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个体概念与唯我论问题
The Conception of Individual and the Problem of Solipsism
【摘要】 人们在思考哲学基本问题时,应该明确个体作为哲学活动实施者的地位,哲学应该是在理想性、原则性总体哲学背景下的具体哲学活动。重申个体在哲学中的基本地位,首先面临的是新的唯我论问题,通过对个体多维结构的分析,人们可以建立个体三种合法的视角,这三种视角下的哲学活动都有其合法性,由此打破新的唯我论,揭示出在新条件下哲学多元化的可能性。
【Abstract】 This paper is intended for the fact that when we meditate on the basic problems of philosophy, it is necessary to ensure individual’s essential role as the actual doer of philosophical activities; and we should, under total philosophy characterized with utopia and principle, carry out concrete philosophical activities. This viewpoint comes directly from the analysis of meaning of socalled philosophical language transfer. In my opinion, this transfer, established by Heidegger and Wittgenstein respectively, has brought people and their ontological basis from heaven to everyday life. Logically, ideal people, who are beyond every living individual and has been taking on the role of narrator of philosophy for a long time in human’s history, cannot take on the role of the real doer of everyday life, part of which philosophical activity is. It is only living individual who can shoulder the role of life bearer and life doer. So, we must reappoint individual’s status in philosophical activities. This reappointed status would confront us with neosolipsism eventually. The solution to the problem depends on the legitimization of three perspectives of individual, which come from its inner structure and can provide legitimate proof for philosophical activities. Individual differs from ideal people in terms of concreteness and limitedness, that is to say, individual is limited by time and space in which he lives. Then his difference from ideal people lies in that the perspectives by which he constructs his own world are limited as our perspectives in daily life. Human beings are not almighty God in any case. Then arises the problem of neosolipsism: how can people, from limited perspectives, understand and treat each other freely and fairly? The solution depends on the analysis of individual and especially the structure of individual’s perspectives. With reference to Satre’s analysis of Dasein’s threedimension structure, this paper divides the individual’s perspectives into three types - subjective, objective and intersubjective, - which respond respectively to individual’s threedimension structure: the subjective perspective to the first dimension of self, the objective perspective to the I in the other’s eye and the intersubjective perspective to plural egalitarian individuals). Self and the other present themselves in the same way, with the body as the center integrating the three dimensions and the three perspectives into a whole individual. Therefore, it is man himself that provides the ontological basis of legitimization for these three perspectives.From above can be reached the conclusion that pluralization of philosophy is legitimate. From every perspective people can construct one dimension of the world and show a particular individual and the limited world in the particular developmental stage of mankind. All these possibilities are based upon equal legitimization
【Key words】 solipsism; plural perspectives; intersubjectivity; pluralization of philosophy;
- 【文献出处】 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版) ,Journal of Zhejiang University(Humanities and Social Sciences) , 编辑部邮箱 ,2003年01期
- 【分类号】B089
- 【被引频次】8
- 【下载频次】363