【作者】 宋浩；

【导师】 王治安；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 会计学， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 我国的证券市场自上世纪90年代初期建立,至今已经经过了近20年的历程。相较于西方发达国家,我国在极短的时间内实现了证券市场的飞速发展,截止2008年末沪深两市的上市公司已超过1600多家,制度建设不断完善,市场效率不断提高,上市公司的治理结构也日趋合理。在肯定成绩的同时,我们不能漠视存在的问题,其中自愿性披露水平不高就是一个重要方面。从某种意义上说,证券市场本质上是一个信息市场,其核心问题是证券价格能否及时、准确的反映公司经营的基本面信息。然而,证券市场信息的非对称性却是常态,信息风险成为系统风险的重要组成部分,妨碍了经济资源配置效率。强化上市公司信息披露制度,是解决这一问题的关键手段之一。信息披露包括了强制性披露与自愿性披露,其中前者是上市公司对法律法规的遵循,后者则是出于管理层的一种自利性行为。那么,上市公司的自愿性披露行为对包括中小股东、机构投资者、债权人这些外部投资者的利益是否有影响,以及这种行为的动机和影响因素又是什么,是重要的理论与实际问题。本文正是针对自愿性披露的公司治理效应问题进行的理论与实证研究,其主要内容和观点如下：第1章：绪论。本章主要介绍了选题背景与研究意义,论文的研究方法、研究逻辑与内容结构,论文的创新与不足、基本概念界定等。第2章：自愿性披露与公司治理。本章首先阐释了自愿性披露的内涵,并结合国内外相关研究,对其外延进行归结,即自愿性披露的信息包括了上市公司背景、业绩、核心产品与技术、内部控制、人力资源、未确认无形资产、社会责任履行和衍生金融工具等八个方面的信息。其次对公司治理的内涵、公司治理的相关问题、公司治理机制、公司治理模式进行了分析研究,其中与公司治理相关的问题包括了资本结构、投资政策、股权结构、产权结构四个方面,而公司治理机制有内部治理与外部治理之分,公司治理模式亦有英美模式、德日模式和家族模式的差异。最后分析了自愿性披露与公司治理的关系,借鉴OECD关于信息披露和透明度作为改善公司治理的重要原则之一的表述,笔者认为,自愿性信息披露具有公司治理效应。准确的说,包括强制性信息与自愿性信息在内的信息披露机制,是公司治理机制的重要组成部分,而其目标是提高上市公司的透明度,而这一目标是改善公司治理的重要原则之一。第3章：自愿性披露的理论与实践的发展与现状分析。本章首先介绍了自愿性披露理论基础,即有效市场假说、企业契约性质理论、信息经济学理论。其次对国内外关于自愿性披露的相关研究进行了评述,在披露的动机、衡量标准、影响因素、经济后果四个方面进行梳理,并指出其中的不足之处。最后将自愿性与强制性披露相结合,从整体上阐释信息披露制度的历史演进,比较当今世界各国与自愿性披露相关的规定,总结其实践发展的内在逻辑。第4章：自愿性披露与外部股东利益保护的实证研究。外部投资者,包括外部股东和债权人,是自愿性披露信息的主要需求者,本章主要关注了外部股东收益利益保护与自愿性披露水平的关系问题。首先,通过对国内外文献的梳理,笔者认为外部股东有中小投资者和机构投资者之分,二者的信息来源与拥有量不同,所以自愿性披露包括了非针对性信息与有针对性信息,在此基础上提出了本章实证研究的相关假设。在研究设计中,笔者以2008年上海证券交易所上市的A股公司为研究对象,以2008年度股票累积报酬率作为外部股东收益的观测变量,分别以临时公告数量和机构持股比例作为衡量非针对性自愿性披露水平和有针对性自愿性披露水平的代理变量,在控制公司规模、盈利能力、行业等因素的基础上,回归结果表明自愿性披露水平与外部股东收益有明显的正相关关系。第5章：自愿性披露与债权人利益保护的实证研究。上市公司债权人包括银行和公司债券的持有人,其利益保护涉及投资风险与投资收益。笔者在理论分析的基础上,提出了研究假设,在研究设计中,以2008年上海证券交易所上市的A股公司为研究对象,以利息保障倍数和上市公司债务资本利息率分别作为债权人投资风险与收益的观察变量,在控制公司规模和资产负债率两个因素的基础上,得出的回归结果表明,自愿性披露水平与债权人的利益无显著的相关关系,并分析了产生这一结果的现实原因。第6章：政策与建议。本章首先在前文分析的基础上,对自愿性披露的公司治理效应进行了归结。其次从理论与实证的层面分析了自愿性披露行为的影响因素。笔者认为,理论上来讲,我国上市公司自愿性披露的影响因素主要有：经理层主观因素、公司内部治理机制和公司外部治理机制三大类,结合我国的实际情况,经理层主观因素主要是公司的经营业绩,与公司内部治理相关的因素有股权集中度、董事会的独立性特征,以及董事长和总经理两职是否相分离,而与公司外部治理相关的因素有公司规模、债权人与机构投资者的参与程度,在此基础上,提出了相关的研究假设。在实证分析中,笔者沿袭前文方法,以临时公告数量作为衡量自愿性披露水平的代理变量,分别考察了经营业绩、股权集中度、董事会独立性、董事长与总经理的职务分工、公司规模、财务杠杆、机构持股比例七个变量对自愿性披露水平的影响。实证检验表明,除与公司内部治理相关的三个因素外,其他四个变量对自愿性披露水平都存在着显著的正相关关系。最后,在理论分析与实证检验的基础上,笔者提出了规范上市公司自愿性披露行为,实现自愿性披露治理效应的政策建议。本文的创新之处,主要表现在以下三个方面：第一,关于自愿性披露的经济后果,国内外文献已经取得了不少研究成果,但是其立足点基本上是披露行为对上市公司资本成本和股票价值的影响,却极少考虑外部投资者的利益保护问题。本文正是站在外部投资者保护的立场上,并将外部投资者细分为中小投资者、机构投资者和债权人,从实证的角度验证了自愿性披露水平与其三者利益保护的相关关系。第二,在分析信息披露渠道的基础上,将自愿性信息分为非针对性信息与有针对性信息两类,认为前者是中小投资者的主要信息来源,而后者是机构投资者所独占。通过选择适合的代理变量,分别验证了两类披露行为对外部股东收益的正向影响。第三,关于机构投资者与自愿性披露水平(主要是非针对性方面)的关系的问题,相关的研究都是在相关的政策建议中,空泛的提出通过大力发展机构投资者以促进上市公司自愿性披露水平,而未做经验的证明。笔者通过构建有关自愿性披露行为影响因素的实证研究模型,首次证明了机构投资者对上市公司持股比例的增加,对自愿性披露水平的增加具有显著的正向影响。本文的不足之处：由于作者水平有限,论文中也存在着诸多不足。如对一些问题的理论的整体性把握不够,虽然对自愿性披露与外部投资者的利益保护关系问题进行了系统阐述,也提出了相应的解决方案,但是这些方案可能是一种理论的推演,是否实际可行,可能存在些许问题。这也促使我在以后的工作和学习中不断探索,努力进一步提高。更多还原

【Abstract】 Chinese securities market which established in early90s last centuries has developed nearly20years. Compared to western developed countries, Chinese securities market has achieved a rapid development in a short time. There are more than1600listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen. With continuous improvement in system construction and market efficiency, the governance structure of listed companies has become more and more rational. While affirming achievements, we can’t ignore problems especially the low level of voluntary disclosure. In a sense, securities market is essentially an information market. Its core question is whether stock prices reflect company’s information timely and accurately. With frequently information asymmetry, information risk as an important component of systematic risk has impeded the resource allocation efficiency. The key to solve this problem is enhancing information disclosure system of listed companies. Information disclosure includes mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure. The former means compliance with laws and regulations for listed company. Voluntary disclosure means self-interest behavior for management. What’s the motivation of voluntary disclosure behavior? How the behaviors affect external investors’ interests? Both questions are important theoretical and practical problems. This paper makes theoretical and empirical research on corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. There are6chapters:Chapter1:IntroductionThis chapter describes the research background, significance, method, logic, content, structure, innovation, lack and definition of basic concepts.Chapter2:Voluntary disclosure and corporate governanceFirstly, this chapter explains the meaning of voluntary disclosure and summarizes voluntary information disclosure including listed company background, performance, core products, technology, internal controls, human resources, unrecognized intangible assets, social responsibility performance and derivative financial instruments. Secondly, this chapter analyzes meaning of corporate governance, related issues, mechanisms and models. The related issues include capital structure, investment policies and ownership structure. The mechanism includes internal governance and external governance. The models include Anglo-American model, German-Japanese model and family model. Thirdly, this chapter analyzes the relationship between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance. With reference to OECD statement that information disclosure and transparency are important principle to improve corporate governance, this paper believes voluntary disclosure has effect on corporate governance. To be precise, the goal of information disclosure mechanism is increasing listed companies transparency. This is one of principles to improve corporate governance.Chapter3:The theory and practice development and status quo analysis of voluntary disclosureFirstly, this chapter introduces theoretical basis of voluntary disclosure. It is efficient market hypothesis, enterprise contract and information economics theory. Secondly, focus on disclosure motivation, measurement standards, factors and economic consequences, this chapter pointed out shortcomings of voluntary disclosure. Finally, compared to related regulation in other countries, this chapter explains the historical evolution of information disclosure system and summarizes the internal logic of practical development.Chapter4:Empirical study on voluntary disclosure and protection of outside shareholders interestsOutside investors including outside shareholders and creditors are main demanders for voluntary information disclosure. This chapter concerns on the relation between voluntary disclosure level and protection of external shareholders interests. Firstly, the paper divides external shareholders into small and medium investors and institutional investors. Their sources of information are different. Therefore, voluntary disclosure is divided into targeted and non-targeted information. On this basis, this chapter presents assumptions of empirical research. The study objectives are A share listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange listed during2008. The observed variables for external shareholder return are cumulative annual return on equity. The proxy variables of targeted and non-targeted voluntary disclosure level are percentage of institutional ownership and number of provisional announcement. According to4factors, such as company size control, profitability, industry, the regression result shows voluntary disclosure level is significantly positive correlation to external shareholder returns.Chapter5:Empirical study on voluntary disclosure and protection of creditors’interestsListed companies creditors include banks and corporate bonds holders. Their protection involves risk and return on investment. The study objective is the same to chapter4. The observation variables of creditor’s risks and returns on investment are interest coverage ratio and interest rates of debt capital. According to two factors, such as company size control and asset-liability ratio, the regression result shows that voluntary disclosure level is no significant correlation to the creditor’s interests. The writer analyzes the reasons for this result.Chapter6:Policy recommendationsFirstly, this chapter summarized corporate governance effects of voluntary disclosure. Secondly, this paper believes that there are three major factors, including executive subjective factors, internal and outside governance mechanisms. Started from actual situation in China, executive subjective factors are mainly operating performance. Internal corporate governance involves degree of concentration in ownership, board independence and separation of chairmanship and CEO. Outside corporate governance includes company size and degree of participation in creditors and institutional investors. The proxy variables of voluntary disclosure level are number of provisional announcement. According to7factors, such as operations results, ownership concentration, board independence, segregation of chairmanship and CEO, company size, financial leverage, percentage of institutional ownership, the regression result shows that, in addition to three factors of internal company governance, voluntary disclosure level is significantly positive correlation to the other four variables. Finally, this paper proposes policy recommendations to improve voluntary disclosure behavior and governance effects.There are three innovations of this paper:First, although domestic and international literature has made a lot of achievements on economic consequences of voluntary disclosure, they’re almost how disclose behavior affect on cost of capital and stock value. The research rarely concerns on protection of outside investors interests. This paper is on the position of outside investor protection and divide outside investors into small and medium investors, institutional investors and creditors. This paper verifies the relationship between voluntary disclosure level and three protections of interests.Second, based on analysis of information disclosure channel, this paper divides the voluntary information into targeted and non-targeted information. The former is the main source of information for small and medium investors. The latter is monopolized by institutional investors. This paper verifies two types of disclosure behavior have positive correlation to outside shareholders earnings.Third, research on relation between institutional investors and voluntary disclosure level (mainly non-targeted) are empty proposal and no empirical evidence. By constructing empirical models of factors in voluntary disclosure behavior, this paper firstly demonstrates increasing institutional investors has significantly positive effect on voluntary disclosure and proportion of shareholding.There are also a lot of shortcomings in this paper, for example, not sufficiently grasping the integrity of theory. This paper systematically describes the relation between voluntary disclosure and protection of external investors’ interests. But the corresponding solution may be a theoretical deduction, whether it is feasible, there may be a little problem. That will prompt me to learn continuously in the future.更多还原