【摘要】 经济学通常认为价格补贴包括要素价格补贴会导致无谓损失,而且对无谓损失的估计有可能影响对农业保险业务的政策支持。本研究认为,即使农业保险是否改变农产品供应曲线、如何影响社会经济福利是一个有争议的问题,但是,如果将保险本身作为特种商品,研究保险市场本身而不是农产品市场的福利变化,仍然可以探讨政策性支持在这一特种商品市场上的作用及其福利含义。在实践中,一个地区是否开展某种保险业务受最低参保率的限制,因而保险市场上的需求曲线并不总能够与供给曲线相交。在两者不相交的情况下存在未实现的潜在经济福利,而政策性支持可能导致其实现,从而增进经济福利;至少实际福利损失要小于简单假定不存在潜在福利的情况。本文以新疆棉花保险、黑龙江玉米保险、江苏水稻、小麦保险为研究对象,利用开放的二分选择式条件估价法(CVM)获取农户对于农业保险的支付意愿(WTP)以测度农业保险的需求曲线并计算不同补贴率下的福利值大小。本文的研究结果验证了上述假设。更多还原

【Abstract】 Economic theory usually assumes the existence of deadweight loss of any price subsidy.The quantitative estimation of such loss might have impact on the decision whether crop insurance should be supported by subsidy from public funds.This research find that the implementation of crop insurance program in any places is restricted by a minimum participation rate requirement,and the demand curve and supply curve may not always meet with each other,If some farmers are denied participating in crop insurance due to insufficient participation rate,there might exist unrealized potential economic welfare.If a subsidy reduces insurance premium and stimulates higher participation so that crop insurance program could be carried out in the location,such potential welfare will be actually realized.In this case,the welfare loss is likely less than conventionally estimated,and there might even be a net increase in social welfare.Dichotomous choice with open-ended followed up contingent Valuation Method(CVM)is applied to household survey data on willingness-to-pay(WTP)collected for cotton insurance in Xinjiang,corn insurance in Heilongjiang,and rice & wheat insurance in Jiangsu to measure the welfare change and cost-benefit ratio resulted from the subsidy under assumed minimum participation rate.The empirical results support the above hypothesis.更多还原