【作者】 冉戎；

【导师】 刘星；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 控制权私有收益问题一直是公司财务领域的重要研究课题之一,可谓成果累累。获得控制权私有收益是公司的控股股东控制公司的主要动机。受该动机驱使,公司大股东所做出的决策和行动,很可能不会再以公司价值最大化目标或者各利益相关方目标来作为标准。自上世纪九十年代以来,随着公司治理研究逐步深入以及古典经济学中股东同质性假设的突破,集中型所有权结构下,直接或间接拥有公司控制权的大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突逐步成为公司治理领域的核心问题之一。因此,由大股东对控制权私有收益的追求动机、形成与分配对公司财务政策的影响,随着公司治理核心问题的转移,开始受到越来越多的关注。从控制权私有收益的度量及其影响因素出发,刻画控制性股东对中小股东利益的侵占问题,一直是上述领域研究的重要线索。但是沿着现有的研究思路,却无法合理解释现实中的一些与控制权私有收益相关的现象,由此预示对控制权私有收益的研究有进一步的深入与细化的必要。若能够更加深入地认识这些现象,并提供合理的解释,对于进一步理解大股东获取控制权私有收益行为,以及由大股东对控制权私有收益的追求而产生的非效率决策行为(尤其是非效率投资行为),及其对公司价值的影响,对推动我国公司治理的完善与发展具有积极意义。本文将研究的目标定位于我国转型经济背景下,对控制权私有收益性质及其对上市公司投资行为影响的进一步思考,探讨控制权私有收益的双重属性以及大股东对控制权私有收益的追求、形成与分配对公司投资的影响机理,并进一步洞悉控制权悖论迷雾。本文在充分借鉴国内外控制权私有收益最新研究成果的基础上,立足于我国上市公司特有的股权结构安排、控制权结构特征,从委托代理理论与公司治理理论相融合的分析方法和框架,以探讨部分控制权私有收益的合理性为切入点,从理论推导和实证检验两个方面,对控制权私有收益的合理性及其对公司价值和公司决策的影响进行了系统、深入地研究。在系统梳理相关文献资料的基础上,本文首先构建控制权私有收益行为分析的理论框架,以控制权私有收益可持续性与控制权成本补偿为基本假说,对控制权私有收益的合理性进行了理论探讨,并对控制权私有收益进行了细分。在此基础上,分别采用实证检验和实物期权方法,对我国上市公司控制权私有收益对公司价值和公司决策的影响进行了深入研究。主要包括三部分内容:第一部分用我国上市公司数据,对合理控制权私有收益和超额控制权私有收益的存在性,以及对公司价值的影响进行了实证研究,得出合理控制权私有收益对公司价值有正向影响,超额控制权私有收益对公司价值有负向影响的结论。第二部分,对合理控制权私有收益和超额控制权私有收益对公司非效率投资行为的影响进行了实证检验,得出合理控制权私有收益不会驱动公司非效率投资行为,超额控制权私有收益会驱动公司非效率投资行为的结论。第三部分,采用实物期权方法,从成长期权视角,以控制权私有收益可持续性与控制权成本补偿为基本假说,研究了大股东在权衡攫取部分控制权私有收益时,对公司投资时机选择的影响,以及对公司价值的影响。并发现,只攫取部分控制权私有收益时,大股东会产生延迟投资行为,但成长期权对该行为有缓解作用,同时公司价值上升,控制权私有收益在其中扮演了激励角色。本文的特色与创新主要体现在以下几个方面:①本文的理论研究发现,大股东对控制权私有收益的追求并不一定带来公司价值的贬损,当控制性股东获取的控制权私有收益属于合理控制权私有收益时,反而可能有利于公司价值的增加。而超额控制权私有收益的存在会损害公司价值,损害中小股东及利益相关者的利益。所以,应该区分控制权私有收益的类别和作用,不能一概论之,承认控制权私有收益的存在的也有积极意义,这为学术界对控制权私有收益的认识提供了新的视角。②在中国转型经济背景下,提供了中国市场存在超额控制权私有收益与合理控制权私有收益的经验证据;提供了合理控制权对公司价值具有正向激励效应,超额控制权私有收益对公司具有负面的影响的经验证据;同时,从合理控制权私有收益视角,在统一框架下对不同终极控制人的不同非效率投资行为进行了理论阐释与实证研究,从而为我国的资本市场建设与监管,以及股权分置改革的争论提供了有益视角。③通过实物期权方法,构建模型研究了大股东的投资时机选择,并从成长期权视角对大股东延迟投资行为进行了研究。研究同样发现,大股东对控制权私有收益的追求并不一定带来公司价值的贬损,部分控制权私有收益对大股东具有激励作用,为进一步开展对大股东非效率投资时机及其影响因素的研究,提供了有益思路。更多还原

【Abstract】 Private benefits of control have always been one of the most important research topics in the area of corporate finance. It had got brilliant achievements. Obtaining the private benefits of control is the main motivation for large shareholder to control the company. Driven by such motivation, the strategies and action made by large shareholders would not base upon the goal of company value or the stakeholders’anymore. As the gradually deepened research of corporate governance and the breakthrough of shareholder homogeneity hypotheses in classic economics, , the benefits conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders have increasingly become the major problem in the corporate governance research since the early 1990’s. .The motivation of pursuing private benefits of control by controlling shareholders, the development, and the impact that is distributed among the corporate financial policies, with the shift of central problem of corporate governance, has been paid more attention.From the perspective of degree of measurement of private benefits of control and its impact, characterizing the problem of entrenchment has always been the important evidence for the research stated above. Nevertheless, the issue of controlling shareholders and their private benefits of control emerged, and this phenomenon can not be given a reasonable explanation by following the current research perspectives. Thus, it is necessary to conduct further research on private benefits of control in more detail.If we could gain better knowledge on these phenomena and give the reasonable explanation, then it would be helpful to understand the behavior of private benefits of control pursued by large shareholder, the behavior of adopting strategies on inefficient finance that is resulted from pursuing controlling private benefits, and the impacts of these behaviors on the value of corporate. Consequently, the issue of corporate governance would be better understood and improved more effectively.This study centered on the issue of the property of private benefits and its influences on the investment behavior of listed company. The purpose of this study was to explore the double properties of private benefits of control, and the pursuing, the formation, and distribution of private benefits of control, as well as its influence on cooperate investment. Furthermore, this study was to seek the explanation on the paradoxes of private benefits of control.Firstly, the paper reviewed the current and past researcher in the fields systematically and constructed model to analyze the private benefits of control behavior, and fined different private benefits of control. Secondly, we studied the influence of private benefits of control on coporate value and coporate decisions with empirical and real options method. The main contents of the thesis are three parts: Part one, empirical research the existence of reasonable and excessive private benefits of control, and the influence on corporate value based on data from Chinese market and present the views that reasonable private benefits of control have positive effect on firm value and exceesive private benefits of control have negative effect on firm value. Part two, study the relationship between inefficient investment behavior and two kinds of private benefits of control and presented the results that excessive private benefits of contol simulated inefficient investment and reasonable privat benefits of control won’t. Part three; we study the the interrelationship between private benefits of control and corporate inefficient investment timing based on some hypothesis using real options method, and discussed the prompting effect of private benefits and the alleviating effect of growth options on inefficient investment.The creativities of this study are described as bellow:First, I found that the decrease of cooperate value are not always resulted from the pursuit of private benefits of control by large shareholder.. If large shareholders solely pursued reasonable private benefits of control, the company value would be increased appropriately. On the other hand if excessive private benefits of control were pursued by large shareholder, the company value would decrease, and the minority shareholders and stakeholders would suffer from the damage. So, we must distribute the private benefits of control into distinct catalogs, and treat them respectively. The existing private benefits of control may play an active role in company. This conclusion provides a new perspective for the future research.Secondly, with the situation of Chinese“Economies in Transformation”, I provided empirical evidences for the fact that reasonable and excessive private benefits of control in Chinese market, together with both the positive effect of reasonable private benefits of control and negative effect of excessive private benefits of control on company value, exist.. These data provided evidence in order to gain better understanding of the construction and supervision of Chinese capital market, as well as the hot debate about stock right that was decentralized allot revolution.The last point is that we further researched large shareholder’s decision of investment based on reasonable private benefits of control ideas, and go beyond the research on the alleviate effect of growth options on large shareholder’s underinvestment. This provided more significant perspective for further research about the factors that have influence the inefficient investment of large shareholder.更多还原