【作者】 杜胜；

【导师】 曹廷贵；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 金融学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 国际清算银行在《新巴塞尔协议》中,把市场约束与最低资本要求(可视为官方监管的代表)和银行的内部管理并列为银行业稳健的三大支柱,对于后二者大家都比较清楚,相对来说,市场约束对于我们还是一个比较新的概念。市场约束到底是什么?它与传统的官方监管和银行自身的内部控制有什么区别呢?为什么国际银行界如此重视它?传统的银行监管存在什么问题?为什么我国银行业在监管当局进一步加强监管后,大案、要案仍然层出不穷呢?市场约束能给银行业的稳健带来什么样的作用呢?正是带着这一系列的问题作者开始关注市场约束这个新颖的银行监管理念。在资料的收集和对市场约束的认识不断深入的过程中,作者发现在我国引入市场约束,能有效地弥补官方监管和银行内部控制管理的不足,降低我国银行业的风险,对提高我国银行业稳健性具有十分重要的意义。本文的研究思路:从国际银行业将市场约束与最低资本要求和内部管理并列为银行业稳健的三大支柱这个现实出发,从对市场约束的释义入手,通过对市场约束经济理论依据的阐述,解释为什么市场约束越来越受到各国银行监管者的重视,并在此基础之上对市场约束与官方监管和银行自身内部控制进行了深入的对比,得出只有三者相互结合,才能最大限度地降低银行的风险,取得比较好的监管效果的结论。随后本文对市场约束发挥作用的机制、市场约束给银行带来的具体作用以及它发挥作用必须具备的基本条件做了比较完整的阐述。巴塞尔委员会是推动市场约束在银行业监管实践中运用与发展的主要力量,新西兰是世界上第一个比较完全意义上采用市场约束来进行银行监管的国家,因而本文在前一部分理论阐述的基础之上,考察了市场约束在新西兰、美国、新加坡银行业监管中的实践情况,并对目前实践情况的争议做出了自己的评价。最后本文探讨了市场约束在我国这样一个发展中国家的银行监管中是否具有必要性、可行性以及存在的难点进行了逐一分析,并对构建我国银行市场约束体系,利用市场约束力量来加强银行业监管提出了几条建议。本文共分六章。第一章为前言,主要对本论文的选题背景和意义进行了阐述,并进行了相关研究的文献回顾,包括市场约束的理论研究综述和实证研究综述。最后对论文的主要结构、研究方法和创新做出了阐述。第二章为市场约束的概述,分为四节。第一节在对市场约束的定义进行综述的基础上,给出了自己的定义,并指出市场约束的产生是由于目前的官方监管存在着许多不足之处。第二节从经济学角度对市场约束的理论依据进行了分析,阐述官方监管存在缺陷的情况下银行信息披露和市场约束的重要性。第三和第四节主要探讨了市场约束与官方监管和内部控制的关系。第三章为银行业市场约束的机制、功能和有效性的条件分析,分为三节。第一节讨论了股权人、债权人、客户制约和银行业自律的作用机制。第二节阐述了银行业市场约束的功能。第三节分析了有效的银行业市场约束所需具备的条件。第四章为国际银行业市场约束的进展和实践,分为三节。第一节回顾了巴塞尔委员会关于推动市场约束的进程。第二节比较分析了市场约束在新西兰、美国和新加坡的实践。第三节在对国际银行业市场约束进行评价的基础上,指出国际银行业市场约束实践对我国的启示。第五章为中国银行业监管中引入市场约束的现实情况分析,分为三节。第一节分析了中国银行业引入市场约束的必要性。第二节对中国银行业引入市场约束的可行性进行了研究。第三节阐明了中国银行业引入市场约束的难点。第六章为中国银行业市场约束体系的构建,分为三节。第一节分析了如何建立一个行之有效的完善的信息披露制度,以促进市场约束体系的构建。第二节阐明了中国银行业市场约束体系的构建必须完善的市场经济基础性条件。第三节指出强化市场约束作用,需要监管机构观念和职能有所转变。更多还原

【Abstract】 The ability of market forces to supervise banking firms has become an important policy problem as banking firms evolve within increasingly global financial markets. The Basel Committee has expressed growing interest in the use of market-related to supplement their traditional methods of supervising banking firms. In 2001 according to the comment of The New Basel Capital Accord, The Committee has put forward that minimum capital standards (Pillar 1) and the supervisory review process (Pillar 2) and market discipline(pillar 3) can promote safety and soundness in banks and financial systems. Market discipline imposes strong incentives on banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound and efficient manner, including an incentive to maintain a strong capital base as a cushion against potential future losses arising from risk exposures. So it is crucial to the safety of bank systems.In the first chapter, the paper introduces the background of writing and reviews the research relative to market discipline. In addition, this chapter points out the structure and research method of the paper.In the second and the third chapter, the paper gives a definition of the market discipline. Market discipline is a process in which the creditors and owners of a bank or other related-beneficiaries will transfer their deposits from an unsound bank to a sound bank or sell their owned equity of unsound bank based on the information disclosure from the bank, the account office, the law office and the credit agencies etc. By doing so, the bank will be forced to run soundly, or it will be drop out of the market. The traditional government supervision shows serious flaws in that its strict and overall regulations subdue the development of banks and this leads to the emergence of market discipline. In addition, the paper elaborate on the content of market discipline. First, some preconditions must be met to maximize the effect of market discipline, including perfect information disclosure, limited safety net, the strict market-dropout policy and good banking environment, etc. Of course, sound macroeconomic circumstance is the first premise of efficient market discipline to achieve its goals by means of actions form a single bank. If the bank system encounters problems, the function of market discipline will fall into trouble. Not surprisingly, as for the government supervision and market discipline, each type of supervision has some comparative advantages, thus it is difficult to choose one system over the other on the basis of the theory alone. Government agents probably have a cost advantage over multiple private analysts, and their access to inside information about firm condition may be superior for two reasons: examiners can force managers to reveal information, and a single government agency does not suffer from free-rider problems associated with many fragmented stakeholders. These government advantages may be partially offset by government constraints which make it difficult to pay competitive market wages. In addition, regulator’s incentives to identify and remedy problems promptly have been questioned. When it comes to the discipline of banks, government agents operate under rigid procedural constraints designed to ensure that all regulated institutions are treated fairly. These procedures often slow the imposition of corrective measures, even when problems have been accurately identified. By the contrary, the market is not expected to be fair treated-at least not to the same extent. Market disciplinary forces can therefore take effect rapidly, only if the government safety net does not mute market incentives to act quickly when a problem is first recognized.In the fourth chapter, the paper discusses the practice of market discipline in developed countries and this progress of it promoted by The Basel Committee. The Basel Committee is the most important force to encourage market discipline. In Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (SEP, 1997), it is pointed out that effective market discipline is the preconditions for effective banking supervision. An effective system of banking supervision will assign clear responsibilities and objectives to each agency involved in the supervision of banking organizations. Each such agency should possess operational independence and adequate resources. Arrangements for sharing information between supervisors and protecting the confidentiality of such information should be in place. In Enhancing Bank Transparency (SEP, 1998), this report discusses the role of information in effective market discipline and effective banking supervision. The paper recommends that banks, in their financial reports and other disclosures to the public, provide timely information which facilitates market participants’ assessment of them. It identifies the following six broad categories of information, each of which should be addressed in clear terms and appropriate detail to help achieve a satisfactory level of bank transparency: financial performance, financial position, risk management strategies and practices, risk exposures accounting policies, and basic business, management and corporate governance information. In New Basel Capital Accord, it identifies that market discipline is one of three pillars to protect the stability of banks. Market discipline has the potential to reinforce minimum capital standards (Pillar 1) and the supervisory review process (Pillar 2), and thus promote safety and soundness in banks and financial systems. Market discipline imposes strong incentives on banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound and efficient manner, including an incentive to maintain a strong capital base as a cushion against potential future losses arising from risk exposures. NEW ZEALAND is the first country to enforce the market discipline in regulating the banks. AMERICA and SINGAPORE are also good patterns of market discipline. These countries make some progress in practice but at the same time incur some criticisms, so there are still some points deserving further discussion.The fifth chapter and the sixth chapter are difficult to deal in the whole paper because there are few materials on market discipline at present in China and it is an arduous work to enhance the overall effect of market discipline in Chinese banking supervision. However, the construction of market discipline mechanism is an issue that must be confronted regardless of arduous difficulties in our country. The government supervision and the interior management of banks have many defects which create preconditions for the market discipline. So we must create conditions actively in order to avoid exterior costs stemmed from the action of market discipline. We need to deepen the reformation of commercial banks, establish the perfect corporate governance and information disclosure system in banks. And we also need to abolish the potential deposit insured system, persist on the principle of limited safety net, strict the market-dropout policy and establish the credit agency system.The main contribution of this paper is that it first elaborates on the relation among the government supervision, market discipline and the interior management. It also puts forward the viewpoints about the discussion of the practice of market discipline and furthermore provides some valuable areas in the forthcoming discussion.更多还原