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论国有企业经营者报酬激励机制

On state-owned enterprise manager′s remuneration motivation mechanism

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【作者】 陈晓红; 毛萍;

【Author】 CHEN Xiao hong,MAO Ping (College of Business and Management, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

【机构】 中南大学工商管理学院!长沙; 410083;

【摘要】 现代公司制企业制度出现了股东与现代企业经营者之间的委托代理关系 ,为了最大限度地增加委托人的效用 ,必须对代理人进行有效的激励 ,这是委托代理关系中的核心问题 ,其中报酬成为诸多激励因素中最重要的一种。基于此 ,从报酬激励机制含义出发 ,阐述了尽快建立有效的国企经营者报酬激励机制的重要性 ,分析了国有企业经营者年薪制激励存在的问题 ,提出了重构市场经济下国企经营者报酬激励机制的路径和对策

【Abstract】 The relation of agency by agreement between shareholders and modern enterprises manager has emerged under modern enterprise institution of corporation system. In order to maximize shareholders′ utility, agents must be effectively motivated. This is the key problem of the relation of agency by agreement. Remuneration has become the most important of all motivation factors. This article has expounded on remuneration motivation mechanism, set forth importance of establishing valid state owned enterprise manager′s remuneration motivation mechanism, analyzed existing problems of state owned enterprise managers′ motivation of yearly salary system, and pointed out ways and countermeasures of reconstructing state owned enterprise managers′ remuneration motivation mechanism under market economy.

  • 【文献出处】 中南工业大学学报(社会科学版) ,Social Science Journal For Central South Vuiversity of Technology , 编辑部邮箱 ,2001年01期
  • 【分类号】F272
  • 【被引频次】120
  • 【下载频次】463
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