【作者】 胡宏伟；

【导师】 廖洪；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 会计学， 2014， 博士

【副题名】来自上海上市公司的经验证据

【摘要】 股权结构是公司治理结构的核心,合理的股权结构对公司治理效率有积极的作用。在中国,自上世纪九十年代以来,有关研究成果发现,越来越多的上市公司处于金字塔结构、交叉持股等复杂股权结构之下,控制权与所有权偏离。这种股权结构是否对上市公司的经营绩效存在影响?本文以2008-2012年上海上市公司为样本,采用比较分析和回归分析方法,研究了我国上市公司的股权结构以及控制权配置与公司经营绩效之间的关系,得出了一定的结论,并提出了相应的建议。本文研究结果表明：上市公司终极控制人拥有的控制权与上市公司绩效显著负相关,是影响公司绩效的主要因素。这一结论对现实经济生活中控制人通过构建复杂组织结构提高在上市公司的控制权比例提供了解释。尤其值得关注的是,相较于控制权,控制人拥有的所有权比例有助于提高上市公司的经营绩效,体现出“利益一致效应”。本文的结论提醒我们,要准确把握控制人所有权与控制权的关系,不能停留于表面数据,分析所有权背后的控制权因素才能揭示股权结构的实质及其对经营绩效的影响。在既定的控制权格局下,控制人试图以较低的现金流权带动掌控更多的股份,从而形成了众多横向或纵向的关联方,这有利于形成产业链,发挥规模效应和提高抵御外来风险的能力,但这种效应唯有在经济开放度很小的范围内才能充分发挥。当公司需要开拓创新、寻找新的利润增长点,当世界经济一体化的冲击日益增强,这种效应可能就会走向反面。本文发现,控制权与所有权的分离程度越大,上市公司的盈利能力越低。上市公司股份的国有性质与公司绩效正相关。在国家高度重视国有企业发展的背景下,通过从产权制度到经营管理的持续改革,我国的国有企业已经在产业发展上成为重要的支撑和带动力量,在经济效益上也日益体现进步。股权的制衡度与公司绩效正相关,这与众多呼唤增强对大股东制衡力度的声音是一致的。然而在投资者保护制度尚待完善的资本市场上,要真正实现“同股同权”,需要走的路还相当长。控制人担任上市公司高管与经营绩效负相关。我们分析认为,如果控制人从其“集团”利益出发,更倾向于主要关注某上市公司在其控制圈内的“宏观”地位,则对公司日常经营可能带来负面的影响。而作为公司管理者,他们也更有机会和能力操纵公司“业绩”,为其控制权私利服务。基于上述研究结论,我们建议：适度降低上市公司的所有权集中度,同时鼓励终极控制人直接控股,以降低所有权与控制权的分离度,减少控制链增加带来的代理成本。此外,应加强对最终控制人的重视与监管,增强股份的流通性,并大力培育充分竞争的经理人市场。文章的主要结构如下：导论部分介绍了研究的背景及问题的产生来源,简要阐述了研究的思路、目标和方法,从理论和实践两个方面归纳了本文的意义以及创新点,并对文章涉及的主要概念作了简要描述。第一章文献综述,围绕论文主题——终级控制权与公司绩效的关系,对近年来国际和国内学术界的主要研究成果进行了梳理。第二章讨论本文研究的理论基础,包括公司产权理论、交易费用理论、公司控制权理论以及委托代理理论。第三章为实证研究部分,以上海上市公司2008-2012年间的数据为样本,采用比较分析和回归分析方法,研究了上市公司股权结构以及控制权配置与公司经营绩效之间的关系。第四章归纳实证研究所得出的结论,在此基础之上提出相关政策性建议,并对未来研究的拓展方向作出展望。更多还原

【Abstract】 Ownership structure, the core of corporate governance, plays a reasonably important role in maintaining managerial efficiency. In China, however, since the1990s, many research results have revealed the deviation of control and equity under pyramid or cross-shareholding structures in an increasing number of listed companies. Employing the2008-2012statistics of the listed companies located in Shanghai, the largest city of China, this dissertation adopts comparative analysis and regression analysis methods in studying the efficiency and performance of these special ownership structures. Based on the research conclusions, a number of policy-making suggestions are put forward.This dissertation shows that the control power of the ultimate controllers, as a major influencing factor, is related to corporate performance in a significant and negative way. This conclusion helps explain the craze to raise control power by building complex organizational structures. On the contrary, ownership power exerts a positive influence on performance, which is in line with the Alignment Effect. The conclusion of the dissertation reminds us that to fully understand the mechanism of ownership vs. control power, we should look beyond the statistics and dig into the ruling structure behind.The craving for greater control with less cash flow rights creates a cobweb of affiliated parties, which helps in developing industrial chains with stronger scale effect and better risk prevention abilities. But such a mechanism works better in those less-open economies, and may turns into its opposite when the enterprise needs innovation and growth or faces violent global economic impact. This dissertation claims that the wider the gap between ownership and control power, the lower the profitability of the related company. And such profitability could be improved when the actual controller exercises direct control.The state-owned background is positively related to business performance. We hold that with the government’s focus on corporate growth and unremitted reform in property rights and management systems, the state-owned enterprises have been playing a supporting and leading role in both industrial advancement and profit-making. The shareholding counterbalance is positively relative to business performance, which is consistent with the call for checks and balances between minor and major shareholders. However, there is still a long way to go in implementing equal right for every share in China’s capital market which is short of an all-round investor protection mechanism.Controller-act-as-executive is negatively correlated with operating performance. When the controllers pay more attention to the macro wellbeing of their reining territory instead of a specific company, the business performance must be negatively influenced. As a matter if face, this executives are in a better position to manipulate their operating results.Based on the above conclusions, we suggest that ownership concentration be moderately reduced and that ultimate controllers be encouraged to exercise direct control for a shortened control chain, lowered agency costs and a narrowed gap between ownership and control power. At the same time, the supervision over ultimate controllers should be intensified, and stock liquidity should be enhanced. Also important is the effort to develop a fully competitive market for professional managers.The structure of this dissertation is as follows:In Introduction, the research background is explained, followed by a brief summary of the development, the objective and the method of the research. The contributions of this dissertation are summed up from the theoretical as well as the practical aspects. Finally, key terms and concepts are defined.Chapter I gives a relatively full description of both international and domestic academic achievements on the correlation examination of ultimate control and corporate performance.Chapter II provides the basic theories for this research, including the enterprise property rights theory, the transaction cost theory, the control rights theory and the agency theory.Chapter III, employing the2008-2012statistics from the listed companies in Shanghai, digs into the correlation between the equity structure as well as the control configuration and the company’s business performance through comparision and regression analyses.Chapter IV offers a number of policy suggestions on the basis of the empirical research conclusions and describs the possibilities for future studies.更多还原