节点文献
省域污染物总量控制指标差异性公平分配与优化算法研究——基于不对称Nash谈判模型
Difference fairness allocation and the optimization algorithm of the provincial total amount control index of pollutant emissions: based on Asymmetric Nash Negotiation Model
【摘要】 公平合理的污染物排放总量控制指标分配是总量控制制度有效运行的关键环节。本文综合考虑区域差异、行业差异等,研究总量控制指标差异性公平分配模式;设定区域差异情景、行业差异情景、一般耦合情景和综合耦合情景,运用Nash谈判模型建立政府横向公平对比谈判机制,研究区域污染物总量控制指标差异性公平分配的优化算法,并以吉林省的COD总量控制指标分解为例进行实例分析。结果显示,与基准年排放量占比相比,基于区域差异的分配方案变化不大(-15.22%~4.48%),但基于行业差异的分配方案因化学纤维制造业(30.0%)和黑色金属冶炼和压延加工业(27.2%)配额影响而变化很大(-87.83%~154.22%)。考虑传统总量指标配额行政直接分配模式单一,运用Nash谈判模型对分配结果进行谈判优化,结果显示综合耦合情景下的COD配额分配结果因综合区域差异和行业差异而基本得到了所有市的认可,综合满意度为89.02%;而区域差异情景下的COD配额分配结果,因更接近于基准年排放量占比而得到除吉林市和通化市以外的其他7个城市的认可,优化博弈后的满意度最高(89.25%);一般耦合情景和行业差异情景,因部分配额高指标行业集中到吉林市和通化市,存在很大的争议;博弈结果显示各市并不希望配额指标分配结果偏离基准年太多。因此,实现省域总量控制指标差异性公平分配,可引入政府横向公平谈判机制博弈优化差异性配置方案,识别满意度最高或认可度最高的谈判优化方案,实现总量控制指标分配的差异性公平。
【Abstract】 The fair and reasonable allocation of total amount control index of pollutant emissions is the key point for the effective operation of the total amount control system. In this paper,we firstly studied the allocation model for regional total pollutant control index considering the regional differences and industry differences,etc. Then we set up the regional difference scenario,the industry difference scenario,the general coupling scenario and the comprehensive coupling scenario,and used the method of Nash Negotiation Model to introduce the government mechanism of horizontal fair comparison and negotiation,so as to study the optimization algorithm of difference fairness allocation. We took the decomposition of COD total amount control index in Jilin Province as an example. The results showed that the allocation of COD based on regional differences had a little change compared with that of the base year( the rate of change range from-15. 22% to 4. 48%). The allocation of COD based on industry differences varied greatly from the proportion of base year emissions( the rate of change range from-87. 83% to 154. 22%),as a result of the impact of chemical fiber manufacturing( 30. 0%) and ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry( 27. 2%). Since the traditional administrative direct distribution is single form, this paper used the Nash Negotiation Model to introduce the competition and supervision mechanism among governments. The results showed that COD allocation in the comprehensive coupling scenario had basically been approved by all cities due to the regional differences and industry differences. The comprehensive satisfaction rate was 89. 02%. However,the allocation of COD allocation under the regional difference scenario was approved by 7 cities because of the results close to the proportion of base year emissions,except Jilin City and Tonghua City. The comprehensive satisfaction was the highest( 89. 25%). Controversy existed in the general coupling scenario and the industry difference scenario,because of some industries with a higher allocation ratio in Jilin and Tonghua. The game result showed that each city did not want the allocation results to deviate from the base year. Therefore,to realize the difference fairness allocation of provincial total amount control index,we should introduce the horizontal fair comparison and negotiation of differential allocation and identify the highest satisfaction or highest recognition of negotiation optimization scheme,so as to achieve the difference fairness allocation of total amount control index.
【Key words】 total amount control; difference fairness; regional difference; industry difference; the Asymmetric Nash Negotiation Model;
- 【文献出处】 中国人口·资源与环境 ,China Population,Resources and Environment , 编辑部邮箱 ,2018年08期
- 【分类号】X321
- 【被引频次】10
- 【下载频次】535