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基于产业组织理论的我国审计市场研究

A Study on the China’s Audit Market Based on the Theory of Industrial Organization

【作者】 刘丹

【导师】 方红星;

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 , 会计学, 2014, 博士

【副题名】理论归纳与实证检验

【摘要】 近年来,在政府的大力推动下,通过做大做强战略的实施,我国注册会计师行业取得了飞速的发展,这必将引起审计市场结构的重大变化。而根据产业组织理论,市场结构与市场行为、市场绩效之间是相互影响、相互作用的。因此有必要以市场结构为起点,研究我国审计市场行为与市场绩效现状。本文以产业组织理论为基础,探讨审计市场结构、行为与绩效之间的相互关系,并在当前的制度背景和理论基础上,以SCP(“结构-行为-绩效”)框架为路径展开实证研究。在对我国目前的审计市场结构进行度量和评价的基础上,实证检验了影响审计市场结构的因素,审计市场价格竞争行为与审计市场绩效。这些经验检验结果为深入理解我国审计市场的特征提供了证据,为政府监管部门制定相关政策提供经验支持。全文共分八章。第一章是导论,这一部分主要阐述本文的研究动机,指明研究目的。介绍论文的研究方法和研究思路,提出行文框架。并列出论文的主要创新点。第二章是文献综述,本章对于有关审计市场结构、行为与绩效的相关文献进行回顾和总结,对审计市场集中度、审计市场结构影响因素、审计定价行为、会计师事务所内部运营绩效及审计质量等文献进行系统梳理,并对文献进行评述。第三章是理论分析和制度背景,本章厘清了产业组织理论的演进过程,确定了SCP分析框架。从产业组织理论视角,探讨了审计市场的垄断效应与寡头垄断市场结构效率。对我国审计市场的制度背景进行了介绍。第四章是我国审计市场结构分析;通过本章分析,对我国审计市场现状获得清晰全面的把握。并对审计市场的影响因素进行经验检验。第五章是审计市场价格竞争行为研究,本章分为两个部分:首先,利用2002年和2012年的A股证券市场数据对市场结构与审计定价的关系进行实证检验。其中市场结构主要从市场势力和行业专长两个方面进行分析;其次,对我国审计市场中的低价揽客行为进行了理论和实证分析。第六章是我国审计市场内部绩效,采用DEA方法和Malmquist指数对我国会计师事务所静态运营效率和动态效率变化进行研究。首先,静态效率角度,DEA方法估计出会计师事务所运营效率,并从市场结构角度探讨其与运营效率的关系,为避免遗漏变量和多重共线性对结果稳定性可能产生的影响,我们采用面板数据分析。其次,动态效率角度,使用Malmquist指数对比国际四大与我国本土会计师事务所的动态效率变化。第七章是审计市场外部绩效。本章主要考察审计市场结构、行为与效率对审计质量的影响。首先对审计市场行业集中度、行业专长与审计质量的关系进行检验。考虑到会计师事务所的选择与客户企业盈余管理互相内生的复杂关系,本文通过选择工具变量进行两阶段最小二乘的回归检验。其次,建立面板数据模型,对发生审计师变更的客户企业变更前后的盈余管理程度进行对比,以此获得低价揽业行为经济后果的经验证据。最后,通过面板数据实证检验审计效率与审计质量的关系。第八章是结论,本章是全文的总结,包括研究结论、政策建议以及本文的局限性和未来研究方向。通过研究,本文得出如下主要结论:1.审计市场上,寡头垄断的市场结构能够实现规模经济与市场竞争的平衡。在审计市场上,由于市场信息不对称可能导致审计市场失灵,会计师事务所的规模可以起到信号传递的作用缓解审计市场的信息不对称问题。发展会计师事务所规模,实现事务所的规模经济并不一定会削弱审计市场的竞争,“马歇尔冲突”在审计市场上并不存在。这是因为审计市场进入壁垒较低,即使是寡头垄断的会计师事务所也要面临着潜在进入者的竞争。审计市场中的寡头垄断结构体现的不是寡头垄断行为的均衡,而是寡头竞争的均衡,是有效率的。2.我国A股审计市场正向集中度更高的寡占型市场结构演变。对我国审计市场结构进行描述性统计研究,结果发现我国A股审计市场结构日趋完善,正由低集中度寡占型市场结构向更高集中度的寡占型市场结构演变。政府监管方的政策干预和市场自发的竞争力量共同推动了证券审计市场结构的不断集中。我国本土会计师事务所虽然审计客户的数量占优,但是在审计客户的质量上却远低于于国际四大。我国本土会计师事务所相对国际四大无市场优势,市场份额不稳定,行业专长的优势还不是十分突出。3.特定行业内客户的竞争程度和会计师事务所的行业专长投资是影响我国审计市场结构的重要因素。从客户企业对会计师事务所的选择角度出发,发现特定行业内的客户企业之间竞争程度越高,越会选择不同于竞争对手的会计师事务所对其进行审计。这也从另一方面说明审计市场中的供给方,即会计师事务所之间进行合谋的可能性不大;其次,会计师事务所的产品差别化投资对于审计市场集中度存在显著正向影响。说明在特定行业内,会计师事务所实施专门化的经营战略,容易形成竞争性行业壁垒,使得客户企业都倾向于选择具有行业专长的事务所,从而提高了审计市场集中度。在其他因素方面,进入壁垒与市场集中度之间也存在显著的正相关关系,但影响的作用很小,几乎可以忽略;需求增长率对于集中度变化的影响不明确;地域分布对审计市场集中度并不能造成显著影响,这表明随着事务所的合并和规模的扩大,原有审计业务的地域分割趋势已经逐渐减弱。4.审计市场集中度的提高并未带来会计师事务所之间的合谋,市场竞争显著增强。本文通过对比2002年和2012年审计市场结构与审计收费的关系,研究发现尽管目前审计市场集中度较高,但并未对我国A股审计市场的价格竞争造成不利影响,相对2002年,2012年审计市场的价格竞争增强,而且会计师事务所的行业专长优势更加突出。具备行业专长的事务所具有审计定价上的优势,从而能够获得行业专门化带来的溢价,行业专长溢价更多来源于小客户市场。对于大规模公司,其选择的会计师事务所规模也较大,支付的审计收费溢价更多的是与审计品质相关,对事务所的行业专长要求并不突出;对于小规模公司,为了借助行业专长审计师的行业经验和知识,更愿意为行业专长的审计师支付更高的审计费用。说明寡头垄断型的审计市场结构并不会破坏审计市场的竞争,反而使得市场竞争增强。另外,中小型会计师事务所做精做专,专注提高行业专长,才有利于在激烈的市场竞争中生存。5.我国审计市场上存在低价揽业行为,低价揽业并未造成审计质量的显著降低。检验结果表明审计市场存在低价揽业行为,相对于未发生变更的事务所而言,发生变更的事务所对客户企业的审计收费前三年平均折价程度为3.7%。这种折价行为主要表现在同级事务所的变更之中。而且,较前任拥有更多市场份额的后任事务所给予客户的折扣显著更低,未体现会计师事务所的规模经济。会计师事务所的变更带来审计收费的降低这一趋势,也为审计市场价格竞争的增强添加了佐证。另外,本文还对低价揽业行为造成的经济后果进行检验。结果发现,后任会计师事务所并没有因为其审计收费的降低而降低审计质量。可见在目前市场竞争激烈的背景下,会计师事务所都会谨慎地避免审计风险带来的诉讼风险,并非为了盈利而置审计质量于不顾。因此,可以认为低价揽客行为是一种正常的价格竞争行为。6.我国会计师事务所内部运营效率与审计市场结构变化的要求还存在差距。运用DEA-Malmquist方法对我国会计师事务所运营绩效进行研究,发现我国会计师事务所取得快速发展,有能力与国际四大竞争。通过面板数据对会计师事务所运营效率的影响因素进行实证检验,发现运营效率的变化与会计师事务所市场份额的提高并不一致,呈现出区间效应。说明我国本土事务所市场份额增加,但效率还有待进一步的提升。另外,通过对我国本土会计师事务所运营效率与审计质量的关系检验,发现会计师事务所运营效率越高,其可容忍的客户企业可操控性应计就越高,审计质量越低。表明我国本土会计师事务所可能要投入更多的人力、物力,只是适当保证了审计质量,或者耗用大量资源的基础上才能使得审计质量得到充分保证。会计师事务所的规模并不是越大越好,规模与效率应当协调发展,才能更具竞争力。因此,我国本土会计师事务所在关注自身规模发展的同时,还应在技术与经验管理方面,积极向四大学习,这样才能充分利用已有资源,实现做大做强。7.寡头垄断的市场结构有利于提高审计市场外部绩效。在市场结构与审计质量的关系检验中,选取行业HHI指数作为市场集中度的替代变量,通过实证检验表明会计师事务所的选择与客户企业盈余管理之间存在白选择问题,通过引入工具变量控制了自选择引起的内生性问题后,研究结果才能更为稳健。研究表明,市场集中度越高,审计质量也越高,二者呈显著的正相关关系。没有发现会计师事务所的行业专长对客户企业的盈余管理程度存在显著的相关关系,但是通过稳健性检验,发现行业专长对客户企业的正向盈余管理程度存在显著的抑制作用。这在一定程度上说明行业专长能够促进审计质量的提高,而且我国会计师事务所的行业专长程度有待进一步的发展。高集中度的市场结构有助于提高我国审计市场的外部绩效,这为我国注册会计师行业做大做强政策提供了经验支持。从整体上看,随着审计市场结构的优化,我国注册会计师行业的外部绩效取得了显著进步。本文的创新之处在于:首先,在理论方面,从审计市场自身特征出发,结合产业组织理论对审计市场结构的垄断效应与寡头垄断结构效率进行了系统分析。其次,在实证检验部分,本文首次引入会计师事务所的市场势力,对我国审计市场的竞争行为进行研究;从内部绩效和外部绩效两个角度对审计市场绩效进行了较为全面的考察;在克服内生性的基础上验证市场结构与审计质量的关系,选取工具变量采用两阶段的最小二乘法对模型进行实证检验,使研究结果更加合理。

【Abstract】 In recent years, through the implementation of bigger and stronger strategy promoted by government, China’s CPA industry has achieved rapid development.This will cause major changes in the audit market structure. According to the theory of industrial organization, market structure and market behavior, market performance interact each other. Therefore,it is necessary to study the status of the audit market behavior and market performance,taking the market structure as the research begining.Based on the theory of industrial organization,this dissertation explore the relationship between audit market structure, conduct and performance, and develop the empirical study on the basis of the current system background and theory following the path of SCP paradigm.This dissertation measures and evaluates the present audit market structure in China, and then empirically tests the main factors that affect the structure of the audit market, audit pricing behavior and audit market performance. The results of the empirical test provide evidence for the deep understanding of features of the audit market in China and provide empirical support for the government supervision departments to formulate relevant policies.The full text is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter is introduction, mainly elaborates the research motivation, describes the research methods and the study framework. Finally, this chapter lists the main innovations. The second chapter is literature review. This chapter summarizes the relevant literature on the audit market structure, conduct and performance.The third chapter is the theoretical basis and institutional background.This chapter clarifies the evolution of the theory of industrial organization, identifies the SCP framework, discusses the reasons of monopoly of the audit market and efficiency of oligopoly market structure on the baisi of industrial organization theory. In order to understand the basic research direction, this chapter then expounds the process of institutional change. The fourth chapter is the analysis of audit market structure in China. Through the analysis, we can have a clear and comprehensive understanding to the current situation of the audit market. Then it identifies factors determining the market structure. The fifth chapter is the research of price competition behavior. This chapter is divided into two parts:First, it empirically tests the relationship between audit market structure and audit pricing on the basis of the A-share stock market data for the year of2002and2012.It substitute market structure with market power and industry expertise; Secondly, it makes theoretical and empirical analysis of low balling.The sixth chapter is the research of internal audit market performance by adopting the method of DEA and malmquist index.It evaluates the operational efficiency from the perspective of static efficiency and dynamic change.First of all,it uses DEA method to estimate the CPA operational efficiency and explores the relationship between operational efficiency and market structure.In order to avoid the effects of omitted variables and multicollinearity, this chapter uses panel data analysis. Secondly, it uses Malmquist index to contrast efficiency of big four with our local accounting firms. The seventh chapter is the research of external audit market performance. This chapter mainly examines the impact of audit price and audit operating efficiency on audit quality.Firstly, taking into account of endogenous problems between the customer selection and earnings management,it carries out a two-stage least squares regression to test the relationship among the audit market concentration, industry expertise and audit quality by selecting the instrumental variables. Secondly, in order to obtain empirical evidence of the economic consequences of the low-balling behavior, it compares the enterprises’degree of earnings management before and after the auditor change with the panel data model. Finally, it explores the relationship between audit efficiency and audit quality with the panel data. The eighth chapter is the conclusion. This chapter is the summary of the full text, including research conclusions, policy recommendations, the limitations and future research directions.The main conclusions are as follows:1.In the audit market, oligopoly market structure can achieve the balance of economies of scale and market competition. The market information asymmetry may result in the audit market failures, the size of the accounting firm can have the effect of signal transmission to alleviate the problem of information asymmetry in audit market. The development of accounting firm scale and the realization of firm’s economies of scale will not necessarily undermine the competition of audit market."Marshall conflict" does not exist in the audit market. Because of the low entry barriers, even oligopoly accounting firm also faces the competition from potential entrants. In the audit market,oligopoly market structure does not mean the existence of oligopolistic behavior. It can realize the equilibrium of oligopoly and competition,so it is efficient.2. The concentration of A share audit market is becoming higher. Descriptive statistics of the Chinese audit market structure shows that the structure of China’s A-share audit market is maturing, evolving from the low concentration degree of oligopolistic market structure type to a higher concentration degree of the oligopolistic market structure. The government regulation policy and market competition strength jointly promote the continuous improvement. Although our local accounting firms are predominant in the number of audit clients, their quality of audit clients are far lower than big four. Market shares of our local accounting firms are not stable, the advantages of industry expertise are not prominent compared with big four.3. The competition of specific industry customer and auditors’ industry expertise are the important factors which have influence on the audit market structure in our country. From the perspective of customer’s choice of accounting firm, the results find that when the competition within a specific industry is fierce, the competitors would choose a different accounting firm to audit them.This is also shows that the possibility of collusion between the suppliers in the audit market, namely the accounting firms is very low. Secondly, the accounting firm’s investment in product differentiation constitute significant positive effect on audit market concentration. It means that industry expertise form competitive industry barriers, making customers tend to choose a firm with expertise in the industry, thus improving the audit market concentration.In other respects,there is a significant positive correlation between entry barriers with market concentration, but the effect is very small;the impact of sales growth and geographical distribution is not significant, suggesting that with the expansion of the scale of the accounting firms, the trend of original regional segmentation of audit business has gradually weakened.-4. The improvement of audit market concentration will not result in collusion between accounting firms, market competition significantly enhanced. By comparing relationship between market structure and audit fees in the year of2002and2012, price competition enhanced. What is more, industry expertise of accounting firms in2012shows more prominent advantage. The industry experts have advantage on the audit pricing, and bring premium income. For large companies, they choose accounting firms with large size, more premium paid for audit quality and not for the firm’s industry expertise; For small companies, they would like to pay higher audit fees for the industry expertise of auditors for their industry experience and knowledge of auditors.It means that oligopolistic structure of the audit market does not undermine competition in the audit market. In addition, in order to survive in the fierce market competition, small and medium sized accounting firms should focus on improving their industry expertise.5. There is low-balling in the audit market, but it did not cause significant reduction in audit quality.The results indicate a significant price cutting in the initial three years.The average discount degree is3.7%and the price cutting mainly exists in the auditor switch between auditors providing the same audit quality. Moreover, the successor auditors who have more market shares than the former give lower discounts. In addition, the economic consequences of low balling has been tested by contrasting the audit quality before and after the auditor change. Results show that the audit quality have not been reduced even when the successors’charge lower fees. On the contrary, the audit quality improve. It shows that accounting firms will be cautious to avoid the litigation risk and they are not only for profit regardless of the audit quality. Therefore, low balling belongs to a normal price competition behavior.6. There are still gaps between the auditors’ operational efficiency and the requirements of audit market structure changes.The results with DEA and malmquist index show that in the recent years,the operational efficiency continue to rise,but compared with big four, the operational efficiency level of our local accounting firms is at a low level.The empirical tests indicate that the operational efficiency and audit market structure is not linear positive correlated, showing phasal effect,which means that the operating efficiency of accounting firms remains to be further improved.In addition, the empirical test show that there is a significantly negative correlation between audit quality and operational efficiency for local accounting firms,which means that in order to ensure the audit quality, local accounting firms need to invest more manpower and material resources.For being more competitive,local accounting firms should develop their scale and efficiency coordinately. Therefore, local accounting firms should pay more attention to the improvement of technology and management experience and actively learn from the big four to make full use of existing resources and to achieve bigger and stronger.7. Oligopolistic market structure is favorable for the improvement of external performance in the audit market. It investigates the relationship of audit market structure and earnings management of clients, choosing HHI index as a proxy for market concentration. To get a reliable result, this article settles the problem of endogeneity with the instrumental variables methods. Studies have shown that there is significant positive relation between market concentration and audit quality. Through the robust test, it find that industry expertise can contribute to restrain positive earnings management to some extent. The industry expertise of the accounting firm need to be further developed. High concentration of market structure helps to improve the external performance of the audit market, which provides empirical support for bigger and stronger policies of CPA industry. Overall, with the optimization of the structure in the audit market, the external performance of the CPA profession has made significant progress.The main innovations of this study are as follows:first, in theory, on the basis of the characteristics of audit market, we systematically analyze the reasons and efficiency of oligopolistic audit market structure combined with the theory of industrial organization. Secondly, in the empirical part, we first study the market power of the accounting firms, to examine the competition behavior of audit market in China; We carry on the comprehensive investigation of audit market performance from two aspects of internal and external performance; On the basis of overcoming the endogeneity, we select instrumental varibles to examine the relationship between market structure and audit quality with two-stage least squares method, making research results more reasonable.

  • 【分类号】F062.9;F239.22
  • 【被引频次】7
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