【作者】 黄静晗；

【导师】 郑传芳；

【作者基本信息】 福建农林大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2015， 博士

【摘要】 集体产权制度改革是城中村转型发展的难点,也是破解城乡二元结构、提高城镇化质量的关键。城中村集体产权制度改革是利益调整与重构的过程,涉及村民、村社组织、政府等不同利益主体。村民作为改革中最主要的利益主体和初级行为主体,其对改革的预期、偏好和行为将影响改革的效率和效果,集体产权制度创新应当以村民的制度需求为基础和依据。将改革中的村民行为作为研究对象,分析村民行为动机、目标以及成本约束条件下决策和选择的过程,探讨村民行为的结构与机理,对于城中村乃至广大农村地区集体产权制度改革具有重要的现实意义,同时有助于丰富集体产权制度改革的理论研究。本文借助制度与制度变迁理论、产权理论、博弈论、公共选择理论、行为经济学等相关理论构建理论分析框架,综合采用动态博弈模型、成本-收益模型、二元Logistic回归分析、交叉分组下的频数分析、案例分析等定量定性方法,基于福州市城中村集体产权制度改革的调研数据和典型案例,主要进行了以下研究：第一,构建理论分析框架,界定农村集体产权、行为等核心概念,评述相关’理论,提出论文研究分析框架。第二,系统回顾与总结城中村集体产权制度改革的形成逻辑、关键环节与发展困境,描述村民改革行为的历史与现实背景并引出问题。第三,分析改革中村民的地位、博弈与分化,讨论中央与地方政府、村社组织、村民等利益主体的动机、目标与选择,分析产权制度变迁中村民形成初级行为主体地位的演进历程及其发挥的作用,用动态博弈模型讨论村民与地方政府围绕改革展开的利益博弈,分析村民内部基于不同的利益目标产生的普通村民与村庄精英等群体分化。第四,讨论改革中普通村民和村庄精英的行为,围绕集体资产量化、集体经济组织重建和集体经济发展这三项集体产权制度改革的主要内容,分析从外部利润出现到打破原有的制度均衡、重新界定产权的过程中,普通村民与村庄精英的行为动机与利益诉求,群体之间的冲突与博弈,如何做出决策与选择形成利益均衡的一致性合约。采用二元logistic回归模型对村民集体产权制度改革意愿的影响因素进行实证分析。第五,探讨城中村集体产权制度改革中村民行为的结构与机理。由4个内部变量和14个外部变量共同构建村民制度选择行为结构模型,分析村民在产权实践中进行制度选择的机理。第六,提出推进城中村集体产权制度改革的对策建议。研究得出以下主要结论：第一,村民是城中村集体产权制度改革的初级行为主体,是制度变迁的推动者、制度改革方案的设计者和决策者。村民自下而上的制度创新与地方政府推动是这场改革的主要形式和典型特征。第二,集体产权制度改革方案的形成是行为主体之间博弈与较量的结果。普通村民通过影响制度的交易费用和生产效率实际影响了制度的绩效,在改革方案形成过程中起到关键性的作用。从资产量化、组织重建到集体经济发展,普通村民基于对现期收益最大化的追求,在普通村民与村干部、社员与非社员、村民与居民、村民与政府等内外部利益主体的博弈中建构对自己最为有利的集体资产分配结构,形成了改革方案并推动制度变迁。第三,村庄精英是改革中的制度企业家,对改革方向和内容的确定起了导向性作用。本文借鉴“滞后供给”模式的变形建立成本—收益模型分析村庄精英改革的成本与收益,村庄精英改革成本主要包括决策与组织成本、直接和间接个人经济成本、阻滞成本,收益由物质收益和精神收益组成。村庄精英做出的行为选择是基于对成本和收益的理性计算和价值判断,同时体现出对声誉、信任、公正等利他、非理性动机的追求。第四,村民改革意愿主要受到个体和家庭特征、收益预期、改革认知和村庄信任等因素的影响,村民的受教育程度、征地后家庭收入主要来源、对改革后集体资产收益预期、对集体资产所有权归属的认知、是否关心村集体经济运作、是否信任经合社领导等变量对村民的改革意愿产生显著影响。第五,基于奥斯特罗姆构建的个人制度选择分析框架,结合对城中村集体产权制度改革中村民行为的定性定量分析,本文建构出改革中村民制度选择行为的一般模型。影响村民行为的4个内部变量为预期收益、预期成本、内在规范和贴现率,14个外部变量为制度方案设计、集体资产条件、利益的异质性、改革认知、村庄信任、传统文化等,外部变量通过对内部变量的作用影响村民的决策与选择,内部变量与外部变量的组合构成了村民制度选择行为的一般模型。第六,提出了村民制度选择的机理：(1)利益是村民评估是否支持改革和如何改革的核心变量,不同的目标函数引出不同的行为策略。(2)村民内外部的利益冲突反映出改革的制度供给不均衡,制度的内在张力和空白留出了冲突与斗争的空间。(3)村民行为反复主要由产权制度改革不彻底造成,没有产权制度的根本性改革,随着利益主体力量的此消彼长,试图推动再分配的冲突和斗争就不会停止。(4)良好的制度方案设计机制能够增强村民的改革意愿,有助于达到次满意均衡点,实现帕累托改进。(5)普通村民与精英的一致性程度较高时改革推进顺利,当普通村民与精英在制度变迁方向和内容上有冲突时,一般向村庄精英支持的方向发展。更多还原

【Abstract】 Collective property rights institution reform is the difficult part of the transformation and development of urban village. It is also an essential part in terms of changing the urban-rural dual structure and improving the quality of Urbanization. The process of collective property rights institution reform is a process of interest adjustment and reconstruction, involving different interest subject such as villagers, village organizations, government and so on. Villagers are the main interest subject and primary behavior subject whose expectation, reference and behavior will have an impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the reform. Thus the innovation of collective property right institution should base on the need of villagers. This paper takes behavior of villagers as the research object, analyzes the process of villagers’behavioral motives, aims, the decision-making and choice restrained by cost, and the structure and mechanism of the behavior of the villagers, which can not only be of an important practical significance to the reforming of the collective property right institution in the urban villages and the vast rural areas,but also offers a referential ideas and support for the theoretical study of collective property rights institution reform.This paper is based on the theoretical frame of the institution and institutional change theory, property right theory,game theory, public choice theory and behavioral economics. Synthetically, some quantitative and qualitative methods such as dynamic game model analysis, binary Logistic regression analysis, cross contingency table, cost-benefit analysis and case analysis are used. With use of survey data and typical cases of urban villages’collective property rights institution reform in Fuzhou, the paper revolves around the following issues:First, the theoretical analysis framework is built, the paper defines the core concepts such as rural collective property rights and behavior, etc., explains the relevant theories, and put forward the research framework.Second, the formation logic, essential parts and the development dilemma of collective property rights institution reform in urban village, and the historical and realistic background of behaviors of villagers in the reform are systematically reviewed and summarized, leading to the questions.Third, the paper analyzes the status, games and differentiation of the villagers in the reform, discusses the motivation, goals and choice of different interest subject such as central and local government, rural organizations, villagers and so on. Then the paper analyzes the primary behavior status evolution of villagers and its function in the changing process of property rights institution, the benefit-scrambling game between villagers and local government around the reform with a dynamic game model and the differentiation of ordinary villagers and the village elites based on different interests.Fourth, the paper discusses the behavior of ordinary villagers and the village elite in the reform. Revolving around three pieces of main contents in the reform, which are quantification of collective property, restoration of collective economic organizations and collective economy development, the behavior motivation and the benefit pursuit of ordinary villagers and village elites as well as their conflicts and gaining during the process from the appearance of external, profits to the break of balancing institution and redefining property right are analyzed as to figure out how they make decisions to form the contracts of benefit consistency. The paper uses binary logistic regression model to analyze factors which affects the willingness of villagers in collective property right reforming.Fifth, the paper discusses the structure and mechanism of villagers’behavior in the reforming process of collective property rights institution. Using the structure model of the villager institutional choice behavior which made up of 4 inner factors and 14 external factors, the paper discusses the mechanism of the villagers’institutional choices in property rights reform.Sixth, put forward the policy suggestions to promote the reform of collective property rights institutionThe main conclusions of the paper are as follows: First, villagers are the primary behavior subject in the collective property rights institution reform and they are the promoters of institution change, the designers and the decision makers of the reform plan. Second, the collective property rights institution reform is the result of the game between the actors. Ordinary villagers play a key role in determining the direction and content of the reform. They influence institutional performance by the transaction costs and production efficiency. From the quantitative and organizational reconstruction to the collective economic development, ordinary villagers build their most favorable collective asset allocation in the game of structure ordinary villagers and village elite, members and non-members, the villagers and residents, villagers and the government, and other internal and external interests, based on their current income maximizing. They form a reform plan and promote the institutional change finally.Third, the village elite are the institutional entrepreneurs in the reform, and they guide the reform direction and content as the determination of the role. The paper analyzes the cost and benefit the village elite in the reform, using the cost-benefit model based on "lagged supply" model. The cost mainly includes the cost of decision-making and organization, direct and indirect personal economic costs, the cost of blocking, and the benefit of the material and the spiritual. The behavior choices of the vi 1.1 age el ite are based on the rational calculation of cost and benefit and the value judgment, and the pursuit of the reputation, trust, justice, etc.Fourth, the villagers’willingness to reform is influenced by the characteristics of the individual and the family, the expectation of income, the cognition of the reform and the trust. The variables including villagers’education level, the main source of household income after land expropriation, collective asset income expectations after the reform, the ownership of collective assets, whether care about the village collective economic operation, the trust of the economic and social factors, have a significant impact on the villagers’willingness.Fifth, based on Ostrom’s analysis framework of individual institutional choice and the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the villagers’ behavior in the reform, this paper constructs the institutional choice behavior model of the villagers in the reform. The inner factors are the expected revenue, the expected costs, the discount rate and internal standards. The external factors which affect villagers by function the internal factors are made up of the following 14 parts: the institutional design, the collective asset conditions, the heterogeneity of interests, the trust, the conventional cultures and so on. The internal and external variables constitute the general model.Sixth, the mechanism of the villagers’ institutional choice is put forward:(1) Benefit is the main factor for villagers when evaluating whether to support the reform and the way to reform. Different objective functions lead to different behavior. (2) The conflicts of interest between villagers and other interest subjects reflect the defects of reform.The tension inside the institution spare blank space of the conflicts and struggles. (3) The violation of villagers’behavior is mainly caused by the incomplete reform of property rights institution, the conflicts and struggles trying to push the redistribution will not stop, with the strength changing of various benefit parties. (4) Good designing institution mechanism can strengthen the villagers’ willingness to reform, eventually achieving the sub-satisfactory balanced point and realizing the Pareto improvement. (5) On the cases that ordinary villagers and elite share fairly high accordance- and less contradiction, they will cooperate mutually, facilitating the reform smoothly. On the cases that ordinary villagers and elite conflict with each other for the direction or the contents of changing the institution, the results will generally be at the mercy of village elite.更多还原