【摘要】 研究了不同信息结构下的供应商产品质量改进的激励问题,主要运用契约理论设计有效的激励机制促使供应商加强产品质量改进上的努力,并通过对不同信息结构下激励效果的对比,阐明了消除产品质量信息不对称的必要性。在借鉴工程质量监理经验的基础上,建议企业可以尝试开展产品质量监理活动,以消除对供应商产品质量改进信息的不对称。最后,建立了一个激励模型可以促使质量监理工程师汇报真实的质量改进信息,并对引入质量监理工程师的经济性条件进行了分析。更多还原

【Abstract】 Firstly,the problem on how to encourage the suppliers to improve their products quality in different information structure is discussed.It mainly applies the contract theory to design an effective incentive mechanism that can urge the suppliers to enhance their effort in improving products quality.It also contrasts the incentive effects in different information structure and illustrates the necessity of avoiding information asymmetry of the suppliers’ products quality.Secondly,it suggests buyers should carry out quality surveillance activities to avoid information asymmetry based on the experience of engineering quality surveillance.Finally,it designs an incentive model which can induce quality surveillance engineers to report the true information of quality improvement and analyses the economic feasibility condition on hiring quality surveillance engineers.更多还原