【摘要】 基于现代经济学公平偏好理论,通过扩展双代理人与注入刻画代理人之间关于收益比较的横向公平性偏好因素,改进传统经济学纯粹自利性假设下的单代理人的HM模型,设计包括横向公平偏好因素在内的新委托-代理激励机制,并分析非对称信息下的代理成本。结果显示:为了降低"道德风险",委托人无需采取监督与控制的办法,只要雇佣横向公平性偏好程度尽可能高的代理人,就会尽可能减少代理成本,增加委托人的期望收益,这为解决传统经济学理论中由于信息非对称所带来的高监督成本难题,提供了一条有效的新思路。更多还原

【Abstract】 There has been a growing concern in the field of economics about resolving the dilemma between lowering the agency cost caused by asymmetric information and increasing moral risk problems.Although the principal-agent theory can help remove the dilemma,it does not take into consideration high supervision and control costs.The goal of this paper is to seek solutions to effectively reducing the agency cost from the perspective of behavior economics.By emphasizing the intrinsic factors of agents,we introduced the factor of horizontal income comparison of agents.We sorted and structured agents according to the degree of their horizontal fairness preference.A hypothesis was proposed to investigate if a principal could have a preference to elect the types of agents he is interested in working with to reduce the agency cost in the process of hiring an agent.This paper proposes two agents would concern their incomes and comparative incomes from their own jobs if they could perform jobs independently We expanded Holmstrom and Milgrom’s(HM) single agent model into a new principal-agent model that helps explain double agents under the fairness preference condition.After incorporating new incentive mechanisms and the factor of horizontal fairness preference into the principal-agent model,we analyzed the effect of information symmetry on incentives and agency cost.This paper consists of five sections.The first section illustrates self-interest suppositions from the perspective of traditional economics,and the necessity of establishing fairness suppositions from the perspective of behavior economics.This paper proposes a principal-agent model to analyze double agents based on Fehr and Schmidt’s(1999) fairness preference theory and techniques.The second section primarily discussed the horizontal principal-agent model,and revealed similarities and differences of incentive mechanisms of the traditional HM model under different self-interest preference conditions.The third section argued that after considering information asymmetry of agents the horizontal principal-agent model could produce incentive effects different from those of the same model with vertical fairness preference and the traditional HM model with self-interest preference.The fourth section reveals that information asymmetry can produce agency costs using the principal-agent model.The agency cost is negatively related to the degree of the horizontal fairness preference.The agency cost is close to zero when agents have an infinite degree of horizontal fairness preference.The last section concludes the findings of previous sections.This paper provides a new alternative to resolving the dilemma between lowering the agency cost caused by information asymmetry and increasing moral risk problems that long exists in the traditional economics theory.Our proposed principal-agent model shows that the agency cost and moral risks can both be largely reduced by adjusting the agent structure and hiring agents with a higher degree of horizontal fairness preference.更多还原