【摘要】 财政约束硬化是国有企业转换机制的重要前提条件,但是经济转轨国家的实践表明,财政约束硬化在大部分转轨国家都没有做到。尽管产权学论者和外部环境论者都给出了自己的解释,但都不说明政府为什么对硬化国有企业财政约束“知而不能为之”的原因。文章通过建立了政府、国有企业和民营企业三者间动态博弈模型研究发现,政府对国有企业预算约束是“软”或“硬”不能简单地一概而论,财政对国有企业的预算是“硬”还是“软”内生于经济体制改革的进程和改革的方式选择,以及国有企业本身的竞争能力。因此,转轨国家应该考虑国有企业自身竞争能力情况,在改革不同阶段采取灵活的财政手段,保证转轨过程中全社会福利水平的提高,从而顺利推进国有企业改革的进行。更多还原

【Abstract】 That financial subsides are distributed to the StatedOwned Enterprises(SOEs) is a phenomenon of financial soft budget constraint in economic reforming countries. The purpose of economic reform is to harden the constraint of SOEs, to improve their internal efficiencies and to make them share benefits equally. But in reality, reforming countries do not implement all the hardening measures that can play important role in transforming internal mechanism of SOEs. Even though the schools of property right and external environment have given some explanations on it, they do not shown why the governments are incompetent while they know the shortcomings of SOEs. In view of the above situation, this paper tries to solve the problems by a 3stage dynamic game model with complete information. The results show that whether the financial budget constraint is soft or not, the constraint is derived from the process and the competences of economic reforms. Therefore, we suggest that government should take financial measures in terms of SOEs’ competences during different periods of SOEs’ reform.更多还原