,that is,the greater the negative external pay gap,the higher the probability of executives’ voluntary turnover. Political promotion expectation,as an invisible salary incentive,can adjust the influence of external salary gap on the voluntary turnover of executives. Further research shows that the difference of ultimate controllers and the implementation of"salary limit order"can affect the adjustment of political promotion expectations. The research results of this paper support the social comparison theory,and think that the excessive pay gap can affect the perception of executives’ sense of fairness,which is not conducive to the stability of senior management team. The research in this paper provides sufficient empirical evidence and support for the formulation and implementation of the"salary limit order"promulgated on January1,2015 and the subsequent policy suggestions such as further deepening the reform of executive compensation in state-owned Companies.更多还原