【作者】 刘丽华；

【导师】 孔东民；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 金融学， 2021， 博士

【副题名】基于中央企业集团的证据

【摘要】 本文从企业现金持有水平、高管在职消费、企业并购和投资效率四个角度探讨中央企业集团母公司上缴国有资本收益(也称作“集团母公司强制分红政策”)对集团内上市公司行为产生的影响以及具体的影响机制。现有的研究大多基于国有上市公司的自愿性分红和半强制性分红政策对分配股利的公司本身可能产生的影响,鲜有文献关注集团母公司强制性分红政策可能会基于内部资本市场对集团内成员上市公司行为产生的影响。本文将财政部、国资委于2007年12月11日印发的《中央企业国有资本收益收取管理暂行办法》以及后续颁布的一系列提高中央企业国有资本收益收取比例和扩大中央国有资本经营预算实施范围的文件视为对中央企业集团母公司的强制性分红政策。该强制性分红政策规定了每年需要向国家分红的中央企业名单以及相应的需要分红的比例。我们利用这一强制性分红政策作为外生事件,来探讨中央企业集团母公司上缴国有资本收益时,是否会对集团内上市公司行为产生的影响。本文主要基于代理理论、自由现金流量理论、股利政策理论和内部资本市场理论,结合我国的制度背景和股利分配经济后果的相关研究、企业集团内资源配置效率的相关研究、在职消费影响因素的相关研究、企业并购影响因素的相关研究以及投资效率影响因素的相关研究,对集团母公司强制分红政策对集团内成员上市公司行为的影响进行了探讨。具体而言,本文首先探讨了中央企业集团母公司上缴国有资本收益对集团内上市公司现金持有水平的影响,在此基础上,我们进一步探讨了集团母公司负面现金流冲击对集团内上市公司高管在职消费和投资行为(即:企业的并购行为和整体投资效率)的影响,得出了如下几个主要的结论:(1)中央企业集团母公司上缴国有资本收益时,该母公司控制的集团内上市公司现金持有水平会显著下降。机制检验结果表明集团母公司遇到负面的现金流冲击时,没有通过提高集团内上市公司现金分红的比例来为母公司提供资金,相反,集团母公司会通过关联借贷行为从上市公司中转移资金。我们进一步发现,集团母公司强制分红政策的实施会促使大股东进一步通过其他应收款占用上市公司的资金。(2)中央企业集团母公司上缴国有资本收益时,该母公司控制的集团内上市公司的高管在职消费会显著下降,这种影响主要存在于企业融资约束较大、经营活动现金流净值较低、大股东占款较多和政府补贴较低的公司中,这一发现表明强制分红导致了集团内现金流降低进而使得管理者控制的现金流水平下降,一方面使得管理者用于在职消费的现金流降低,另一方面企业内部融资途径受到影响时,外部融资需求会上升,进而会使得企业受到外部资金提供者的监督,进而约束了管理者的在职消费行为。进一步的异质性检验结果表明,集团母公司强制分红对集团内上市公司在职消费的影响主要存在于内外部治理水平较高的公司中。最后,本章还探讨了强制分红政策对企业研发支出的影响,以及在职消费对两者关系的调节作用,我们发现在职消费的降低有助于进一步提升强制分红政策对研发支出的促进作用。(3)中央企业集团母公司上缴国有资本收益时,会抑制该母公司控制的集团内上市公司的并购行为,这种影响主要存在于企业融资约束较大、经营活动现金流净值较低、大股东占款较多和政府补贴较低的公司中,这一发现表明强制分红导致了集团内现金流降低进而使得管理者控制的现金流水平下降,一方面使得管理者用于盲目扩张而进行并购的现金流降低,另一方面企业内部融资途径受到影响时,外部融资需求会上升,进而会使得企业受到外部资金提供者的监督,进而约束了管理者的盲目扩张的行为。我们进一步检验了强制分红政策的实施对并购绩效的影响,从短期绩效来看,我们发现市场并不看好在集团母公司被要求上缴国有资本收益的背景下集团内上市公司的并购行为;从长期绩效来看,在此背景下进行的并购不能为并购方带来收益。(4)中央企业集团母公司上缴国有资本收益时,该母公司控制的集团内上市公司的投资效率会显著提升。在机制分析部分,我们发现强制分红政策实施后,投资机会较少的集团下属上市公司会有额外的现金流出,而且投资机会较少的企业的投资支出也会显著减少,投资效率的提高也主要体现在这些企业中。我们还发现拥有财务公司的中央企业集团内的上市公司的投资效率会比同类企业有更显著的提升。在异质性检验部分,我们发现集团母公司强制分红政策对集团内上市公司投资效率的改善作用主要集中在有较好的内外部治理环境中的企业。最后,本文对研究结论进行了相应的总结,并在此基础上提出了政策建议。此外,我们还介绍了本文的研究不足之处以及未来可以展望的方向。更多还原

【Abstract】 This study investigates the impact of the turning over of state-owned capital gains from unlisted parent central state-owned enterprises(hereafter parent CSOEs)on the behavior of the group-affiliated listed central state-owned enterprises(hereafter listed CSOEs)controlled by those parent CSOEs and the specific mechanism of the impact from four perspectives: corporate cash holdings,the perk consumption of management,corporate mergers and acquisitions,and investment efficiency.Existing studies are mainly based on the possible impact of the voluntary and semi-mandatory dividend policy of state-owned listed companies on the company itself that distributes dividends.However,few studies explore the impact of mandatory dividend policy of the parent firm of the business group on the listed firms affiliated to the business group controlled by those parent firms based on the internal capital market.The article treats a series of files such as the “Interim Measures for the Administration of the Collection of State-owned Capital Gains by Central Enterprises” issued on December 11,2007 and the follow-up documents issued by the Ministry of Finance and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission as mandatory dividend policy.The mandatory dividend policy stipulates the list of central state-owned enterprises that need to distribute dividends and the corresponding proportion of dividends to the state each year.We use this mandatory dividend policy as an exogenous event to explore the listed CSOEs’ behavior when their parent CSOEs of the business group are mandatorily required to pay dividend to the governments.Based on agency theory,free cash flow theory,dividend policy theory and internal capital market theory,combined with Chinese institutional background and relevant research on the economic consequences of dividend distribution,relevant research on the efficiency of resource allocation in business group,determinants of perk consumption,mergers and acquisitions as well as investment efficiency,we investigate the impact of the mandatory dividend policy of the parent firms of the business group on the behavior of the listed firms in the group controlled by those parent firms.Specifically,this study firstly explores the impact of state-owned capital gains turned over by the parent CSOEs on the listed CSOEs’ cash holdings.On this basis,we further examine the impact of negative cash flow shock of the parent CSOEs on the listed CSOEs’ perk consumption and investment behavior(i.e.,corporate mergers and acquisitions and investment efficiency)and has drawn the following main conclusions:(1)The implement of the mandatory dividend policy of the parent CSOEs would significantly reduce listed CSOEs’ cash holdings.The mechanism test results show that when the parent CSOEs encounter a negative cash flow shock,the business group would not provide funds to the parent CSOEs by increasing the proportion of cash dividends of the listed CSOEs in the group.On the contrary,the business group transfers funds from the listed CSOEs to the parent CSOEs through related lending.Moreover,we find that the implementation of the mandatory dividend policy will encourage the parent CSOEs to further occupy the funds of the listed CSOEs through other receivables.(2)When parent CSOEs are mandatorily required to pay dividend to the governments,the listed CSOEs would experience a substantial decrease in perk expenditures.This effect mainly exists in firms with higher level of financing constraints,lower level of net cash flow from operating activities,higher level of occupancy of controlling shareholders,and lower level of government subsidies,indicating that the adverse cash shock for parent CSOEs could reduce perk consumption through shrinking the resources under management control and alleviating the agency problems.We further find that the impact is more pronounced for firms with better internal and external governance.Finally,this chapter also discusses the impact of the mandatory dividend policy on R&D expenditures,as well as the moderating effect of perk consumption on the relationship.We find that the reduction of perk expenditures helps to further enhance the role of mandatory dividend policy on R&D expenditure.(3)When parent CSOEs are mandatorily required to pay dividend to the governments,the listed CSOEs would experience a substantial decrease in the probability and frequency of mergers and acquisitions of listed CSOEs.This effect mainly exists in firms with higher level of financing constraints,lower level of net cash flow from operating activities,higher level of occupancy of controlling shareholders,and lower level of government subsidies,indicating that the adverse cash shock for parent CSOEs could restrain the merger and acquisition of listed CSOEs through shrinking the resources under management control and alleviating the agency problems.We further examine the impact of the implementation of the mandatory dividend policy on the performance of mergers and acquisitions.In terms of short-term performance,we find that the market is not optimistic about the mergers and acquisitions.Regarding long-term performance,mergers and acquisitions of the listed CSOEs cannot bring benefits to the acquirer.(4)When parent CSOEs are mandatorily required to pay dividend to the governments,the investment efficiency is substantially improved in listed CSOEs.A plausible mechanism is that adverse cash shocks of parent CSOEs could facilitate the resource reallocation through related party transactions within a business group motivated by the listed CSOEs’ investment opportunity instead of the parent CSOEs’ tunneling behavior.Our findings are more pronounced for firms with better external and internal governance.Finally,we summarize the research conclusions and put forward policy recommendations.In addition,we also point out the research deficiencies of this article and the possible future research directions.更多还原