【作者】 张莉；

【导师】 王路；

【作者基本信息】 清华大学 ， 哲学， 2023， 博士

【副题名】以真之极小论为中心

【摘要】 “真(truth)”是西方哲学中最为重要的概念之一。但对于什么是真、应该如何定义真乃至应该如何研究真,人们往往莫衷一是。按照传统观点,“真”这个概念是实质概念,它或者表示语句、陈述、命题等真之载体与外部世界间的某种关系,如“符合”;或者表示真之载体相互间某种关系,如“融贯”等等。基于这些观点,真似乎可以由别的概念定义,真概念也因其实质性而在人们的信念体系中扮演重要角色。自弗雷格以降,人们对“真”的看法发生改变。弗雷格认为真无法定义。更重要的是,他发现真概念的独特之处:真概念的使用服从于T语句。后一点在塔斯基的真之理论中得到应用。在经典逻辑中,塔斯基为人们贡献了真之不可定义性定理。在语义性真之理论中,塔斯基通过语言分层的方法,为满足特定条件的对象语言提供真之定义。弗雷格、塔斯基等人对T语句的发现和使用引起后世学者们的重视。紧缩主义真之理论的大部分论题也围绕T语句建立。冗余论、代语句论、真之述行论、去引号论以及真之极小论都属于紧缩主义真之理论。本研究以真之极小论为中心而展开,兼顾其它真之紧缩论。真之极小论认为,真概念的基本内容由T模式及其例示给出;借助T模式,人们可以说明有关真的一切问题;真之理论对其它理论具有中立性;除了表达概括等功能,真概念不应被赋予更多作用。这些观点是紧缩论最具代表性的观点,因而受到多方批判。在一定程度上修正真之极小论的表述后,本文从真概念的解释功能、真之理论在科学实在论与反实在论之争中的作用、真之理论与意义理论的关系等方面为极小论的论题进行辩护。概括问题是紧缩论充分性论题面临的一大挑战。本文借助公理化真之理论的成果,在坚持真之理论的中立性,即形式意义上保守性的前提下,解决概括问题。公理化真之理论是逻辑、真之理论、数学以及知识论相互交叉的领域,其中仍有许多开放问题亟待解决。更多还原

【Abstract】 Truth is one of the most important concepts in western philosophy.However,there has been no consensus among philosophers when it comes to these topics: What is the essence of truth(if any)? How should we define truth(if possible)? And how the study of truth should be executed? etc.From a traditional viewpoint,truth is substantial,rep-resenting some relationship between truth-bearers and worlds outside of our languages,or some relationship between truth-bearers.Thus,truth can be defined by concepts such as ‘correspondence’,‘coherence’ and the like.It thereby should play an important role in the human belief system.Frege held an alternative view of truth.For him,truth cannot be defined by any means.He discovered T-sentences,by which he was convinced that truth is unique.Tarski made heavy use of the T-schema in his seminal paper,claiming instances of it should be implied by any adequate definition of truth.The truth predicate cannot be defined by first-order languages for these languages themselves,according to Tarski’s work.Therefore,he distinguished object languages and meta-languages,and gave semantic definitions of truth for a set of object languages within the latter.Philosophers after Frege and Tarski have noticed the significance of the T-schema.Deflationism is built up on the T-schema,indeed.The redundancy theory of truth,the prosentential theory of truth,the performative theory of truth,disquotationalism and minimalism are typical deflationary truth theories.Minimalism claims that all the content of the concept of truth has been exhausted by T-sentences.Therefore,all problems concerning truth can be explained within the scope of Tarski biconditionals.Truth theories are neutral,according to minimalism,hence battles between realists and anti-realists cannot be resolved by them.We have a truth predicate to express generalisations,that is the only raison d’être of the truth predicate.Minimalism and deflationism in general have been under fire since the day they were born.This paper is going to defend minimalism and deflationism as a consequence.We first tackle the problem of how to formulate minimalism,then argue that mini-malism is sufficient for explaining various phenomena concerning truth.We argue that truth theories are neutral,which is instantiated by scientific realism debates.We argue that the truth-conditional theory of meaning is compatible with deflationism,but not in the term’s original sense.By the end,under the light of axiomatic truth theories,we re-solve the generalisation problem,defending the adequacy thesis of minimalism on the one hand,and the conservativeness thesis on the other.Axiomatic studies of truth is a field full of open questions,which deserve scholars’ further efforts.更多还原