【摘要】 在我国,政府深度参与重大工程建设各个阶段,承担多重的、动态的重要功能,不同阶段的不同功能影响着重大工程治理体系的构建以及社会效益的实现。构建相互独立、权责清晰的建设主体和监管主体,能够充分发挥政府监管作用,保证治理的科学性。从政府承担的不同功能入手来探讨重大工程治理问题,创新性地提出一个以政府为主导的"政府式委托代理"治理结构,并在此基础上构建"激励-监管"治理模型,对比有无监管条件下的帕累托最优解,并结合数值分析进行验证。结果表明,有效的政府监管能够显著提升建设主体努力水平和工程整体效益,且随着监管主体监管水平的提高,能够有效降低工程风险。尤其对于重大工程这一类具有复杂性、深度不确定性的高风险工程而言,较高的监管水平能够有效防治工程风险,提升工程整体社会效益。政府应当努力提升治理能力,通过科学手段引导重大工程相关行业提升创新能力,促进社会进步。更多还原

【Abstract】 In China,the governments are deeply involved in all project stages of the major infrastructure projects and play a variety of multiple,important,and even conflicting roles in affecting the governance structures and the project social benefits.In this study,we argue that the governance structure with clear demystification between the construction parties and regulatory parties can allow the governments to fulfill their regulative duties.Following this logic,this paper proposes a "government-related incentiveregulation"model(GIR model).We employ the numerical analysis of the Pareto optimal solutions to examine the two alternatives of the proposed theoretical model that is,with and without regulatory parties existed.We found that the effective government regulation can significantly improve the level of construction effort and benefit the overall project’social benefits.In addition,the regulatory intensity can effectively reduce the project risk,especially for major infrastructure projects with significant complexity and uncertainty.That is,the higher level of regulation,the less project risks,and the more social benefits.In the end,we suggest that the government should increase the level of regulation to promote innovation and improve social welfare.更多还原