【摘要】 实际参与生产经营和公司管理的创业板上市公司高级管理人员(高管)集体离职不仅对创业板公司的长期稳定发展造成不利的影响,同时也给创业板市场带来负面冲击,并加大创业板市场波动。本文从微观视角验证了PE基金抑制高管集体离职的积极作用,实证结果表明:首先,相比于没有PE基金参与的创业板上市公司,PE基金的参与能够显著的抑制高管主动离职;其次,从PE基金管理合伙人的股东背景视角看,相比于国资基金和民营基金,外资基金抑制高管离职的作用最为显著;而券商直投基金对抑制高管离职的作用不强。更多还原

【Abstract】 The resignation of the top management executives who are actually conducting the production operation and company management will cause adverse effects both on long-term stable development of the companies themselves, and on the Growth Enterprise Market(GEM)’s development. From the microscopic perspective, the empirical results of this paper show that:(1) compared to the GEM listing companies without PE involvement, PE funds’ participation can restrain executives voluntary resignations;(2) from the perspective of the shareholder background of the PE funds, foreign funds, compared to state owned funds and non-state owned funds can inhibit the executive resignation more significantly, but the inhibition of the brokerage directed funds on executive resignation is not strong.更多还原