地方政府债券违约风险形成机制及防范——基于委托代理问题的分析

【摘要】 就地方政府债券而言,在地方政府和居民之间涉及两类委托代理问题:债权债务的代理问题和公共政策的代理问题。地方政府依凭中央政府的"父爱心理",具有向上转移债务的动机,导致地方政府债券规模人为扩大;地方政府"经济人"特性促使其有意识地运用公共债务追求自身利益而罔顾公共财政风险。这些都隐藏着潜在风险无限增加的可能性。可以从建立相应的法律法规制度、居民退出机制、地方政府内在约束机制、事前制约机制、事后监督机制以及深化政务公开制度来防范信用风险。更多还原

【Abstract】 As for local governmental bonds,there are two kinds of principle-agent problems between local governments and residents: creditor’s right and debt agent,and public policies agent.Local governments which depend on paternalism have motivation to shift debt to the central government,which results in the artificial expansion of local governments bonds scale;the specialty of local governmental "economic man"promotes them to consciously use public debts to pursue their own interests and ignore public finance risk,which implicates the possibility of potential risk unlimited increase.It is possible to prevent credit risk by establishing corresponding law,regulations,and system,residents exiting mechanism,local government internal restraining mechanism,afterwards supervision mechanism,and deepen public affairs system.更多还原