【作者】 李越；

【导师】 李秉祥；

【作者基本信息】 西安理工大学 ， 企业管理， 2018， 博士

【摘要】 在公司治理中,公司所有者和管理者之间的委托代理关系一直以来是学界研究的焦点。经理在公司内部和外部压力下,会选择有利于个人利益而非公司整体利益的策略或行为来加强其职位安全性和实现自身效用最大化,即经理管理防御行为。如何有效抑制经理管理防御行为是当前亟待解决的问题。随着近年来机构投资者的发展,其市场主体地位不断攀升。机构投资者持股逐渐作为一种重要的公司治理机制,被学界所关注。在传统理性“经济人”假设下,现有文献对于机构投资者治理作用的看法存在分歧,主要“有效监督”观、“用脚投票”观和“合谋”观。实际上,机构投资者和经理各自的利益获取不仅取决于自身的经济行为,也取决于相互间的交互行为,他们不仅重视物质利益分配,还会权衡对方对自己的友善程度。因此,基于互惠理论,解释机构投资者对经理管理防御的治理作用,具有显著的现实意义。基于此,本文在管理防御理论框架下,着重运用互惠理论,通过数理模型分析和实证检验,探究机构投资者对经理互惠行为的激励作用,并解释机构投资者互惠行为当中可能蕴含的“合谋”行为,为公司优化经理激励机制提供理论指导。主要研究工作体现在以下几方面:第一,对互惠理论、管理防御相关研究进展和机构投资者参与公司治理的有关文献进行了梳理,在对相关主要概念进行界定和解析的基础上,建立了机构投资者互惠行为对经理管理防御影响的理论模型。然后,从传统经济学和行为经济学辩证统一的角度,分析机构投资者互惠行为对经理产生激励作用的本质原因是人类与生俱来的自利性动机。同时,采用心理学的成就动机模型探讨机构投资者互惠行为发挥激励作用的内在原因,并对机构投资者参与公司治理的途径进行了总结。第二,依据边际产出递减理论,定义机构投资者和公司经理的效用函数。在完全信息条件下采用DK动态序贯互惠模型分析机构投资者和经理之间的互惠博弈过程,解释互惠动机是如何改变行为策略的。模型分析结果显示,只有在经理具有一定的互惠敏感性的情况下,机构投资者对经理的互惠行为才能有效发挥对经理的激励作用。而如果经理本身的互惠敏感性较低,无论机构投资者采取何种策略,管理防御行为都是经理理性选择的结果。即机构投资者对经理的互惠行为产生激励作用的前提是经理充分受到互惠动机的驱动。此外,如果机构投资者先行选择投机,那么经理就会实施管理防御行为以降低自身利益的损失。第三,基于Sahlins对互惠类型的划分,编制中国上市公司机构投资者对被投资公司经理互惠行为的量表,并建立多元回归模型,实证检验机构投资者对经理的广义互惠行为、平衡互惠行为和负互惠行为与公司非效率投资的关系,以及机构投资者持股比例的调节作用。检验结果显示,机构投资者对经理实施广义互惠行为能够显著降低公司的非效率投资现象;而机构投资者对经理实施负互惠行为,会显著加剧公司的非效率投资现象;且机构投资者持股比例上升能够加强机构投资者互惠行为对公司非效率的影响,机构投资者互惠行为对国有企业投资效率的影响强于非国有企业。第四,实证检验机构投资者互惠行为能否促进公司发放更多的现金股利,探讨机构投资者互惠行为中是否蕴含着“合谋”。研究发现,机构投资者广义互惠行为能够促使公司现金股利趋于合理化;机构投资者负互惠行为会对公司现金股利分配产生显著负向影响。机构投资者通过平衡互惠与经理建立的合作关系会导致双方进行“合谋”。具体的,在有着异常低派现问题的公司中,机构投资者平衡互惠行为与现金股利分配显著负相关,而随着机构投资者自身治理状况的提高,这一负相关关系减弱。最后,对本文的研究结论进行总结,分析研究存在的不足,并对未来可能开展的研究做出规划。更多还原

【Abstract】 In corporate governance,the principal-agent relationship between shareholders and managers has always been the focus of academic research.In the internal and external pressure of company,managers may choose managerial entrenchment behavior which benefits individual interests rather than the overall interests of the company,for maintaining the stability of their career and maximizing their own utility.How to effectively suppress the manager’s managerial entrenchment behavior is an urgent problem.With the development of institutional investor groups in recent years,their market principal position keeps climbing.Institutional investors holding gradually becomes a kind of important corporate governance mechanism,and turned into the focus of academic discussion.Under the traditional rational “economic man”hypothesis,existing literature about the research on the influence of the governance role of institutional investors is divided.The three main ideas are “effective monitor”,“voting with their feet”,and “collusion”,respectively.In fact,the respective interest get of institutional investors and managers depends on not only their own economic behaviors,but the mutual interactions.They not only attach great importance to the distribution of material benefits,but also weigh the friendliness others for themselves.Therefore,based on reciprocity theory,it is of great practical significance to explain the governance effect of institutional investors on managerial entrenchment.Based on this,this paper is under the framework of managerial entrenchment theory,mainly uses the reciprocity theory to explore the incentive effect of institutional investors’ reciprocal behavior on managers,and explains the “conspiracy” behavior that might be included in institutional investors’ reciprocal behavior,through mathematical model analysis and empirical test.This paper provides theoretical guidance for companys to optimize manager incentive mechanism.The main research work is reflected in the following aspects.First,this paper reviewed the related research progress of reciprocity theory,managerial entrenchment theory and institutional investors’ participation in corporate governance.On the basis of defining and analyzing the related main concepts,the theoretical model of the influence of institutional investors’ reciprocal behavior on managerial entrenchment was established.Then,from the perspective of dialectical unification in Classical Economics and Behavioral Economics,this paper analyzed the essential reason for the incentive effect of institutional investors’ reciprocal behavior,which was human innate self-interest motive.Meanwhile,this paper explored the intrinsic reason of the motivation of reciprocity by using the model of achievement motivation in psychology and summarized the way by which institutional investors participated in corporate governance.Second,according to the law of diminishing marginal utility,the utility function of institutional investor and company manager was defined.Under the condition of complete information,this paper analyzed the reciprocal game process between institutional investor and manager by DK dynamic sequential reciprocity model,and explained how reciprocal motivation changed behavioral strategy.Model analysis results showed that manager with a certain reciprocity sensitivity was the premise of institutional investor’ reciprocity behaviors playing incentive effect.Namely,if the manager was driven by reciprocity motivation,the incentive effect of institutional investors’ reciprocal behavior would work.But if the manager’s own reciprocal sensitivity was low,the implementation of reciprocal behavior by institutional investor could not affect managers.Third,based on the type division of reciprocity by Sahlins who divided reciprocal behavior into generalized reciprocal behavior,negative reciprocal behavior,and balanced reciprocal behavior,this paper developed reciprocal scale and made a multiple regression model to investigate the relation between institutional investors’ reciprocal behavior and inefficient investment of companies,as well as the regulatory role of institutional investors’ shareholding ratio.The results showed that institutional investors in general reciprocity could inhibit the inefficient investment of companies.While the implementation of negative reciprocity by institutional investors would exacerbate the phenomenon of inefficiency investment of companies.And this effect in state-owned companies was stronger than that of non-state-owned companies.Fourth,this paper examined whether the reciprocal behavior of the institutional investors could promote more cash dividends in companies,and explored whether there was "collusion" in the reciprocal behavior of institutional investors.It had been discovered that the generalized reciprocal behavior of institutional investors could promote corporate cash dividend for rationalization.And institutional investors’ negative reciprocal behavior would have a significant negative impact on corporate cash dividend distribution.Institutional investors’ cooperative relationship with managers established through balanced reciprocal behavior would lead to "collusion" between the two sides.Specifically,there was a significant negative correlation between the balanced reciprocal behavior of institutional investors and cash dividend distribution in companie with abnormal low cash dividend issues,and the negative correlation was gradually weakened with the improvement of institutional investors’ governance status.Finally,this paper summarized the research conclusions,analyzed the shortcomings of the research,and planed for future research.更多还原