【作者】 李莉；

【导师】 徐向艺；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 企业管理， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 关联交易是介于企业和市场之间的一种交易形式,在交易性质上既具有促进公司规模经营、减少交易过程中的不确定性、降低交易成本、实现集团战略目标等积极作用,同时也存在违背市场公平竞争原则,关联方之间转移资金和利润,进而损害公司和股东利益等诸多负面作用。Johnson等(2000)提出“掏空”(Tunneling)的概念来描述大股东对中小股东的侵占现象,其中提到关联交易便是“掏空”的诸多途径之一。关联人在利已动机的诱导下,将关联交易作为调节利润、转移利益、操纵股价的有力工具。因此,对关联交易的治理便成为各国资本市场要面临的一个重大问题。本文从政府监管的角度研究关联交易的治理问题,系统分析我国上市公司关联交易监管制度的变迁历程,并对监管效果进行实证检验。文章首先在理论上寻找关联交易这类交易形式需要政府介入的依据,外部性理论、信息不对称理论、法与金融理论可以为我们提供答案。继而为揭示政府监管制度与企业关联交易行为特征的相互影响,文章运用博弈论工具对政府监管与上市公司关联交易行为之间的关系进行理论推导,分别以静态和动态的观点采用多个博弈模型对政府监管机构和企业行为的关系进行研究,从理论上验证了关联交易监管政策变化对企业关联交易行为产生重要的影响,同时企业的行为也对政策的制定产生了影响,即企业的行为作为反馈机制影响后续的政策制定；随后对我国关联交易监管制度的发展历程从法律规制、会计管制、证券监管的角度进行了梳理,从中可以看出,我国对关联交易的监管制度是随着企业关联交易行为的变化而产生和发展起来,反之又对企业的关联交易行为产生着重要的影响,可见中国的实际支持了理论分析中企业与政府间的博弈过程。通过梳理1997年以来监管机构出台的一系列规范关联交易行为的政策法规可以发现,其所涵盖的监管措施(事前监管)主要集中于：对关联人或关联交易行为的界定、价格规制、数量规制、信息披露、公司治理、违规措施等几大方面。将关联交易监管措施对上市公司关联交易行为的影响进行实证检验,研究结果发现,在监管环境日益强化的背景下,关联交易依然是上市公司及其控制股东偏好的交易方式。进一步用关联交易中的资金往来数据展开的实证检验结果表明,随着监管程度的加强,上市公司对关联方资金借出和借入的数额均有所增长,但是借出增长的幅度要低于借入增长的幅度,因此关联方净占资呈现出下降的趋势；上市公司对控股股东资金借入的数额呈显著增长态势,上市公司对控股股东资金借出呈显著下降态势,因此控股股东净占资呈现显著下降的趋势。可见,关联交易监管措施可以在一定程度上抑制关联方尤其是大股东通过关联交易实施的利益侵占。对关联交易违规行为的事后监管主要是指对关联交易违规行为的事后处罚机制,也是政府对关联交易进行管制的一个重要方面。通过对2001--2010年我国上市公司关联交易违规事项的研究发现,上市公司通常会由于关联交易审批授权程序违规、未及时披露、隐瞒披露关联关系、重大遗漏、虚假披露、关联方占资及违规担保等原因受到处罚,其中存在审批授权程序违规、信息披露不及时、以及大股东占资行为的企业占了违规总体相当大的比重。就信息载体而言,绝大多数企业在临时公告的信息披露中存在违规。就监管主体而言,证监会、证券交易所、财政部都会对上市公司的关联交易违规行为进行事后监管,采取公开批评、公开谴责、内部通报批评、行政处罚、乃至市场禁入等处罚措施。通过对违规事项的市场反应所作研究发现,事后监管起到一定作用。投资者对公开谴责、行政处罚、内部通报批评、和市场禁入这四种处罚形式均有所反应,对行政处罚和市场禁入反应尤为强烈；对上市公司发生关联交易事项的重大遗漏、大股东占资、及授权审批程序违规反应非常强烈；与其他监管机构相比,证监会对关联交易的处罚公告具有较强的威慑力。针对违规关联交易企业为样本所作实证研究发现,关联交易违规企业具有区别于其他企业的显著的财务特征和公司治理特征。出现期间费用及销售收入异常增长、资产质量恶化、负债水平增长的企业更有可能出现关联交易违规。考虑股权集中度和股权制衡对关联交易的影响时,不仅要看股东的持股比例,更要关注、识别股东之间错综复杂的关联关系,有多家股东受同一实际控制人控制的情况要格外注意。另外,良好的外部治理环境可以有效地遏制关联交易违规行为,外部审计监督、企业是否跨地上市、企业面临的产品竞争市场等外部治理环境均可以为监管者或投资者判别企业关联交易行为提供参考。其他国家和地区对于上市公司关联交易的监管有很多值得我们借鉴之处,例如,建立严格的上市审查制度,从源头上对上市公司关联交易进行控制；按重要性原则进行分类监管,为关联交易的事前和事中有效控制建立保障；确定严格的法律责任和建立有效的司法救济制度。论文在比较借鉴的基础上提出了中国上市公司关联交易监管的制度设计：首先,应本着成本与效益平衡兼顾的制度设计理念；其次,在各监管主体之间进行权力与责任的分配,要特别注意对关联交易的会计管制和证券监管的协同改进；另外,要建立对关联交易的事前有效控制和监督机制,以及事后严格的责任追究制度和有效的利益补偿机制。更多还原

【Abstract】 Related party transaction is a form of a transaction between the enterprise and the market. It can promote the scale management, reduce the uncertainty in the transaction process, reduce transaction costs, and achieve the strategic objectives of the Group, but it also can violate the principle of fair market competition, transfer capital and profits between related parties, and damage the interests of the company and shareholders. Johnson et al (2000) proposed the concept of Tunneling to describe the occupation of the large shareholders to minority shareholders, and pointed out that related party transaction is a way of Tunneling. Unfair related party transaction is often used to adjust profits and manipulate earnings management by corporate insiders. Therefore, the governance of related party transactions has become a major problem in the capital market of the world. The dissertation discusses the governance of the RPTs from the perspective of government supervision. Systematic study is performed on the change of RPTs supervisory system, and empirical tests are made on the supervision effect.The article first searches for theoretical basis of government intervention in RPTs. Externality theory, information asymmetry theory, and law and finance theory can give us the answer. Then game theory tools are used to reveal the mutual influence of the government regulatory system and characteristics of related party transactions, with both static model and dynamic model adopted. The models verify that regulatory policy has an important impact on RPTs, and conversely, the behavior of enterprises has an impact on policy development. We comb the change of RPTs supervisory system from the aspect of legal regulation, accounting controls, and the securities regulatory, from which we can see that government supervisory system and characters of RPTs have mutual impacts on each other. So practice in China supports the game models in above theoretical analysis.A series of regulatory policies and regulations of RPTs have been issued since1997in China, and they focus on the definition of RPTs, price regulation, quantity regulation, information disclosure, corporate governance, illegal measures, etc. Empirical examination is made to test the impact of regulatory measures on RPTs. The results find that, RPTs are still preferences of listed company and its controlling shareholders in spite of the enhancement of supervision. Further empirical test with funds data in the RPTs shows that with the strengthening of the degree of supervision, the amount of lending and borrowing of funds from the listed companies to related parties are on the rise, but the lending growth rate is lower than the borrowing growth rate, net occupation of funds by all related parties showing a downward trend. The amount borrowed by controlling shareholders is on the rise, while the amount lent by controlling shareholders is declining, so net occupation of funds by controlling shareholders shows a downward trend. Therefore, RPTs can be inhibited by RPTs regulatory measures to some extent, especially those for purpose of tunneling by large shareholders.Post-mortem supervision on RPTs mainly refers to mechanism of punishment on violations of RPTs, which is an import aspect of supervision. Research based on illegal behaviors of listed companies in China during the year of2001-2010shows that, punishments are usually caused by violation in approval process, not timely disclosure, concealment of relationship, material omissions, false disclosure, occupation, illegal guarantee, etc. Most of the companies violate regulation in temporary bulletins. The SFC, the Stock Exchange, and the Ministry of Finance could all supervise violations of RPTs.Research on the market reaction to the violations of RPTs shows that, post-mortem supervision play a role to some extent. Investors react to four forms of punishment, which are the public reprimand, administrative penalty, internal reprimand, and banning the entry into the securities market. The reaction is particularly strong on the administrative penalty and banning the entry into the market. Significant omission, occupation by large shareholders and violation in approval process are strongly reacted to. Compared with other regulatory bodies, punishment by the SFC has a strong deterrent.Research is made on companies that violated Related-Party-Transaction regulation, and the results show that these companies have remarkable financial and corporate governance characteristics that distinguish from other companies. Companies characterized by abnormal period costs and sales revenue growth, worsening of asset quality, and the growth in debt, are more likely to be associated with trading violations. When we consider the impact of ownership concentration and equity balance on RPTs, we should not only look at the shareholding ratio, but also pay attention to the intricate relationship among the shareholders, especially those subject to the same actual controller. Good external governance environment can effectively inhibit the violation. External audit, whether a company is cross-listed, and competition facing it can all help regulators or investors distinguish the enterprises that tend to violate.There is a lot we can learn from other countries and regions about the supervision of the RPTs of listed companies. Some establish stringent listing censorship; some classify the companies according to importance principles; and some determine strict liability and establish an effective judicial remedy system. At last, the dissertation designs supervisory system of RPT of the Listed Company in China. Firstly, design concepts that balance costs and benefits should be adopted; secondly, the distribution of power and responsibility must be made among the regulatory bodies, especially accounting controls and securities regulation should be improved collaboratively; in addition, we must establish effective beforehand control and supervision mechanisms as well as afterwards accountability system and interest compensation mechanism.更多还原