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财政分权背景下中国环境治理体系演化博弈研究

Research on evolutionary game of China’s environmental governance system under the background of fiscal decentralization

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【作者】 王育宝陆扬

【Author】 WANG Yu-bao;LU Yang;School of Economics and Finance,Xi’an Jiaotong University;

【通讯作者】 陆扬;

【机构】 西安交通大学经济与金融学院

【摘要】 立足于新时代环境政策的一系列变革举措,聚焦环境治理体系的重要抓手和基础支撑―财政分权体制,深入研究多元主体背景下有效环境治理体系运行机制,为建立新时代背景下稳定高效的环境治理体系提供理论基础。创新性地将中央政府策略集合与财税体制发生关联,运用演化博弈模型,探讨了在(中央政府、地方政府、企业)交互作用下,中央政府的财税体制选择与其余主体策略选择间的作用机理和演化过程,并通过均衡点稳定条件求解,分析了不同政策取向下环境规制体系的作用效率与演化路径。结论显示:环境治理体系三方演化博弈模型存在多重演化稳定策略,且存在相应的演化稳定条件。其中,在中央政府选择高财政分权度、地方政府选择积极治理、企业选择治污达标情景下,中央政府以更快的速度到达均衡;在中央政府选择低财政分权度、地方政府选择积极治理、企业选择治污达标情景下,地方政府以更快的速度到达均衡,而企业在两种情景下均呈现最为缓慢的演化速度。总体来看,三方主体在(低财政分权度、积极治理、治污达标)情境下以最快速度达成有效的稳定均衡解。通过对混合策略均衡进行参数敏感性分析得出结论:扩大地方环保财政支出、提高企业减排补贴以及强化官员政治约束,同时调整中央转移支付额度与结构、适度使用行政罚款类手段将有助于构建三方主体协同联动治理模式。进而提出央地间财权事权合理划分、提高环保财政支出、强化政约束等政策建议,推进环境治理体系稳定高效运行。

【Abstract】 Based on a series of reform measures of environmental policy in the new era,focusing on the fiscal decentralization system,the paper makes a thorough study of the effective environmental governance system under the background of multiple subjects,and provides a theoretical basis for the establishment of stable and efficient environmental governance system in the new era. This paper innovatively associates the central government strategies with the finance and taxation system. With the evolutionary game model,this paper explores the evolutionary process between the fiscal and taxation system selection of central government and the strategy selection of other main bodies under the interaction of three subjects,stabilizes them through the equilibrium point,and analyzes the efficiency and evolution path of environmental regulation system under different policies. The conclusion shows that the tripartite evolutionary game model of environmental governance system has multiple evolutionary stabilization strategies. The central government achieves equilibrium faster in the circumstance of central government choosing high fiscal decentralization,local government choosing active governance,and enterprises choosing pollution control; the local government achieves equilibrium faster in the circumstance of the central government choosing low fiscal decentralization,the local government choosing active governance,and enterprises choosing pollution control; in both circumstances,enterprises show the slowest evolution speed. Generally speaking,the three subjects can reach an effective stable and balanced solution as quickly as possible under the circumstances of low fiscal decentralization,active governance and pollution control.Through the parametric sensitivity analysis of the mixed strategy equilibrium,it is concluded that expanding protection fiscal expenditure of the local environmental,increasing enterprise emission reduction subsidies,strengthening officials’ political constraints,adjusting the amount and structure of central transfer payment,and using administrative fines appropriately will help to build a three-party principal coordinated governance model. Then it puts forward some policy suggestions,such as reasonable division of financial powers between central and local governments,increasing financial expenditure on environmental protection and strengthening political constraints,to promote stable and efficient operation of environmental governance system.

【基金】 国家社会科学基金项目“土地使用权流转背景下矿产资源开采地居民持续受益机制研究”(批准号:14BJL108);中国清洁发展机制基金赠款项目“陕西省应对气候变化统计核算制度和能力建设”(批准号:2013118)
  • 【文献出处】 中国人口·资源与环境 ,China Population,Resources and Environment , 编辑部邮箱 ,2019年06期
  • 【分类号】F812;X321
  • 【被引频次】18
  • 【下载频次】1797
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