【摘要】 在对风险资本融资过程中风险投资家声誉的作用与影响进行分析与讨论的基础上 ,运用博弈论多阶段动态模型建立了一个风险投资家考虑声誉的两阶段动态融资模型并进行了分析 ,得出如下主要结论 :受声誉影响的阶段的努力程度严格大于不受声誉影响的阶段的努力程度 ;受影响的时期越长 ,声誉对风险投资家的激励作用就越大 ,风险投资家的努力程度也就越高 .最后还给出了一个例子具体地说明风险投资家两阶段动态融资模型的应用与分析 .更多还原

【Abstract】 On the basis of analysis and discussion of the function and affection of the reputation of venture capitalists during the raising of venture capital, this paper sets up a two-period dynamic financing model of venture capitalists considering reputation using multi-period dynamic model of game theory and analyses it. Then some important conclusions have been drawn: the degree of endeavor during the period affected by reputation is strictly more than that during the period not affected by reputation; the longer the period affected by reputation is, the larger the incentive function of reputation to venture capitalist is, and the higher the degree of endeavor of venture capitalist is. Lastly, an example is cited to concretely illustrate the application and analysis of two-period dynamic financing model of venture capitalist.更多还原