【作者】 王迪；

【导师】 刘伟华；

【作者基本信息】 天津大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2020， 博士

【摘要】 全球经济一体化与电子商务的快速发展,为物流产业带来了前所未有的巨大市场,物流服务已经成为全球经济发展的重要推动力量。随着供应链中各成员能力优势的不断分化,具有资源和信息优势的物流企业逐渐转型成为物流服务集成商的角色,而擅长于从事基础物流服务的企业则成为功能型物流服务提供商,上下游通过协同努力共同为客户提供物流服务解决方案,实现价值创造,从而形成了物流服务供应链的基本结构:“功能型物流服务提供商—物流服务集成商—终端客户”。不同于传统的运作管理研究,从行为运作管理的角度来看,管理者会受到社会偏好的影响,从而修正其决策目标,最终做出“最满意”的决策。一些基于“理性经济人”假设的研究结论由于忽视了行为因素的影响不再适用,因此研究面向成员行为的物流服务供应链决策优化具有重要意义。本论文首先对物流服务供应链以及行为运作管理两大领域的研究现状进行了系统综述,通过对已有文献的归纳总结,指出了现有研究的不足以及本论文的研究重点。在此基础上,本论文通过构建四种典型的物流服务供应链决策场景,分析并求解了相应场景中关键行为因素的影响。具体的研究内容与结论总结如下:首先,本研究构建了确定需求下的物流服务供应链订单分配场景,求解了一个物流服务集成商和两个先后进入市场的物流服务提供商之间的斯坦克尔伯格博弈模型。本论文创新性地考虑了同级成员的行为异质性,分析了在位提供商的分配公平关切和后进提供商的同行公平关切对决策的影响。研究表明:物流服务供应链中的最优定价、最优服务创新水平,以及集成商的最优效用均会随后进服务提供商的同行公平关切系数递增,随在位服务提供商的分配公平关切系数递减。当两种公平关切类型同时存在时,对决策结果的影响取决于同行竞争强度和上下游之间定价系数之间的关系。当供应链中仅存在同行公平关切时,集成商可以实现效用最大化。在此基础上,本论文设计了“加盟费+利润共享”形式的激励契约,研究表明,当参数满足一定条件时,可以实现物流服务供应链中决策的优化和集成商效用的提升。此外,通过讨论三种模型拓展情况:考虑不同的公平关切系数;考虑提供商的批发价格为内生决策变量;同时考虑优势不公平和劣势不公平,本论文验证了相关结论的鲁棒性。其次,本论文构建了不确定需求下的物流服务供应链订单分配场景,建立了一个物流服务集成商,一个关键物流服务提供商和一个普通物流服务提供商之间的斯坦克尔伯格博弈模型。从全局优化的角度出发,分析了物流服务集成商的风险厌恶行为,两个物流服务提供商之间的同行竞争以及上下游之间的关系强度的单独影响机制和交互影响机制。研究表明:风险厌恶程度会对供应链中的集成商最优定价、最优质量承诺水平,以及服务提供商的最优质量保障水平产生负向影响,而同行竞争和关系强度则会对上述最优决策结果产生正向影响。三种因素之间存在交互影响机制,即“抵消效应”、“放大效应”,以及“均衡效应”。据此本论文提出了两种决策改进策略:通过调节三种因素的关系来实现的“有限改善”,以及通过运用“激励升级+成本共担”契约来实现的“完全改善”。此外,本论文讨论了当物流服务集成商的服务质量承诺水平和物流服务提供商的服务质量保障水平存在关联关系时的拓展情况,验证了相关结论的鲁棒性。第三,本论文结合物流产业智慧化转型的发展背景,构建了物流服务供应链中的数据价值转化场景,求解了一个物流服务集成商,一个在位物流服务提供商和一个后进物流服务提供商之间的斯坦克尔伯格博弈模型。考虑到集成商和提供商在服务流程与服务特点方面的差异性,本论文将服务过程中可供转化的数据价值细分为两种类型:需求驱动和供给驱动的数据价值,并检验了集成商在数据价值共享过程中利他行为的影响。研究表明:集成商的最优定价和两个服务提供商的最优增值服务水平均会随着需求驱动的数据价值的转化比例递减,从而引发“需求驱动的数据价值悖论”现象;会随着供给驱动的数据价值的转化比例递增,集成商未花费成本而获得了更高的效用,实现了“搭便车效应”。当集成商表现出利他行为时,上述最优决策均随着利他偏好的强度递增,并且三种因素之间会产生“传导效应”。当参数满足一定条件时,客户可以获得一个“最优购买区间”,以更低的市场价格享受更高水平的增值服务。最后,本论文基于对四家中国物流企业的深入调研,采用多案例研究方法,探索了客户的不耐心行为对物流服务供应链绩效的影响路径。研究表明,客户的不耐心行为会通过三种中介因素影响物流服务供应链的绩效,分别是上下游协同程度、供应链成员的风险厌恶程度以及同级成员之间的竞争强度。与此同时,物流企业在物流服务供应链中的控制权强度会对三种中介因素的影响机制产生调节作用。在此基础上,本论文构建了面向客户行为的物流服务供应链绩效管理的全新理论框架。本论文所得的结论不仅能够丰富物流服务供应链和行为运作管理等领域的学术理论,也可以为物流业中的利益相关者提供新颖的管理学见解与决策参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 The rapid development of global economic integration and e-commerce has brought an unprecedented huge market to the logistics industry,and the logistics service has become an important driving force for global economic development.With the continuous differentiation of advantageous capabilities of upstream and downstream,enterprise with resource and information advantages has transformed to the role of logistics service integrator(LSI),while the enterprises that are good at basic logistics services become functional logistics service providers(FLSP).Through the joint efforts of LSI and FLSP,they can provide customers with logistics service solutions and realize value creation,thus forming the basic structure of the logistics service supply chain(LSSC): "FLSP-LSI-Customer".Different from the traditional operations management research,from the view of behavioral operations management,decision-makers are often affected by social preferences,so that they may modify the decision goals and make the most satisfactory decisions.Some research conclusions based on the assumption of "rational economic man" are no longer applicable,as they ignore the influence of behavior factors.It is of great significance to study the member behaviororiented decision optimization of LSSC.This thesis first systematically reviews the research status of the two major areas,that is LSSC management and behavioral operations management.Based on the literature review,the shortcomings of existing research and the research focus of this thesis are pointed out.By constructing four typical decision-making scenarios,the impact mechanisms of key behavioral factors in the corresponding scenarios are analyzed.The specific research conclusions are summarized as follows:First,this thesis constructs an order allocation scenario of LSSC,and solves a Stackelberg game among an LSI and two FLSPs who have entered the market successively.Combining the behavioral heterogeneity of peer member innovatively,this thesis discusses the impacts of the incumbent FLSP’s distributional fairness concern and the new entrant FLSP’s peer-induced fairness concern on the decisionmaking.The thesis shows that the optimal pricing,the optimal service innovation level,and the LSI’s optimal utility increase with the latter FLSP’s peer-induced fairness concern,and decrease with the incumbent FLSP’s distributional fairness concern.When two types of fairness concerns coexist,then the final impact on decision-making depends on the relationship between the competition coefficient and price coefficient.LSI can achieve maximal utility when there only exists the peer-induced fairness concern.Based on the above results,an incentive contract in the form of membership fee and profit sharing is proposed.This thesis finds that when the parameters meet a certain condition,the decision optimization and the improvement of LSI’s utility can be realized.Besides,three model extension cases are discussed: considering different fairness concern coefficients;considering the wholesale price as the endogenous decision variable;and considering the advantage and disadvantage fairness concerns,and this thesis verifies the robustness of relevant conclusions.Second,this thesis constructs an order allocation scenario of LSSC under uncertain demand,and builds a Stackelberg game model among an LSI,a key FLSP and an ordinary FLSP.From the perspective of global optimization,the individual and interaction impacts of the LSI’s risk aversion behavior,peer competition between two FLSPs,and the relationship strength between LSI and FLSP are analyzed.This thesis concludes that the risk aversion behavior has negative impacts on the optimal pricing,optimal level of quality commitment,and level of quality assurance of service product,while peer competition and relationship strength have positive impacts.There are interaction influences among the three factors: the "offset effect",the "amplification effect",and the "equilibrium effect".Two improvement strategies are proposed accordingly,that is the "limited improvement" achieved by adjusting the strength of three factors,and the "complete improvement" achieved by implementing the“incentive upgrade and cost sharing” contract.In addition,this thesis discusses the model extension where there exists a certain relationship between the service commitment level and the service assurance level,and verifies the robustness of the relevant conclusions.Third,this thesis considers the development background of the intelligent transformation of the logistics industry,constructs a scenario of data value transformation in the LSSC and solves the Stackelberg game among one LSI,one incumbent FLSP and one new entrant FLSP.Considering the differences in the service process and characteristic of LSI and FLSP,this thesis divides the data value transformed during the service offering into demand and supply-driven data value,and examines the impact of LSI’s altruistic behavior during the data value sharing.This thesis finds that the LSI’s optimal pricing and FLSPs’ optimal value-added service levels decrease with the conversion ratio of demand-driven data value,resulting in the phenomenon of "demand-driven data value paradox";increase with the conversion ratio of supply-driven data value and the LSI can get higher utility at no cost,achieving the "free-riding effect".When the LSI shows the altruistic behavior,the optimal solutions increase with the altruistic degree and a "transmission effect" occurs among three factors.When the parameters meet a certain condition,customers can obtain an "optimal purchasing area" and gain higher level of value-added service at lower price.Finally,this thesis conducts a multi-case study based on in-depth investigations of four Chinese logistics enterprises,and explores the impact of customers’ impatient behavior on LSSC’s performance.The thesis finds that that the impatient behavior affects the LSSC’s performance through three mediator factors,namely the synergy degree,the risk aversion degree,and the peer competition strength.At the same time,the enterprise’s control power in LSSC is the moderator and influences the impacts of the three mediator factors.A customer behavior-oriented theoretical framework for the performance management of LSSC is obtained accordingly.The conclusions obtained in this thesis can not only enrich academic theories in related fields of LSSC and behavioral operations,but also provide novel management insights and decision references for stakeholders in the logistics industry.更多还原