【作者】 杨艳冰；

【导师】 杨赞；

【作者基本信息】 大连海事大学 ， 交通运输规划与管理， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 航运市场上的寡头垄断和不完全竞争行为,导致各集装箱港口在其发展中只考虑个体利益,追求个体利益的最大化;与此同时,由于港口企业具有规模经济效益,不断扩大港口规模成为大多数集装箱港口最重要的发展战略。但是,在一定时期内集装箱港口的需求是相对固定的,由此造成集装箱港口市场上供需之间的结构性矛盾。本文将从区域、网络的宏观角度,基于市场整体的竞争机制和市场均衡,研究集装箱港口竞争机制及政府宏观调控手段,从而优化区域范围内各集装箱港口的地位、吞吐能力以及整体网络布局,以使集装箱港口的规划建设获取最大的社会效益,实现社会资源的有效配置和利用。首先,本文对产业组织理论,即产业经济学的起源和发展,进行综述和总结。在此基础上对现代产业组织理论中关于竞争与垄断的研究及中国集装箱港口的发展态势进行系统分析,指出传统研究方法的局限与不足。其次,以市场竞争理论为基础,论证导致规模集中的驱动机理,分析集装箱港口市场上供需之间的结构性矛盾,并通过建立相应的模型系统,在集装箱港口市场寡头垄断的状况下,对港口企业的竞争策略与行为进行博弈均衡分析,发现港口企业可以充分利用完全信息下的博弈模式,根据各阶段的最优规模策略均衡解,获得最大效益。第三,基于p-选择模型,建立集装箱港口市场竞争力的指标体系和评价模型,并给出港口腹地的计算模型,改进原有算法中的缺陷,进行数值测试。测试结果表明,合理进行运输配置,将创造更大的社会效益,避免不必要的社会资源浪费。最后,基于经济学的相关理论,分析地方政府的参与行为对港口规模博弈的影响,提出集装箱港口规模决策的优化模型,并给出基于该优化模型的宏观调控问题的理论及应用框架,为国家相关部门决策提供参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 Oligarch monopoly and incomplete competition behavior in port network leads that each port department only considers its own benefit and maximizes it. Meanwhile, because of scale economic benefit, constantly enlarging port scale becomes the most important development strategy of majority of container ports. On the other hand, the demand of port market in a certain period is relatively fixed, so scale structure conflict of container port market is engendered. Based on market holistic competition mechanism and market equilibrium, in this paper, container port competition and government macro-control from the macro angle of region and network are investigated. An effective method is propoesed for the balance of self-operation for microcosmic market of port.In order to seek optimal network layout of port capacity, obtain maximal social benefit and realize rational allocation of social resources, an effective policy control is implemented via no over-interference but guide microcosmic market’s competition,In this dissertation, the author firstly summarizes the origin and development of industrial economics, makes a systematic exposition to the research methods about competition and monopoly in theory of industrial organization and the development situation of China’s container port, and points out the limitations and shortcomings of traditional research method. Second, the author demonstrates driving mechanism of inducing scale concentration based on rational market competition mechanism, analyzes structure illogicality of container port, and researches competitive strategy and behavier of port enterprises in the market of non-perfect competition under the definite assume conditions by establishing corresponding game models. The conclusions are, under the case of oligarch competition, port enterprises could make full use of game model under complete information, to obtain the maximum benefit according to the optimal strategies equilibrium solutions of scale game in each stage. Thirdly, we establish index system and evaluation model of container port competition power by utilizing analytic hierarchy process, calculate the probability of the city choose port and hinterland scope of node based on p-choice model in an area of covering with container ports network, improve the defects in original algorithm and make numerical test examples. At last, in order to to provide reference for government’s decision-making, we study the relationship between government macro-control and port scale construct game based on correlative theory of economics, put forward the conception of decision-making function, and present theory and application framework to quantify this macro-control question based on decision-making function.更多还原