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程颐、朱熹“格物致知”论思路判析──从近代认识论角度

A Modern Epistemological Criticism of Cheng-Yi and Zhu-Xi’s Theory of "Studying Things to Acquire Knowledge

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【作者】 邓联合; 周广立;

【Author】 DENG Lian-He; ZHOU Guang-Li ( College of Literature, Law and Politics, China University of Mining And Technology, Xuzhou 221000; Xin Hun Daily Office, NanJing 210092)

【机构】 中国矿业大学文法学院; 《新华日报》社 江苏徐州221000; 江苏南京210092;

【摘要】 程颐、朱囊的“格物致知”理论本质上是一种道德形上学,其本质论前提是“理”的本体论,其认识论前提是主体和客体的相对二分。由于这一理论在力倡认识自然事物的同时却未能提供切实有效的认知方法,因而未能实现向近代科学认识论的转型。

【Abstract】 The modern epistemological method is used to criticize Cheng-Yi and Zhu-Xi’ s theory of "Studying Things To Acquire Knowledge" in this paper. The author puts forwards that their theory has not offered effective means to study the essence of natural things, therefore it can not transform into modern scientific epistemology.

【关键词】 程熙; 朱熹; “格物致知”;
【Key words】 Cheng-Yi; Zhu-Xi; "Studying Things To Acquire Knowledge;
  • 【文献出处】 徐州师范大学学报 , 编辑部邮箱 ,2001年03期
  • 【分类号】B244.6;B244.7
  • 【被引频次】8
  • 【下载频次】540
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