【作者】 刘征驰；

【导师】 赖明勇；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 应用经济学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 服务外包是在经济全球化浪潮中,依托现代信息技术而发展起来的新兴产业组织模式。技术创新和信息革命的发展使得服务产品在生产与消费上的分离成为可能,从而使得服务具有了跨越地理空间的可交易性,服务产品的生产可根据地区的比较优势实现跨地域的资源配置,从而提升企业的整体竞争力。随着服务外包市场的日益成熟,技术、知识密集型项目在服务外包中所占的比例越来越高,发包方与接包方之间的关系也由过去简单的雇佣关系发展成为新型的战略协作伙伴关系。目前国内外学者对服务外包的研究偏重于宏观视角的分析,本文则立足微观视角,试图打开服务外包组织的“黑箱”,通过对服务外包组织中发包方和接包方企业互动博弈行为的刻画,揭示服务外包组织存在和运行的一般规律。本文主要研究内容有:首先,通过对市场组织、企业组织和外包组织三种制度形式的对比,对服务外包组织的本质属性进行界定,得出服务外包组织本质上是一种基于关系型契约的双边治理模式,即解决了服务外包组织“是什么”的问题。对服务外包的组织本质的研究回答了“是什么”的问题,却没有回答服务外包组织为何存在的问题,或者说“为什么”的问题。在对服务外包组织本质属性进行清晰界定的基础上,本文从人力资本和进入权治理视角对服务外包组织治理结构进行了分析,认为其核心治理机制是通过发包企业向接包企业开放其关键资源进入权,激励接包企业进行相应的人力资本专用性投资。这种组织治理模式在知识和人力资本密集型的服务交易中有其独到的治理优势,这也就解释了服务外包产业为何能够在近年来能够得到发展和壮大。服务外包组织产生后,是以怎样的方式运行的呢,其中是否存在一些共性的规律?这就是需要回答的第三个问题,即“怎么样”的问题。本文通过以下几个方面来诠释服务外包组织的运行。第一,讨论服务外包中多任务的激励机制;第二,分析服务外包中发包决策机制;第三,研究服务外包中的知识共享机制。本文的创新点主要有:(1)提出了服务外包组织契约特征及其治理模式。以制度经济学的交易成本分析为工具,通过对市场组织、企业组织和外包组织三种制度形式的对比,得出服务外包组织本质上是一种介于市场与企业之间的基于关系型契约的双边治理模式。(2)揭示了服务外包组织治理的核心机制,并基于“进入权”和“声誉”机制从静态和动态两个层面构建了带有不对称信息的不完全契约模型。通过引入“进入权”理论,指出服务外包组织治理的核心机制是:通过发包企业向接包企业开放其关键资源进入权,激励接包企业进行相应的人力资本专用性投资。通过建模证明了在静态条件下(单次博弈),服务外包组织可以达到相对较优的投资激励水平,但是却不可能实现社会最优的投资激励目标;在动态条件下(重复博弈),由于声誉机制的作用,存在使双方达到社会最优的投资水平的均衡状态。(3)建立了服务外包多任务激励模型。针对服务外包中多任务、任务可测度低和任务之间关联度大的特点,定义了服务外包的最优契约设计约束条件,并在经典的薪酬激励模型基础上建立了服务外包多任务激励模型,给出了包含不同性质任务的激励机制设计方案。(4)建立了服务外包发包决策模型。针对服务外包不确定性较强的特点,在外包决策中增加风险估计和第三方监督费用,从成本--收益角度构建了一个较为全面的服务外包发包决策模型。在此基础上计算模型非合作均衡解,再考虑到外包合作双方决策者偏好,最终得到一个合作双方均满意的最优决策方案。(5)建立了服务外包知识共享模型。基于服务外包组织知识共享的特点,建立了服务外包知识共享的演化博弈模型,揭示了服务外包知识共享的内在机制及其动态演化过程,并指出知识共享演化路径和达到的均衡点与博弈的支付矩阵以及系统参数的变化密切相关。更多还原

【Abstract】 Service outsourcing is a new industrial organization model, relying on modern information technology, and developed in economic globalization. Technological innovation and information revolution make it possible to separate service products production from consumption. The separation endues service products with cross-regional tradability. As production of service products can be cross-regional ly allocated based on regional comparative advantages, the overall competitiveness of enterprises could be enhanced. As outsourcing market matures, and technology-knowledge-intensive projects takes an increasing proportion in the service outsourcing, the simple employment relationship between contractor and contractee develops into a new strategic partnership of cooperation. While scholars at home and abroad emphasis on the macro-perspective analysis in service outsourcing research, this paper is based on micro-perspective, and revealing the general rules in service outsourcing organization, by portraying the behavior of both contractor and contractee in the interactive game.Firstly, this paper answers the question of“WHAT is service outsourcing organization”. By comparing 3 kinds institutional forms, market, firm and outsourcing, the nature of service outsourcing organization is defined as relational-contract-based bilateral governance.Then, another question merges,“WHY service outsourcing organization exists”. By defining the nature of service outsourcing organization and analyzing its governance structure from the perspective of human capital and access theory, the core governance mechanism of service outsourcing is concluded, in which the contractors open up the access rights to critical resources to motivate the contractee to take corresponding specific investment in human capital. This governance model takes advantages in knowledge-human-intensive service transactions. It also explains the development of service outsourcing industry.However,“HOW service outsourcing organization operates”remains undiscovered. This paper explores the operation in the following areas, multitask incentives, decision-making mechanism, and knowledge sharing in service outsourcing.The innovation of this paper is mainly: (1)This paper proposes service outsourcing contract characteristics and governance model. Based on institutional economics transaction cost analysis and the comparing the institutional forms of market, firm and outsourcing, the nature of service outsourcing organization is defined as relational-contract-based bilateral governance.(2)This paper reveals the core mechanism of service outsourcing governance, and constructs incomplete contract model with asymmetric information in both static and dynamic aspects, which is based on the access rights and reputation mechanism. The core governance mechanism of service outsourcing is concluded, in which the contractors open up the access rights to critical resources to motivate the contractee to take corresponding specific investment in human capital. The model demonstrates that in one-off game (under static condition) service outsourcing organizations could reach suboptimal level of investment incentives, but could not archive social optimal investment incentives. The model also demonstrates that in repeated game (under dynamic condition) the equilibrium state, in which both sides could reach social optimization, could be achieved, under the effect of the reputation mechanism.(3)This paper established multitask incentive model in service outsourcing. Considering that service outsourcing is featured in multitask, low accountability and high relevancy, and defining the optimal contract design constraint condition, multitask incentive model is established, based on classic salary motivation model. The model also includes incentive mechanism design of different tasks.(4)This paper established decision-making model in service outsourcing. Since service outsourcing is marked by uncertainty, the risk estimates and third-party supervision fee is added to construct the decision-making model from the perspective of cost-benefit analysis. Considering to outsourcing decision-makers preferences, the model could provide an optimal decision scheme.(5)This paper established knowledge-sharing model in service outsourcing. The evolutionary-game model shows the internal mechanisms and dynamic evolution process of knowledge-sharing, and also points out the relation between evolution process, equilibrium point, pay-off matrix and parametric.更多还原