节点文献

试析国有资产营运机构和政府的委托—代理关系

Principal—Agent Model Between the State-owned Assets Operating Organizations and the Government

  • 推荐 CAJ下载
  • PDF下载
  • 不支持迅雷等下载工具,请取消加速工具后下载。

【作者】 费章凤

【Author】 FEI Zhang-feng(Glorious Sun School of Business and Management,Donghua University,Shanghai,200051)

【机构】 东华大学旭日工商管理学院 上海200051

【摘要】 国有资产营运机构和政府的关系是构建国资营运机构治理模式的基础。本文通过委托—代理模型剖析国有资产营运机构与政府之间的关系。基本委托—代理模型,结合国有资产营运机构的特点,引入概率约束参数来反映国有资产运营机构参与国有资产经营管理的约束条件,得出国资营运机构的努力成本系数是影响营运绩效的重要因素,政府应通过有效的激励与约束机制降低国有资产运营中的努力成本系数,完善与营运机构之间的委托—代理关系,实现双方利益的最优化。

【Abstract】 The relationship between the State-owned Assets Operating Organizations and the Government is essential for establishing the governance model of the State-owned Assets Operating Organizations.Based on the principal-agent model and combined with the characteristics of the State-owned Assets Operating Organizations,the paper utilizes the probability constraint parameters to reflect the constraint conditions for the State-owned Assets Operating Organizations’ participation in managing the state-owned assets.The paper points out that the effort cost coefficient is the critical factor that influences the operational excellence of the State-owned Assets Operating Organizations.As the principal,the Government shall try to improve its principal-agent relationship with the State-owned Assets Operating Organizations and optimize mutual benefits through effective incentive and control mechanism.

  • 【文献出处】 东华大学学报(自然科学版) ,Journal of Donghua University(Natural Science) , 编辑部邮箱 ,2006年04期
  • 【分类号】F123.7
  • 【下载频次】160
节点文献中: