【摘要】 借助微分博弈理论,研究政府补贴下由一个供应商和一个制造商组成的供应链长期合作减排的动态协调问题。在产品需求受减排量的影响下,构建了集中式和分散式微分博弈模型,并设计了成本分担契约协调供应链。结合算例对参数进行灵敏度分析,研究发现:政府补贴对企业减排起到有效的激励作用并且有助于供应链实现协调;成本分担契约的引入可提高供应商和制造商的减排努力水平、产品减排量及需求量,并实现了供应链协调;随着供应商、制造商减排成本系数以及减排量自衰减率的增大,引入契约后产品减排量呈下降趋势;相反,随着产品减排量对减排努力水平的敏感性以及消费者低碳意识的增强,产品减排量呈上升趋势。更多还原

【Abstract】 By means of differential game theory, the dynamic coordination of long-term cooperative emission reduction in a supply chain composed of a supplier and a manufacturer is studied under the government subsidy policy. This paper establishes centralized and decentralized differential game models based on the demand of products which is affected by the carbon emission reduction of products, and also the cost-sharing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain. Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis of parameters is conducted by using the numerical simulation method. The results show that the government subsidy provides effective incentives for cooperation on carbon emission reduction and helps the supply chain achieve coordination. It is also found that the carbon emission reduction effort of both the supplier and manufacturer, the carbon emission reduction as well as the demand of product are promoted by introducing the cost-sharing contract, and the coordination of the whole supply chain is well achieved. With the increase of supplier’s and manufacturer’s cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction factor and the self-decay rate of carbon emissions reduction, the carbon emission reduction of products presents a declining curve after introducing the contract. On the contrary, with the increase of both consumer’s low-carbon awareness and the sensitivity of carbon emission reduction on efforts factor, a rise can be seen on the carbon emission reduction of products.更多还原