授权体制：改革时期政府间纵向关系研究

【作者】 薛立强；

【导师】 朱光磊；

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 ， 政治学理论， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 政府间纵向关系是一国内部不同层级的政府及其部门之间在垂直方向上的关系。中国的政府间纵向关系相当重要而复杂,改革以来,这一关系又经过了诸多变迁。当前,如何认识这一关系,如何推动这一关系更加科学化、合理化,不但是学界的研究热点,而且也是实践中重大而紧迫的问题。本文的目的在于对改革时期的政府间纵向关系做出一种阐释,并据此提出对这一关系进行改革的对策。中外学者对改革时期的政府间纵向关系进行了诸多研究,提出了大量的观点。本文在对其中的代表性观点进行述评的基础上,提出了一个由“结构性要素”、“体制性要素”、“调控性要素”组成的政府间纵向关系理论分析框架。根据这一框架,本文对典型国家的政府间纵向关系进行了横向的分析与比较,对中国改革之前和改革以来的政府间纵向关系进行了纵向的分析与比较。经过这些分析与比较,本文认为,改革时期的政府间纵向关系是一种中央政府和上级政府可以通过授权方式来调控其与地方政府和下级政府关系的“授权体制”。首先,集中型的结构性要素:政权力量强大,社会自主力量弱小;中国共产党“一条主线”贯穿到底;“一条船上的”立法机关、行政机关、司法机关;单一制国家结构,行政体地方政府。这些为中央政府向地方政府、上级政府向下级政府授权,并在一定情况下选择性集权提供了制度保证。其次,体制性要素上,五级政府之间形成复杂的条块关系;各级政府之间职责同构;实行分税制,财力上聚;有力的纵向监督体制。这些为授权提供了体制保证。再次,调控性要素上,为了发展经济,实现国家复兴,也为了改变权力高度集中的弊端,改革以来,中央政府向地方政府、上级政府向下级政府进行了大规模的、有控制的授权。其中,1978—1991年间,主要表现为中央政府向地方政府、上级政府向下级政府授权。1992年以来,为了适应构建社会主义市场经济体制的要求,在总体授权的前提下,中央政府和上级政府又进行了选择性集权。改革时期的授权体制表现为全面授权、倾斜授权、个别授权、选择性集权等形态。授权体制的运行要经过授权意愿的酝酿、请求授权意见的表达、授权对象的确定、特殊权力的授予等过程。改革时期,通过灵活地授权,授权体制有效地促进了经济发展和体制完善。但是,在三组要素上,这一体制仍然存在着严重的问题:调控性要素上授权不规范、体制性要素不协调、结构性要素不平衡。为了解决这些问题,本文提出了对授权体制改革的基本思路:通过制度化建设,提升授权体制的合理因素和适合国情的成份,克服授权体制的弊端,着力进行政府管理层面的改革;以构建政府间财力与公共服务职责相互匹配的体制为突破口,统筹推进三组要素的改革,变整体授权为有选择的分类分层次授权,推进选择性集权、适当授权和合理分权的有机结合,最终实现制度性分权。具体的政策建议为:近期应合理划分政府间公共服务职责,在此基础上实现财力与公共服务职责的合理匹配;中期应推进政府间纵向体制性要素的协调化,弱化授权,培育制度性分权;长期应实现政府间结构性要素的平衡化。更多还原

【Abstract】 Longitudinal intergovernmental relations are the vertical relations among various levels of government and its branches within one country. China’s longitudinal intergovernmental relations are very important and complicated, and since 1978, the relations have changed a lot. At present, how to understand these relations and how to make them more scientific and rational are not only the "hot spots" of the academic circle, but significant and pressing questions in practice. The purpose of this dissertation is to advance a new explanation for the longitudinal intergovernmental relations during the reform era and accordingly, to put forward some proposals for the further reform of these relations.Scholars in China and foreign countries have made a good deal of research on the longitudinal intergovernmental relations in the reform era and advanced numerous viewpoints. In this dissertation, the author reviews some typical viewpoints and on this basis advances a theoretical framework of longitudinal intergovernmental relations. This theoretical framework consists of three groups of elements: "the structure elements", "the system elements" and "the adjustment elements". According to this theoretical framework, the author analyses and compares the longitudinal intergovernmental relations among several typical countries and the longitudinal intergovernmental relations before and after 1978 in contemporary China. The analyses and comparisons show that the longitudinal intergovernmental relations during the reform era are an "authorization system", in which the central government and higher levels of government could adjust the longitudinal intergovernmental relations through "authorization". Firstly, as far as the centralized structure elements are concerned, the state power is strong and the social strength is weak; the Communist Party of China as "one main line" breakthroughs to all grass-roots units; the legislative organ, the administrative organ and the judicial organ "live in one boat"; the state is unitary and the local government is administrative. They provide institutional safeguards for the central government to authorize the local government and for higher levels of government to authorize the lower levels. Secondly, as for the system elements, the five levels of government form complex "Tiao-quai" relations; the responsibility of different levels of government is isomorphic; Tax-sharing system is exercised and revenue is gathered in higher levels of government; the longitudinal supervising system is powerful. They provide systematic safeguards for authorization. Thirdly, as far as the adjustment elements are concerned, in order not only to develop the economy and realize the rejuvenate of the country, but also to reform the malpractice of the high centralization of the state power, the central government has authorized much power to local government and higher levels of government to lower levels since the beginning of the reform. During 1978-1991, the main manifestation was that the central government authorized power to the local government and higher levels of government to lower levels. From 1992, in order to adapt to the socialist market economy, on the premise of collective authorization, the central government and higher levels of government also have executed selective recentralization of power.The conformation of the authorization system during the reform era is all-round authorization, inclined authorization, exceptional authorization, and selective recentralization of power. The running of the authorization system would pass through such processes as the brow of authorization aspiration, the expression of asking for authorization, selecting the authorization objects and awarding special power to some authorization objects. During the reform era, through flexible authorization, the authorization system accelerated the development of the economy and the well-establishment of the system. However, this system has serious issues, for instance, authorization is nonstandard in the adjustment elements, system elements are not matched and structure elements are not balanced. In order to ravel out these issues, the author presents a basic resolution in this dissertation, that is, to improve the components of the authorization system that are reasonable and adaptable to China and to overcome the malpractice of the authorization system through institutionalizing; to advance the reform of government management; to push the reform of three groups of elements by building a matching system between financial capacity and public services responsibility, to change the all-round authorization to selective authorization, to stimulate the combination of selective recentralization, felicitous authorization and rational decentralization of power, and ultimately to realize institutional decentralization. The policy proposals are as follows: in the short term, the public services responsibility at all levels of government should be compartmentalized and then rational allocation of financial capacity and public services responsibility should be realized; in the mid-term, harmonization of the system elements and weakening of the authorization should be realized and institutional decentralization should be cultivated; and in the long tem, balance of the structure elements should be realized.更多还原