【摘要】 在研发项目外包合作关系中,缔约各方的行为不仅受正式契约规制,而且受非正式契约调节。后者对合作研发绩效尤其是持续合作有着重要影响。鉴于此,本文在“关系契约”概念基础上构建了一个研发项目外包者与承包者之间的重复博弈模型,分析研发项目外包合作关系中的非正式治理机制—关系契约的基本特征。结果表明,研发项目外包者和承包者之间的对称性关系契约只与技术成果价值的波动幅度有关,而与承包者的研发生产率系数及私人成本系数等特征参数无关。这对于关系契约的优化设计具有重要的参考价值。更多还原

【Abstract】 During R&D outsourcing,the actions of the participants are regulated not only by formal contracts but also by informal contracts which are badly important to the performance of sustaining cooperative R&D.This paper studies the informal governance mechanism,namely relational contracts,in R&D outsourcing by a repeated game model based on the concept of relational contracts.According to the result,the symmetric relational contract between the principal and agent depends only on the fluctuation of the targeted innovation′ value and has nothing to do with the agent′s characteristic parameters such as the R&D productivity and the private marginal cost.The theoretical conclusion can contribute greatly to the design of relational contracts for R&D outsourcing.更多还原