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有限理性视角下城市遗产保护主体的行为机制——基于上海市三个案例的比较研究

MAIN ACTORS’ BEHAVIOR MECHANISM OF URBAN HERITAGE PROTECTION UNDER THE BOUNDED RATIONALITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THREE CASES IN SHANGHAI

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【作者】 张小平闫凤英

【Author】 ZHANG Xiaoping;YAN Fengying;

【机构】 天津大学建筑学院

【摘要】 当前城市遗产保护主体的日益多元化,逐渐成为推进城市遗产保护的新动力,因此明确不同保护主体的行为机制对于提高城市遗产保护的效果起着重要作用。本文从有限理性的视角入手,建立城市遗产不同保护主体的博弈演化机制。首先通过借鉴利益相关者理论,划分城市遗产保护主体的第一利益圈层、第二利益圈层和第三利益圈层。其次针对不同的利益圈层分别选取上海新天地、M50创意产业园及田子坊三个案例进行比较,总结有限理性下不同保护主体之间的行为机制在动力机制、过程机制及约束机制上的异同。最后提出城市遗产的保护应"对症下药",同时建立政府、专业精英、遗产使用人及公众协同参与的机制,以解决当前城市遗产保护中面临的"主体困境"。

【Abstract】 Main urban heritage protection actors, which are increasingly diverse, have gradually become a new impetus to promote urban heritage protection. So it is important to identify the behavior mechanism of different protection actors to improve the effect of urban heritage protection. From the perspective of the bounded rationality, this paper develops a game evolution mechanism of different urban heritage protection actors. Firstly, drawing from the theory of stakeholders, the paper divides the main actors of urban heritage protection into the first interests circle, the second interests circle, and the third interests circle. Secondly, through the analogy of three cases: Xintiandi, M50 creative industry park, and Tianzifang in Shanghai, it summarizes differences and similarities of the dynamic mechanism, process mechanism, and restraint mechanism between different protection actors under the bounded rationality. Finally, it concludes that in order to solve the current dilemma of urban heritage protection, we should choose "the right medicine" and establish a mechanism for government, professional elites, heritage users, and public participation in current urban heritage protection.

【基金】 教育部人文社会科学研究项目“我国新农村城镇化模式探析与片区空间规划理论研究”(11YJA840025)
  • 【文献出处】 城市规划 ,City Planning Review , 编辑部邮箱 ,2018年07期
  • 【分类号】TU984.114
  • 【被引频次】4
  • 【下载频次】1046
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