【作者】 王婷婷；

【导师】 王道平；

【作者基本信息】 北京科技大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2021， 博士

【摘要】 低碳经济背景下,随着消费者低碳意识的增强和政府减排政策的日益严格,迫使企业更加关注碳排放。减少碳排放,实现经济可持续发展,已成为企业获取核心竞争力的关键举措。由于产品生产过程是通过供应链形式实现的,企业的减排决策会受到上下游企业减排决策的共同影响,因此,为降低产品的碳排放,需要供应链各个节点紧密合作,共同寻求降低碳排放的方法。通过契约加强供应链上下游企业间的合作,且政府通过补贴机制激励企业的减排行为,从而实现企业资源的高效利用和保护环境的双重目标。此外,考虑到企业决策往往具有滞后效应,因此,从动态架构下,研究政府补贴下供应链合作减排的策略问题,为供应链的低碳化管理和政府补贴政策的科学制定提供了理论依据。本研究主要从以下四个方面展开:(1)在政府补贴下,研究供应商和制造商均进行减排投入的供应链动态协调问题。借助微分博弈理论,考虑政府为供应商和制造商均提供减排补贴且产品需求受减排量的影响下,构建了集中式和分散式微分博弈模型,并设计了改进的双边成本分担契约协调供应链。结合算例,验证了改进的双边成本分担契约的合理性,且分析了政府补贴机制对产品减排量和企业利润改善的有效性。(2)接着研究了不同博弈结构下供应链合作减排和政府补贴策略的制定问题。在第1部分研究内容的基础上,将政府作为博弈参与方,分别构建三种决策下的微分博弈模型。得出并比较有政府补贴、无政府补贴下,三种决策中供应商和制造商各自相应的最优反馈均衡策略以及产品减排量的最优轨迹。然后,讨论政府补贴行为与企业选择合作减排行为之间的互动博弈。且通过算例对相关参数进行灵敏度分析,验证了结论的有效性,为供应链上下游企业长期开展合作减排以及政府制定补贴政策提供了科学依据。(3)进一步研究了考虑政府补贴和零售商领导下的供应链合作减排与低碳宣传决策问题。大型零售企业在减排活动中的优势地位日益凸显,且因零售商具有接近市场的优势,便于将制造商的减排投入信息传达给消费者。在此背景下,借鉴第2部分模型的思想,研究由制造商和零售商构成的低碳供应链长期纵向合作减排、低碳宣传以及政府补贴策略问题。考虑到需求受产品减排量和零售商低碳宣传努力的双重影响下,构建了零售商领导下的Stackelbeg微分博弈模型。比较分析有政府补贴和无政府补贴下,集中式、分散式以及减排成本分担契约下的最优均衡策略,并探讨了政府和供应链成员的交互影响。(4)将模型扩展到双渠道供应链中进行研究。网络销售渠道的发展为制造企业的发展带来机遇和挑战。低碳产品通过双渠道模式进行销售,不仅能有效降低销售环节的碳排放,还能满足消费者对产品个性化和多样化的需求;然而渠道冲突也会给企业的决策带来挑战。在此背景下,对第3部分的模型进行拓展,将价格因素、政府补贴因素均纳入分析框架,且将产品减排量和商誉同时作为状态变量,考虑需求同时受价格因素和非价格因素(产品减排量和商誉)的影响,构建了集中式、批发价契约下以及收益共享契约下的双渠道供应链微分博弈模型。比较分析无政府补贴、有政府补贴时,这三种决策下的最优均衡策略。通过算例,探讨了在改善因双重边际效应和渠道冲突带来的供应链利润损失方面,收益共享契约发挥的作用,且分析了政府补贴机制对各决策下产品减排量和企业利润的提升力度。更多还原

【Abstract】 Under the background of low-carbon economy,with the increasing of consumers’ low-carbon awareness and the increasingly strict government policies to reduce emissions,enterprises have to pay more attention to carbon emissions.Reducing carbon emissions and achieving sustainable economic development has become the key measure for enterprises to acquire core competitiveness.Since the production process of products is achieved through the form of supply chain,the decisions of enterprises to reduce emissions are affected by the decisions of both the upstream enterprises and the downstream enterprises to reduce emissions.Therefore,in order to reduce the carbon emissions of products,it is necessary for all the nodes in the supply chain to work closely together to find ways to reduce carbon emissions.To strengthen cooperation between upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain by the contract,and the government stimulates the enterprises’ emission reduction behavior by the subsidy mechanism,so that the dual objectives of efficient use of enterprises resources and protect the environment will be achieved.In addition,considering that enterprises’ decisions often have a lag effect.Therefore,study on the dynamic strategies of cooperative emission reduction in supply chain considering the government subsidy,which provides a theoretical basis for the low-carbon management of supply chain and the scientific formulation of government’s subsidy policy.This research aiming at the following four aspects mainly:(1)Study on the dynamic coordination of the supply chain considering the government subsidy,where both the supplier and manufacturer are engaged in emission reduction inputs.By means of differential game theory,it is considered that the government provides emission reduction subsidy to both the supplier and manufacturer.Meanwhile,the product’s demand is affected by the emission reduction.Then the centralized and decentralized differential game models are established,and the improved bilateral cost-sharing contract designed to coordinate the supply chain.Combined with the examples,it is reasonable to verify that the improved bilateral cost-sharing contract.Moreover,we analyze that the government subsidy mechanism is effective on the improvement to product’s emission reduction and enterprises’profits.(2)Then,we study the formulation of government’s subsidy strategy and the cooperative emission reduction in supply chain under different game structures.Based on the research content in part 1,the government is used as a game participant to establish differential game models under three decisions.Whether the government subsidy is considered or not,as for the three decisions,we can obtain and compare the optimal feedback equilibrium strategies,and the optimal trajectories of product’s emission reduction.Then,we discuss the interaction game between government subsidy behaviors and companies’ choice of reducing emissions in cooperation.Moreover,the sensitivity analysis of the relevant parameters is conducted by the simulation,to verify the validity of conclusions,which provides scientific basis for long-term cooperative emission reduction in supply chain’s upstream and downstream enterprises and the subsidy policy made by government.(3)Further,we study the cooperative emission reduction and low-carbon propaganda in supply chain,when the government subsidy and the leadership of retailer are considered.The dominant position of large retailer in emission reduction activities is becoming increasingly prominent.Meanwhile,it is easy to communicate the manufacturer’s emission reduction input information to consumers,since the retailers have the advantage of being close to the market.In this context,drawing on the idea of model in part 2,the long-term vertical cooperatwve emission reduction,low-carbon propaganda in a supply chain comprised of a manufacturer and retailer,and the subsidy strategies of government is studied.Considering that the demand is affected by product’s emission reduction and retailer’s low-carbon propaganda effort,the Stackelbeg differential game models are established under the leadership of retailers.Whether the government subsidy is considered or not,we compare and analyze the optimal equilibrium strategies under the centralized,decentralized and cost-sharing contract.And we discuss the interaction between government and supply chain members.(4)Extend the model to the dual-channel supply chain.The development of online sales channels brings opportunities and challenges to the development of manufacturing enterprises.If the low-carbon products are sold by the dual-channel model,it is not only effectively reduces carbon emissions during the selling,but also meets consumers’ needs for products’ personalization and diversification.However,channel conflicts can also bring challenges to enterprises’ decisions.In this context,we expand the model based on part 3,and take the price factors and government subsidy into the analytical framework.Meanwhile,both the product’s emission reduction and goodwill are used as state variables.It is considered that the demand is affected by both price and non-price factors,and the non-price factors include the product’s emission reduction and goodwill.Then,we establish the differential game models in dual-channel supply chain under the centralized,wholesale price contract and the revenue-sharing contract.Whether the government subsidy is considered or not,we compare and analyze the optimal equilibrium strategies under three decisions.Since the double marginal effect and channel conflict bring the loss of profit to the supply chain,then the role of the revenue-sharing contract is discussed in improving the loss of supply chain’s profit by the simulation.Meanwhile,we analyze the intensity in improving product’s emission reduction and enterprises’ profits by the government subsidy mechanism under different decisions.更多还原