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上市公司经理激励的东西部比较研究

Comparative Research of Executive Incentive of Listed Companies of Chinese Eastern and Western Areas

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【作者】 兰永李仕明杜义飞

【Author】 LAN Yong, LI Shi-ming, DU Yi-fei(School of Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China)

【机构】 电子科技大学管理学院电子科技大学管理学院 四川成都610054四川成都610054四川成都610054

【摘要】 通过考察上市公司高级管理层激励测度的内在结构,利用因子分析法获得了"经理薪酬"和"经理持股"两个主成分,在此基础上,建立经济增加值、市场增加值与两个主成分的多元回归模型并统计检验。结果表明:东部和西部上市公司高级管理层激励测度的内在结构存在明显差异,东部股权激励较货币激励突出,西部货币激励较股权激励突出。东部上市公司经济增加值与"经理薪酬"、"经理持股"显著正相关,市场增加值与两个激励测度正相关,但不显著;西部地区经济增加值与"经理薪酬"显著负相关,市场增加值与"经理薪酬"和"经理持股"均存在显著的正相关关系。

【Abstract】 On the basis of observing the inherent structure of top-management incentive in listed companies and by factor analysis, we get two principal components, which are executive salary and executive shareholding. Then, we establish several multivariate regression models which link economic value added(EVA) and market value added(MVA) to the two principal components and carry out statistical tests. The results show that the inherent structure of top-management incentive of listed companies in Chinese eastern and western areas is obviously different. In the east, equity incentive is more outstanding than monetary incentive, EVA is significantly positively related with executive salary and executive shareholding; MVA is positively related with the two principal components, but not significant. In the west, monetary incentive is more outstanding than equity incentive; EVA is significantly negatively related with executive salary while MVA is significantly positively related with executive salary and executive shareholding.

【关键词】 委托代理激励绩效经济利润
【Key words】 principal-agentincentiveperformanceeconomic profit
【基金】 国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(79725002)
  • 【文献出处】 预测 ,Forecasting , 编辑部邮箱 ,2003年06期
  • 【分类号】F276.6
  • 【被引频次】16
  • 【下载频次】210
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