节点文献
大股东监督机制与收购约束机制之间的冲突
Conflicts Between the Supervision Mechanism From Large Shareholders and Outer Acquisition Restriction Mechanism
【摘要】 在现代公司治理机制中,大股东监督机制的有效性起着重要作用;同时,它与其他治理机制之间存在着矛盾与冲突。我们基于大股东监督机制、经理人行为以及外部收购约束机制三者之间的相互作用关系建立模型,对大股东监督机制与收购约束机制之间的冲突进行具体分析,提出减少这两种机制之间的冲突、发挥治理机制最大效用的基本思路。
【Abstract】 In modern corporate governance mechanisms,the supervision mechanism from large shareholders plays an important role,and it has conflict with other mechanisms at the same time.Based on the relationship among supervision mechanism from large shareholders,manager and acquisition restriction mechanism,this paper analyses the conflicts between the supervision mechanism from large shareholders and outer acquisition restriction mechanism by constructing a model,and puts forward a simple thought on how to harmonize the conflicts and show the function of corporate governance mechanisms farthest.
【Key words】 supervision mechanism from large shareholders; acquisition restriction mechanism; agency costs;
- 【文献出处】 山西财经大学学报 ,Journal of Shanxi Finance and Economics University , 编辑部邮箱 ,2006年06期
- 【分类号】F832.51;F224
- 【下载频次】130