【摘要】 1999~2014年,我国对稀土的控制主要放在稀土产业链的末端即出口环节上。在稀土产业链的上游即稀土的生产和经营的环节,对非国有的民企和外企是放开的。国企的稀土出口指标是有富裕的,而民企和外企的稀土出口指标是短缺的,这客观上会导致对稀土出口指标的寻租行为,由此引发关于稀土出口指标公开或私下的市场交易。2011年我国的稀土出口总量降至最高峰年稀土出口总量的四分之一,说明出口配额管制在量的控制方面还是有成效的。在"后配额管制"时代,民企和外企的稀土生产和出口可能会有进一步的发展,我国的稀土总出口量可能会所反弹。为控制稀土这一重要的战略资源,国家可将控制权从稀土产业下游的出口数量方面的限制渐渐移至对稀土资源的源头控制。更多还原

【Abstract】 From 1999 to 2014, rare earth was controlled by Chinese government at the final stage of the industrial chain, i.e. limited by exporting quota, while the up-streams of rare earth industrial chain, i.e., the producing and operating, was opened to Private Enterprises and the FDIs. However, there was surplus export quota for the SOEs;whereas for Private Enterprises and FDIs there were shortages on the quota. These institutional arrangements had resulted in rent-seeking behavior for rare earth export quotas, causing the black or open market transactions of the export quotas. The export quota policy had controlled China’s total exports of rare earth, its export quantity in 2011 was only a quarter of peak value. During "Post Quota Control" period, the rare earth produced and exported by Non-SOEs and FDIs might further grow, and the total export quantity might rebound. In order to better control rare earth, the government should shift the control right from the final stage to property or capital right on production and operation.更多还原