【作者】 朱晨波；

【导师】 胡建强；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 2007年,在中国民航局的主导下,运营京沪航线的五家航空公司组成了一个战略联盟,名曰“京沪快线”。为了缩短乘客办票、候机及旅行的时间,共同运营“京沪快线”的五家航空公司共享专用的安检通道、候机区域、值机柜台和登机口等机场服务设施；更值得称道的是,乘客只要购买“京沪快线”中任意一家航空公司出售的机票,就可以在出行当天随意随时免费换乘到别家航空公司的航班上去。不过,每换乘成功一位乘客,原先承运该乘客的航空公司就要向实际承运其的航空公司支付换乘费,其价格最初设定为京沪航线全价票价格的八折。然而,“京沪快线”实际运营之后,京沪航班的机票价格却显著上涨,直至民航局介入干预,票价才有所回落。机票价格为什么会上涨?政府规制对航空公司的运营产生了怎样的影响?政府如何去改进规制政策?本文研究基于政府规制的双寡头航空公司的收益管理博弈问题,并试图从航空公司博弈的角度回答上述问题。本文的主要工作包括：一、研究基于政府规制的双寡头航空公司的舱位控制博弈问题。假设机票的价格是给定的,航空公司的决策是如何分配舱位；此研究排除价格竞争因素之干扰,旨在分析政府规制对航空公司舱位竞争的影响。研究发现,政府规制使航空公司倾向于少卖低价票,从而间接地提高了机票的价格,不过,航空公司的收益却不增反降。此外,灵敏度分析显示,若换乘费越低,则低价票供应量就越少,而航空公司的收益却越高。二、研究基于政府规制的双寡头航空公司的定价博弈问题。假设航班的舱位分配是给定的,航空公司的决策是如何定机票(低价票和高价票)的价格；此研究排除舱位竞争因素之干扰,旨在分析政府规制对航空公司价格竞争的影响。研究发现,政府规制使航空公司倾向于提高机票的价格,并且在很宽泛的条件下,航空公司的收益也会增加。此外,灵敏度分析显示,若换乘费越低,则机票的定价以及航空公司的收益也会越低。最后,数值试验的结果表明,受政府规制的影响,在多数情景下,航空公司的机票价格与收益都会提高,不过在少数情景下则不然,这些少数情景的主要特征是换乘费大多比较低；再者,高价票价格降低的情景数目要远多于低价票价格降低的情景数目。三、研究基于政府规制的双寡头航空公司的舱位控制和定价博弈问题。出于简化的目的,假设低价舱位的乘客需求足够大,并且低价票的价格是给定的,航空公司的决策是如何分配舱位以及如何定高价票的价格。研究发现,政府规制使航空公司倾向于增加高价舱位预留座位数量,并同时提高高价票的价格；再者,降低低价票的销售量会减少航空公司的收益,而提高高价票的价格则会增加航空公司的收益。此外,灵敏度分析显示,(1)当低价票价格增大时,高价舱位预留座位数量会被降低；(2)当换乘费增大或者高价舱位确定性需求的基本市场容量增大时,高价舱位预留座位数量以及高价票价格都会被提高；(3)当需求价格弹性增大时,高价舱位预留座位数量以及高价票价格都会被降低。最后,数值试验的结果表明,政府规制对航空公司的舱位分配决策影响较大,而对高价票定价决策以及航空公司收益的影响较小。基于上述研究,本文提出若干建议,旨在改善由政府规制引发的机票价格上涨、低价票供应量减少的问题,藉以提高航空市场的运营效率,并增进社会福利,具体建议如下：(1)政府宜应设定较低的换乘费以平抑高企的机票价格,促使航空公司增加低价票的供应；(2)政府也可以通过调低全价票的价格以达到平抑机票价格的目的；(3)政府宜应调整各家航空公司在不同时段的航班配置,使得各家公司被分配到非黄金时段的航班数量占其总航班数量的比例差不多相等,以促进市场的公平与公正,从而保障换乘政策的实施效果。本文为考虑政府规制的民航业竞争研究提供了一个基于博弈模型的研究框架,本文的结论与建议也为航空公司和民航业监管者提供了科学的参考,具有一定的理论和实践意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 In 2007, the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) asked the five airlines with service between Shanghai and Beijing to form an express shuttle al-liance called "Beijing-Shanghai Express". To reduce waiting and traveling time of passengers, the five airlines share channels of security checks, waiting area, check-in counters and gates for all flights between Shanghai and Beijing; further-more, on the departure day, passengers who have originally purchased tickets from one airline could freely switch to any other airline at any time. If a pas-senger switches from one airline to another, a transfer fee will be paid for by the original airline to the receiving airline, and the amount of the fee was first set at 80% of the full fare price. It seemed that this mechanism should work well since it would provide great convenience for travelers. However, immediately after its implementation on August 6,2007, airfares for flights between Shanghai and Bei-jing shot up significantly, and the situation continues until an intervention was made by CAAC. Why did airfares go up? How does the government mandate impact airline operations? How the government mandate should be designed so that the market could operate as efficiently as possible? This thesis studies rev-enue management games in a duopoly airline market with government mandate, and tries to answer these questions from the perspective of game theory. The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:1. It studies a seat inventory competition game between duopoly airlines with government mandate. In this study, it is assumes that airfares are given a priori, and airlines decide how to allocate seat inventory. This study focuses on analyzing the impact of government mandate on seat inventory competition between airlines without effects of airfares. Results show that with the govern-ment mandate the airlines would provide less low-fare seats which would increase the average airfares and their total revenue would be less as well. In addition, sensitivity analysis implies that, a lower transfer fee could lead to more low-fare seats offered, resulting in higher total revenues.2. It studies a price competition game between duopoly airlines with govern-ment mandate. In this study, it is assumes that the allocation of seat inventory is given a priori and airlines decide how to price the air tickets (low-fare tickets and high-fare tickets). This study focuses on analyzing the impact of government mandate on price competition between airlines without effects of seat inventory allocations. Results show that with the government mandate the airlines would raise the airfares, and their total revenue would be increased under mild condi-tions. In addition, sensitivity analysis implies that a lower transfer fee could lead to lower airfares and total revenues. Finally, numerical results show that with the government mandate, airfares and airlines’total revenue would be increased in almost all test scenarios with only a few exceptions and it can be observed in these few exceptions the transfer fee is usually relatively low and high fares are also relatively low (in comparison with low fares).3. It studies a price and seat inventory competition game between duopoly airlines with government mandate. To simplify the problem, it is assumes that demands for the low-fare seats are sufficient large and the low fare price is given a priori, so that low-fare seats always sell out. In this model, airlines decide how to allocate seat inventory and price the high-fare tickets. Results show that with the government mandate the airlines would provide more high-fare seats and raise high fare prices as well; furthermore, less low-fare seats offered would decrease airlines’revenue, and higher high fare price would increase airlines’revenue. In addition, sensitivity analysis implies:(1) higher low fare price could lead to less high-fare seats protected; (2) higher transfer fee or market share of deterministic demands for the high-fare seats could lead to more high-fare seats protected and higher high fare prices; (3) higher price elasticity of demand could lead to less high-fare seats protected and lower high fare prices. Finally, numerical results show that, comparing with airfares and revenues, the government mandate has greater influence on seat allocations.To improve the efficiency of airline markets and social welfare, some sug-gestions are proposed as follows:(1) the government could set a lower transfer fee to encourage airlines to offer more low-fare seats; (2) the government could also set a lower full fare price to promote lower airfares; (3) the proportion of flights allocated to different time slots for each airline should be about the same, otherwise, it might create an unfair and inefficient market.This thesis provides a game-theoretic approach for the research on airline competition with government mandate, and its conclusions and suggestions are beneficial for both airlines and the civil aviation authority, so the research findings of this thesis have both theoretical and applicable values.更多还原